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
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FILE No.

61/794

PART No.

2



PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

CLASSIFICATION.

**TOP SECRET**



SUBJECT

**GREATER MALAYA**  
**- POLICY -**

RELATED PAPERS

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	P/A	4/16									
	Mr. Griffiths	S									
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	Mr. Griffiths	Q									
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	P/A	4/16	6/8								
	Mr. Griffiths	B									
	Inspector	678	3/9								
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	Mr. Griffiths	25/9	3/9								
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A1209/79

1961/794 part 2



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NAS 1061 (NOV 1991)





A.T. Gough.  
PMD.  
POL 2/1

236

# TELEGRAM

British High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur  
From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1200 hours, 28th February, 1963.

Received: 1715 hours, 28th February, 1963.

PRESSE

TELEGRAM NO. 46      UNCLASSIFIED

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 350.  
Repeated Priority British Ambassadors Djakarta 77, Manila 57,  
Washington 45, (C.R.O. Please pass) British High Commissioner  
46 and Saving to Commissioner General Singapore 85, U.K.  
Commissioner for Singapore 63, British High Commissioner  
Wellington 25, British Mission New York 28 (Washington please  
pass) British High Commissioner Delhi 26, Governor Jesselton  
97, Kuching 99, High Commissioner Brunei 83.

TUNKU'S BROADCAST ON ANNUAL MUSLIM HOLIDAY (HARI RAYA)

FOLLOWING PASTING MONTH.

Text by bag.

Much of speech expresses Malayan peoples desire  
for peace and racial harmony at home but "No amount of  
subversion from <sup>within</sup> ~~within~~ can destroy peace of this country but  
when danger comes from without we trust God to protect us".

2. Tunku referred to traitors who "Took side of  
enemy and trying to start trouble in hope that foreign power  
can take over our country and destroy society in which we  
live". Ideologies were opposed Malayans parliamentary democracy  
the others communist and totalitarian law<sup>ful</sup> should fight the  
traitors wherever they meet them". "All young people will no  
doubt be called on to take up arms to defend their country  
along with our trained soldiers already in service of country".

HIGH COMMISSIONER.

4 MAR 1963

Copy to Defence



235

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

RB

I.5491

FROM:

DATED: 28TH FEBRUARY, 1963  
2040

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.

REC'D: 1ST MARCH, 1963  
1242

554. SECRET.



(CANBERRA PLEASE PASS KUALA LUMPUR, DJAKARTA, SINGAPORE,  
MANILA). COPIES U.N. NEW YORK, LONDON.

MALAYSIA.

FOLLOWING FROM MEMBER OF MALAYAN EMBASSY IN INFORMAL  
DISCUSSION ON 28TH FEBRUARY:-

(A) EMBASSY WAS DISAPPOINTED BY SENATOR MANSFIELD'S  
PUBLIC RECOMMENDATION (OUR 514) TO THE EFFECT THAT USA  
SHOULD NOT GIVE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO MALAYSIA.

EMBASSY HAD HAD NO GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN THIS REGARD  
BUT HAD HOPED FOR CONTINUED PUBLIC MORAL SUPPORT FROM UNITED  
STATES LEADERS.

MANSFIELD'S STATEMENT HAD TO SOME EXTENT REDUCED THE  
IMPACT OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MALAYSIA.

(B) THE POLEMIC EXCHANGE BETWEEN INDONESIAN AND MALAYAN  
LEADERS HAD TAPERED OFF.

HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO ASSUME THAT THE ATMOSPHERE  
WAS AT ALL PROPITIOUS FOR A MEETING INCLUDING THE TUNKU AND  
SUKARNO.

A PERSONAL SPARK BETWEEN THE TWO COULD DO UNFORESEEN  
DAMAGE.

MOREOVER, THE BASIC INDONESIAN TACTICAL AIM WAS TO DIVORCE  
THE BORNEO TERRITORIES FROM MALAYA.

(C) RUSK HAD EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE TO THE MALAYAN AMBASSADOR  
THAT THE PHILIPPINES WOULD NOT DISRUPT MALAYSIA.

ALTHOUGH THIS CONFIDENCE WAS ECHOED DOWN THE LINE IN  
THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE EMBASSY HAD BEEN OFFERED LITTLE  
REAL EVIDENCE IN SUBSTANTIATION.

ON THE CONTRARY THE BULK OF EVIDENCE POINTED TO CONTINUED  
INDONESIAN/PHILIPPINES COLLUSION.

(D) ATTITUDE OF THAILAND WAS WELCOME AND HELPFUL.

THAIS HAD SUPPORTED MALAYSIA USEFULLY IN MANILA AND HAD  
EARLIER TIPPED MALAYANS OFF THAT U.A.R. MIGHT PROVIDE TRAVEL  
DOCUMENTS TO ENABLE AZAHARI TO REACH NEW YORK.

(E) AZAHARI MIGHT NOT BE OF MUCH FURTHER USE TO INDONESIA  
IN COMMITTEE OF 24 OR ELSEWHERE UNLESS A NEW FLARE-UP  
WAS ENGINEERED IN BRUNEI.

..f2



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

RB

2.

I.5491

2. WE TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO BRING MALAYSIA TO BIRTH IN BEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE AND TO STRESS NEED FOR FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS IN BORNEO TERRITORIES OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR MALAYSIA.

3. NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO PROBE REGARDING RECENT QUADRIPARTITE TALKS OR POSSIBLE AUSTRALIAN POLICIES FOLLOWING FORMATION OF MALAYSIA.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'S.

1ST MARCH, 1963



CONFIDENTIAL

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1130 hours 27th February, 1963.

Received: 0900 hours 28th February, 1963.

ROUTINE

TELEGRAM NO. 370 CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed High Commissioners Canberra 370, Wellington 274,  
Kuala Lumpur 522.

Following is text of Foreign Office Telegram addressed to British  
Mission New York 809 of February 26th, repeated for information  
to Djakarta, Manila, Commissioner-General Singapore, Kuala Lumpur,  
Jesselton, Kuching, Brunei, Canberra, Wellington and Saving to  
Washington.

BEGINS:

C.R.O. Telegram No. 501 to Delhi.

NARASIMHAN'S VISIT TO LONDON

A full account of talks with Narasimhan will  
reach you separately. There is one point however to which he  
clearly attaches personal importance. He wants to return to  
South East Asia early next month and to continue what he himself  
describes as his "fact-finding Mission" by visiting first Manila  
~~and then Borneo Territories~~ and subsequently shuttling between  
Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur. Narasimhan appeared uncertain whether or  
not U Thant would approve this plan and suggested that the  
Secretary-General might be reluctant to appear to be intervening  
in the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia at a time when  
Malaysia was liable to be discussed by the Committee of 24. For  
this reason Narasimhan was anxious to obtain our support for his  
second journey.

2. You should accordingly tell U Thant at whatever  
moment you consider this most appropriate that we have been  
impressed by the value of Mr. Narasimhan's efforts to reduce

/tension

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

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TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

.. 2 ..

tension in South East Asia and should be happy if the Secretary-General thinks fit to see these continued on their present discreet and informal basis.

3. We are consulting the local authorities regarding Mr. Narasimhan's wish to visit the Borneo Territories on the same fact-finding basis and will let you know their reactions as soon as possible. Meanwhile it would be inappropriate to mention the Borneo Section of the visit to U Thant and if it is feasible to do so you may wish to postpone action in paragraph 2 above until replies are received. ENDS.

SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

ED.

I.5301.

DATED. 27TH FEBRUARY, 1963.  
1855.  
REC'D. 28TH FEBRUARY, 1963.  
0500.

FROM.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

927. SECRET.



REPEATED SAVING WASHINGTON EX NEW YORK (UN), EX DJAKARTA,  
KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, MANILA.

FROM EXTERNAL.

MALAYSIA.

CABLE (FOREIGN OFFICE) HAS TOLD US THAT NARASIMHAN MADE  
AN ENCOURAGING IMPRESSION OF COMPETENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY  
IN HIS TALKS HERE AND BRITISH ARE FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT HIS  
INFLUENCE WILL BE A HELPFUL ONE.

HE CANVASSED THREE MAIN PROPOSALS -

A. THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD IN SARAWAK AND NORTH  
BORNEO ON THE MALAYSIA ISSUE BEFORE 31ST AUGUST.

B. THAT INDONESIAN/MALAYAN AGREEMENT BE SOUGHT ON THE  
FOLLOWING SIX MEASURES FOR REDUCING TENSION -

(I) THE RESUMPTION OF HEAD-OF-MISSION REPRESENTATION.

(II) JOINT NAVAL PATROLS TO PREVENT SMUGGLING.

(III) ABANDONMENT OF THE WAR OF WORDS.

(IV) A MALAYAN ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SUPPORT  
FOR SUMATRAN DISSIDENTS.

(V) THE MALAYANS TO RESTRAIN THE ACTIVITIES OF SUMITRO  
AND OTHER REBEL REFUGEES AND THE INDONESIANS TO SIMILARLY  
RESTRAIN THE ACTIVITIES OF AZAHARI.

(VI) AN INDONESIAN DECLARATION THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTIONS  
AGAINST THE BORNEO TERRITORIES.

C. THAT NARASIMHAN AFTER REPORTING TO U THANT SHOULD  
MAKE A FURTHER FACT-FINDING TOUR OF THE AREA INCLUDING THE  
BORNEO TERRITORIES.

2. REGARDING 'A' ABOVE NARASIMHAN SAID HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING A  
PLEBISCITE.

2...



# INWARD CABLEGRAM

ED.

I.5301.

- 2 -

HE EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL VIEW (WHICH CABLE ASSUMES REFLECTS INDIAN BRIEFING) THAT THE BRITISH SHOULD NEVER HAVE EMBARKED ON PROCESS OF CONSULTATION BY COBBOLD COMMISSION, ELECTIONS, DEBATES IN LEGISLATURES ETC.

HE FELT HOWEVER THAT AS THEY HAD DECIDED ON A DEGREE OF POPULAR CONSULTATION RATHER THAN A SIMPLE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT TRANSFER THEY SHOULD TAKE THE FURTHER STEP OF SEEKING ENDORSEMENT OF THE PROPOSAL IN POPULAR ELECTIONS.

THIS WOULD HELP TO DISARM INDONESIAN CRITICISM.

BRITISH REPLIED THAT CONSULTATION ALREADY CARRIED OUT OR PLANNED ALREADY EXCEEDED ANYTHING INDONESIANS HAD DONE OR WERE LIKELY TO DO IN WEST IRIAN.

NARASIMHAN SAID HE HAD HIMSELF MADE THIS POINT IN DJAKARTA AND TOLD THE INDONESIANS THAT NORTH BORNEO WAS "MALAYA'S WEST IRIAN".

HE THOUGHT THIS HAD MADE AN IMPRESSION.

3. CABLE SAID THAT NARASIMHAN HAD BEEN TOLD THAT BRITISH COULD NOT ARRANGE SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN THE TERRITORIES IN TIME TO OBTAIN A POPULAR ENDORSEMENT BEFORE 31ST AUGUST AND THEY COULD NOT POSTPONE MALAYSIA DAY FOR THIS PURPOSE.

ELECTIONS WERE IN ANY CASE DUE IN SARAWAK IN JUNE. NARASIMHAN HAD IN MIND ELECTIONS IN BOTH TERRITORIES ON A WIDER FRANCHISE BUT WAS TOLD THAT ORGANISING THIS IN A BACKWARD JUNGLE TERRITORY WITH A LARGELY ILLITERATE ELECTORATE WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IN THE TIME AVAILABLE.

4. CONCERNING THE SIX POINTS LISTED UNDER 'B' IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE BRITISH TOLD NARASIMHAN THAT IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR THAT THESE MUST INVOLVE STRICT RECIPROCITY.

ON THIS SCORE BRITISH HAD SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT (II) THE JOINT NAVAL PATROLS, WHICH THEY FEEL WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSION BY THE MALAYANS.

CABLE EXPLAINED THAT (ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC WAS BETWEEN POINTS IN INDONESIA AND POINTS IN MALAYA) BRITISH DID NOT RECOGNISE ANY MALAYAN OBLIGATIONS TO STOP EVASION BY INDONESIANS OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT EXCISE REGULATIONS.

(WE EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT THIS MIGHT SEEM A RATHER DOG-IN-THE-MANGER ATTITUDE TO OUTSIDERS).

CABLE SAID THEY HAD PARTICULARLY STRESSED TO NARASIMHAN THAT POINT 111) MUST BE INTERPRETED AS A RECIPROCAL OBLIGATION.

THE INDONESIANS HAD STARTED THE WAR OF WORDS AND THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF PRESSING THE TUNKU TO EXERCISE A RESTRAINT WHICH WAS NOT REQUIRED OF THE INDONESIANS AS WELL.

CABLE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE TUNKU WAS HOT-TEMPERED AND HAD OVER-REACTED TO SASTROAMIDJOJO'S ORIGINAL ATTACK, AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT WE MUST ALL URGE HIM TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT.

BUT IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE RESTRAINT HAD TO BE ON BOTH SIDES.

3....



# TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1030 hours 27th February, 1963.

Received: 1500 hours 27th February, 1963.

## PRIORITY.

## TELEGRAM NUMBER 32, UNCLASSIFIED.

Addressed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 292  
Repeated British Ambassadors Manila 43, Djakarta 60, Bangkok 19,  
Washington 32, High Commissioner Canberra 32, United Kingdom  
Commissioner Singapore 49 Saving, Commissioner General Singapore  
66 Saving, High Commissioner Delhi 15 Saving, British Mission  
New York 19 Saving.

## CONFERENCE OF S.E. ASIAN STATES.

"Malayan Times" 18th February reports Tunku as saying in  
interview on the 17th at his house in Alor Star that he was  
prepared to take part in Round Table Conference of South East  
Asian leaders provided talks were initiated by "Third Party"  
neutral power which had nothing to gain.

2. On Indonesia Tunku said Soekarno was trying to "console"  
P.E.I. but latter would increase their power till they could take  
over country.

3. He denied allegations that Malaya was aiding with Malaysia  
to encircle Indonesia and said he did not (not) believe present  
strained relations would develop into armed conflict because  
"blood brothers" would not go to war with one another.

He "Reiterated Malaya's friendly policy towards Indonesia." He  
had some years ago invited Soekarno to Malaya but latter had taken  
two years even to reply. On common problems Indonesians had been  
"lukewarm" to holding of discussions.

HIGH COMMISSIONER



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# TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS, MALAYA.  
To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1030 hours 27th February, 1963.  
Received: 1500 hours 27th February, 1963.

## PRIORITY.

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Addressed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 292  
Repeated British Ambassadors Manila 43, Djakarta 60, Bangkok 19,  
Washington 32, High Commissioner Canberra 32, United Kingdom  
Commissioner Singapore 49 Saving, Commissioner General Singapore  
66 Saving, High Commissioner Delhi 15 Saving, British Mission  
New York 19 Saving.

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He "Reiterated Malaya's friendly policy towards Indonesia." He  
had some years ago invited Soekarno to Malaya but latter had taken  
two years even to reply. On common problems Indonesians had been  
"lukewarm" to holding of discussions.

HIGH COMMISSIONER.



COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE,

DOWNING STREET, S.W.1.

28th February, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL



You will be receiving by the same bag, our Saving telegram No.29 reporting what Mr. Narasimhan told us on Monday last about his talks in Kuala Lumpur. I enclose with this letter a copy of the Foreign Office record of his visit. This has been agreed with us and the Colonial Office.

2. As you will see, we think that three main points for consideration arise from our talks with Narasimhan:-

- (a) the presentation of our case at the United Nations;
- (b) the reduction of tension between Malaya and Indonesia;
- (c) a second tour of South East Asia by Narasimhan.

On (c) above, Narasimhan himself was clearly very keen, and he gave us to understand that the Malaysians also were anxious that he should go back. You will have seen from recent telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Office and New York, that we think Narasimhan can probably play a very useful personal role, that it is in our interests to keep him on our side, and that we should, therefore, encourage any tendency on U Thant's part to let Narasimhan continue his activities on their present "fact finding" basis. We have not yet decided whether it would be a good thing to let him visit the Borneo territories. The Governors and the High Commissioner in Brunei have been asked for their views on this point.

3. We are still considering Narasimhan's suggestions under (a) and (b) above. His ideas about plebiscites or additional United Nations supervised elections (i.e. (a) above) raise some fairly obvious practical difficulties. We do not for the sake of a presentational advantage wish to raise new hesitations and doubts in the minds of the Borneo peoples about our determination to achieve Malaysia by 31st August. On the other hand we think that some real progress in reducing tension between Malaya and Indonesia (i.e. (b) above) might well prove possible on the lines of Narasimhan's ideas without prejudice to the Malaysia programme.

4. We hope to have your further guidance for use in your discussions with the Tanu and Rasak shortly.

5. I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Nick Larnier in Canberra, Tony Harrison in Wellington and Mark Allen in New Delhi.

(A.A. GOLDS)

HIS EXCELLENCY SIR GEORGE TORY, K.C.M.G.,  
KUALA LUMPUR

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE. SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILITY.



## SOUTH-EAST ASIA

London, Visit of Mr. C.V. Narasimhan

February 25, 1963

Mr. Narasimhan, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs visited London for talks with H.M.G. on February 25. These discussions, which included visits to the Foreign Office and Colonial Office and a working lunch given by the Foreign Secretary, took place with Lord Lansdowne, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Sir John Martin, Mr. Wallace (Colonial Office), Mr. Golds (C.R.O.), Sir H. Caccia, Mr. A.D. Wilson, Mr. E.H. Peck and Mr. Cable (Foreign Office).

2. The following summary record isolates the points raised in discussion with Mr. Narasimhan under three broad heads:

- (A) Presentation of popular consultation of the Borneo peoples to the U.N.
- (B) Reduction of tension between Malaya and Indonesia.
- (C) Whether Mr. Narasimhan should pay a second visit to South-East Asia.

These are discussed below.

(A) Presentation of popular consultation of the Borneo peoples to the U.N.

3. Lord Lansdowne gave a full statement of the very careful and detailed steps which H.M.G. had taken to ascertain the will of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak and of the arrangements set out in the Report of the Inter-Governmental Council due to be published on February 27 (Mr. Narasimhan asked for a copy to be sent direct to him). This report would come before the legislatures of both territories; in Sarawak there would also be a general election in June which would be on the issue of Malaysia. Lord Lansdowne admitted the less satisfactory state of consultation in Brunei but expressed the hope that the Sultan, who had now decided in principle to join Malaysia, would find some satisfactory method of ascertaining the will of his people.

4. Mr. Narasimhan was left in no doubt of H.M.G.'s determination to press on with the formation of Malaysia and of the doubts which hesitation might raise in the mind of the Borneo peoples. He applauded this to the extent of giving his off-the-record view that it would all have been much less difficult if H.M.G. had steam-rolled the Borneo peoples into Malaysia with less consultation, and expressed his personal approval of the careful and conscientious measures

/taken



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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILITY.

taken and to be taken. He went on to say that H.M.G. had a legal right to press on with whatever they thought right and proper; but that in default of some form of U.N. supervised plebiscite or other generally approved form of consultation of the will of the people, H.M.G.'s own unilateral arrangements, excellent though they might be, would fail to convince either the Indonesians or the Filipinos that Malaysia was a genuinely wanted Federation; nor would they satisfy the U.N. Committee of 24, which was already in session, at the Special Session of the U.N. Assembly due to meet on May 14. Mr. Narasimhan admitted that a plebiscite in the three territories before Malaysia Day was impracticable and he had ascertained from Lee Kuan Yew that the Tunku would not consider it, while a post-Malaysia plebiscite, which the Tunku might accept, had other disadvantages from the U.N. point of view.

5. To meet these criticisms, Mr. Narasimhan suggested that H.M.G.

- (i) might request U.N. observers for the Sarawak elections in June (at H.M.G.'s expense);
- (ii) might organise elections on the Malaysia issue in North Borneo in July and request U.N. observers for these also;
- (iii) should then undertake to arrange for some form of popular consultation in Brunei in about one year's time.

These suggestions were noted. Mr. Narasimhan again emphasised that they were intended to improve H.M.G.'s public relations posture in the U.N. He added that the Indian Government were against any form of referendum, for fear of the precedent this might set for Kashmir.

#### (B) Reduction of Tension between Malaya and Indonesia

6. Mr. Narasimhan had had discussions with the Tunku and Tun Razak on the Malayan side and with Dr. Subandrio and General Nasution on the Indonesian side. He had found the Indonesians very distrustful not so much of the concept of Malaysia, as of Malayan intentions, either of annexing Sumatra or of allowing a Chinese Communist danger to develop in the Borneo Territories. President Sukarno had said he could cope with a "Peking outpost in Singapore", but failed to realise that this would mean for Malaya. Mr. Narasimhan had pointed out that the Borneo Territories were to Malaya what West Irian was to Indonesia - the unredeemed part of the colonial heritage. This argument seemed to appeal to the Indonesians, though the parallel is not an appropriate one to pursue in Britain.

7. Mr. Narasimhan had told the Malayan leaders that they were unwise to provoke, by ill-advised statements or actions, a very much larger neighbour, one of whose divisions was equal to the total Malayan forces. He suggested the following action

/which



which might be taken to reduce tension:

- (i) settlement of the dispute over the exchange of diplomatic representatives: i.e. the Malayan and to grant agreement to Djatikusumo and to instruct Kamaruddin to return to his post in Djakarta;
- (ii) organisation of joint Indonesian/Malayan naval patrols to curb smuggling in the Straits;
- (iii) a cease-fire on the war of words;
- (iv) the Malaysians to give an assurance that they had no intentions against Sumatra;
- (v) the Malaysians, while continuing to grant political asylum to the former Indonesian dissidents, to refrain from allowing them to become politically active;
- (vi) the Indonesians similarly to restrain Azahari and to re-affirm that they had no intentions against the Borneo Territories.

(C) Mr. Narasimhan's further visit to South-East Asia

8. Mr. Narasimhan said he would be reporting to U Thant on his return to New York. The question of a further visit to South-East Asia in March would then arise. Mr. Narasimhan thought that although U Thant would be reluctant to authorise any overt U.N. mediation while the issue of Malaysia was before the Committee of 24, he might be willing to send Mr. Narasimhan on a further fact-finding mission, in the course of which some private mediation between Indonesia and Malaya could be carried out. Mr. Narasimhan thought it would be helpful if Sir P. Dean could be instructed to support this idea with U Thant. If so, he would plan to visit Manila first (about March 8), then, if the Governors and High Commissioner agreed, call in at Jesselton, Brunei and Kuching. He would then visit Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta, each twice, in an attempt to iron out misunderstandings.

FOREIGN OFFICE,

February 26, 1963



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CONFIDENTIAL

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

TO: KUALA LUMPUR  
RPTD: CANBERRA  
WELLINGTON  
DELHI  
WASHINGTON  
BANGKOK  
COMMISSIONER GENERAL, SINGAPORE  
DJAKARTA  
U.K. MISSION, NEW YORK  
NORTH BORNEO } (SAVING) (VIA COLONIAL  
SARAWAK } OFFICE)  
BRUNEI }

(Dated 26th February, 1963)

No. 29 SAVING CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed Kuala Lumpur No. 29 Saving repeated  
Canberra No. 41 Saving Wellington No. 30 Saving, Delhi No. 52  
Saving and Saving to Washington, Bangkok, Commissioner  
General, Singapore, Djakarta, U.K. Mission New York, North  
Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei.

From Golds.

Your telegram No. 340.

MALAYSIA AND UNITED NATIONS

Following talks here with Narasimhan we hope to send  
you further guidance shortly for further discussions with  
Tunku. Meanwhile following is for your background  
information only.

2. Narasimhan had discussions with Lord Lansdowne and  
officials and lunch with Foreign Secretary. History of  
Malaysia negotiations and of processes of consultation in  
Borneo territories was explained at length. He assured us  
that he was personally pro-Malaysia and very pro-Malay.  
He was anxious to help in any way possible without delaying  
Malaysia programme.

3. He was sure that Malaysians regarded him as personal  
friend and he felt particularly close to Razak. In Kuala  
Lumpur however he had been worried to find Razak almost  
completely ignorant about facts of Indonesian attitude to  
Malaysia. He was certainly not so well informed as British  
Government. Until Narasimhan told him, Razak had not even  
known that Nasution as well as Sukarno opposed Malaysia  
because

- (a) Malaysia would have effect of ultimately legalising  
a Chinese take-over of North Borneo.
- (b) Tunku was expansionist and would want Sumatra next.
- (c) Tunku by his provocative statements had made it  
clear that he was enemy of Indonesia.

Narasimhan had explained to Nasution

- (a) the dangers of Singapore receiving separate  
independence if Malaysia did not happen;

(b)/

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-2-

- (b) the special immigration safeguards designed to prevent Chinese domination in Northern Borneo;
- (c) that if it was right for Indonesia to obtain West Irian it was right for Malaysia to obtain Northern Borneo;
- (d) if the Tunku's actions seemed provocative to Indonesians so did Indonesia actions to the Malaysians.

Narasimhan thought his arguments (particularly (c)) had made some useful impression on Nasution.

4. Narasimhan had advocated both in Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta the following ways of reducing Malayan/Indonesian tension and thought he had received an encouraging response in both places:-

- (a) A reciprocal truce to the war of words.
- (b) Reciprocal statements that neither would plot against the other.
- (c) Strict control over activities of political refugees in each territory especially Sumatrans in Malaya and Azahari and his followers in Indonesia.
- (d) Early appointment of good ambassadors in the two capitals.
- (e) Agreement to joint naval patrols to prevent incidents in connection with piracy and smuggling.

Narasimhan thought much useful progress could be made on these lines without prejudice to Malaysia. He thought much unnecessary acerbity had arisen as a result of delay in granting agreement to new Indonesian Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur. Ghazali had explained to Narasimhan that Malayan delay had simply been due to pressure of work on him. Meanwhile Kamaruddin was complaining unnecessarily about Indonesian attitude towards him. It could not be as bad as Pakistan treatment of Indian High Commissioner in Karachi. Kamaruddin should know this having served there.

5. Narasimhan urged that pre-Malaysia plebiscite in Borneo territories would effectively spike both Indonesian and Philippine guns. He admitted however that Indian Government with whom he had had private discussions in Delhi did not, for their own reasons, advocate our offering plebiscites. They thought we ought to concentrate on "West Irian precedent", legal case and evidence of legislative assemblies as reflecting popular will. Lee Kuan Yew had told Narasimhan in Singapore that it was no use asking Tunku to agree pre-Malaysia plebiscite. Most he might consider was offer to hold one some years after Malaysia on West Irian pattern. Narasimhan himself showed no desire to pursue this latter idea with us.

6. Narasimhan suggested that if pre-Malaysia plebiscite was out of question next best thing might be have fresh elections in North Borneo as well as Sarawak during course of summer before Malaysia Day. We might like to consider asking Secretary-General to send observers since this should make good impression in Committee of Twentyfour. Narasimhan

said/

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THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.  
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILITY.



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- 3 -

said he understood objections to plebiscites or additional elections (which we explained to him) but he clearly hoped that we should be able to think up ways of showing stronger evidence of popular support.

7. Narasimhan is now proceeding to New York where he will consider any further action including possibly his making another visit to South East Asia which he has been encouraged to believe by the Malaysians would be welcome to them. We shall be letting you know more about this.

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CONFIDENTIAL



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# TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1030 hours 26th February, 1963.

Received: 0800 hours 27th February, 1963.



SECRET

EXEMPTED FROM GDS 135 Unclassified

High Commissioners Canberra, Wellington, Delhi, Dar es Salaam,  
Freetown, N.135. Others airmail, repeated High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur.

Paragraph 5(D) of my N.423 Daving of  
10th August, 1962.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE TERMS FOR  
ENTRY INTO MALAYSIA OF NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK

Committee under Lord Lonsdowne's chairmanship has  
now completed its work and its report is to be published on  
February 27th in Malaya, the two Borneo Territories and London.

2. One copy each of report and summary will be sent  
you by first available bag (Canberra and Wellington only)  
spare copies will be sent to you for Commonwealth authorities  
(to all) further copies will follow when available.

SECRETARY OF STATE

27 FEB 1963  
Copy to Defence



FOR PRESS

219  
EMBARGO: Not to be published  
or broadcast before 6 p.m.  
Sunday 24th February, 1963.

AUSTRALIAN TO JOIN MALAYSIAN STUDY TEAM

(Statement by the Treasurer, The Rt. Hon. Harold Holt).

A prominent Australian business executive had been appointed Consulting Industrial Adviser to a Special Economic Mission provided by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will study industrial and economic problems of the proposed Malaysian Federation, the Treasurer, Mr. Harold Holt, said today.

The businessman is Mr. Arthur Wigan, Supply Manager and Director of General Motors Holdens Pty. Ltd.,

The Bank's appointment of Mr. Wigan followed an Australian Government request to G.M.H., when the Governments of Malaya and Singapore indicated to the International Bank of Reconstruction & Development, the desirability of an Australian industrialist being included in the Mission to advise on the problems of industrial development which will face Malaysia.

Apart from Mr. Wigan's general commercial qualifications, he has wide knowledge of the problems involved in establishing and expanding industries - a knowledge acquired in the process of developing the complex of G.M.H., with its 4,000 local suppliers.

Mr. Holt said that G.M.H. was rendering a valuable international service by releasing Mr. Wigan from his duties for three months to take part in the Mission.

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

24th February, 1963.

12/63T



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MEH

I. 4994

FROM:

Dated: 23rd February, 1963  
1200

Rec'd: 23rd February, 1963  
1600

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

139. SECRET.

Repeated London 5, Washington 4, (Canberra please pass)  
Savigram Singapore.

From Critchley.

Malaysia.

Your 142, paragraph 8.

United Kingdom High Commission may have over-emphasised significance of Cabinet conflict over Malaysia to support case for briefing Tunku fully. Nevertheless, with the notable exception of Razak most members of Cabinet and particularly Dr. Ismail have been worried about Malaysia and particularly about what they regard as excessive concessions made to Borneo Territories, including "her generous" representation in Federal Parliament last week when the Inter-Governmental committee's report was being considered most Cabinet members opposed concessions which Razak had made, in particular on control of immigration into North Borneo. This conflict has now been settled and report will be published 27th February.

2. Dr. Ismail has been close to resigning several times over the internal security operation in Singapore and his present relations with Tunku appear to be uneasy.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (3027/1/2/3)  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

24th February, 1963



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

SRG

I. 4940/52

Dated: 22nd February, 1963  
2040

FROM:

Rec'd: 23rd February, 1963  
0817

Australian High Commissioner,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

138. SECRET.

Repeated Savingram Singapore.

From Critchley.

Malaysia:

Your 135.

I agree greater diplomatic effort should be made by Malaya (as well as United Kingdom) to explain and popularise Malaysia. This could include special Missions to United Nations and selected countries.

2. I believe suggestion in your paragraph 2 for "joint body" worth pursuing although it would be open to same criticism as Cobold Commission report and I doubt whether such organised demonstration will have much more effect in Committee of 24. Malaysia Solidarity Committee formed in Jesselton last week by representatives from all territories has provided for tangible evidence of unity and pro-Malaysia attitude of territories in face of external threat. If Narasimham makes proposed fact-finding visit to Borneo there could be advantage in "joint body", that you suggest meeting while he is in area but I believe it could be dangerous to seek United Nations observation.

3. I would have thought most persuasive argument with Afro-Asians is that vestiges of British Colonialism are being removed. Territories with common administrative background and close economic, political and strategic ties are uniting in independence on terms that not only guarantee constitutional reforms (free elections with universal suffrage within 10 years) but also provide Borneo territories with safeguards and much greater than proportional representation in Federal Parliament.

4. British High Commission consider Local Council elections in North Borneo which were fought mainly on Malaysia issue can be used to demonstrate public support. (Alliance controls every Local Council and there could possibly be some advantage in each one passing pro-Malaysian resolutions). In Sarawak, elections will be held in June with extended Franchise for new Council Negri with elected majority. This election will also, presumably, be fought on Malaysia issue and British expect majority for pro-Malaysia parties.

5. I understand representatives of all Borneo territories are to go to New York. If there is pressure for early hearing in Committee of 24, British hope pro-Malaysia representatives will secure postponement until after March 13th for debate of inter-Governmental report in Legislative Councils in which some will be



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

I. 4940/52

participating. Brunei is main problem and defence may have to rest on position of Sultan. British have considered winning over Azahari but are unenthusiastic and Malaysians have indicated to me that they could not trust him.

6. Both Malaysians and British are working on building up political groups in Brunei that will support Malaysia. They have in mind Hengaran Yusof and possibly Zaini. Latter is still in Hong Kong but has asked to return to Brunei even if it means detention.

7. After spending Hari Raya in Brunei Sultan will return for initialling of Heads of Agreement between Brunei and Malayan Governments. Agreement will be made public next week and at same time Sultan will announce termination of emergency and an amnesty for rebel detainees in terms that will indicate that these measures have been made possible because of confidence and security created by Malaysia. United Kingdom and Malaysians are also urging Sultan to announce foreshadowed establishment of fully representative institutions. Meanwhile Legislative and Executive Councils will be re-established and former will include wide representation of different groups in country.

8. No mention is to be made of date of Brunei's entry into Malaysia to give flexibility in meeting any criticisms in Committee of 24 about absence of popular consultation.

9. United Kingdom High Commission (Tory and Mills) have explained current efforts to mollify Philippines and Indonesia. On Philippines, United Kingdom is encouraging meeting between Tunku and Macapagal and implementation of Razak's proposals contained in my 132. British here discount Pilcher's suggestion that Malaysia might be brought into S.E.A.T.O. to satisfy Philippines concern about security.

10. With Indonesia, British expect continued hostility but are considering urging the Tunku to make public statement to effect that he wants to ease tension and that to start with he is imposing moratorium on war of words and hopes Indonesia will follow it. British are also urging early Malayan Agreement to appointment of Djatikusomo as Ambassador to Malaya and to appointment of new Malayan Ambassador to Djakarta.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (3027/1/2/3)  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

23rd February, 1963



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM



MEH

I. 4934

FROM:

Dated: 22nd February, 1963  
1939

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE.

Rec'd: 23rd February, 1963  
0120

116. SECRET.

Repeated Kuala Lumpur 14.

Possible Disturbances in Malaya and Singapore.

British have secret report of decision of Socialist Front and P.M.I.P. to promote anti-government and anti-Malaysian disturbances in Malaya and Singapore in week beginning 25th February. (Hari Raya). Disturbances would be confined at first to Malaysians only with Chinese supporting from behind.

2. Reliability of report and likelihood of decision being implemented are now being assessed.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

23rd February, 1963



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

MEH

I. 4902

FROM:

Dated: 22nd February, 1963  
1938

Rec'd: 23rd February, 1963  
0058

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE

118. SECRET



Repeated Kuala Lumpur 15.

Your 136.

Malaysia.

Our impression here is that the British are now giving urgent attention to question of demonstrating popular support for Malaysia in Borneo territories although whether this will be adequate remains open to question. It also appears that differing of approaches of Foreign Office, C.R.O. and Colonial Office have not yet been reconciled.

2. Inter-Governmental agreements are scheduled to be published next week with view to consideration by legislative councils in North Borneo and Sarawak shortly afterwards. This would appear to allow no time for prior creation of joint body suggested in your paragraph 2.

3. However, the desirability of some form of popular consultation for North Borneo is recognised, particularly with view to enabling Philippines to get off the hook and possibly separating Philippines from Indonesia. Possibility is, therefore, being considered of Legislative Council also deciding to refer agreements to referendum for endorsement. Favourable result would be most likely and Governor is understood not to object.

4. For Sarawak the fact that Legislative Council has elective majority and has already unanimously endorsed Malaysia, plan is regarded as evidence of popular support. New elections are due in June in which Malaysia would inevitably be major issue. Outcome of possible referendum would be uncertain because of commanding position of S.U.P.P. which could easily reverse vote in council and oppose Malaysia. Governor is understood to regard referendum as unnecessary in view of approaching elections.

5. Brunei poses difficult dilemma. Sulon is due to announce heads of Agreement on Malaysia (probably next week) together with measures referred to in our memorandum 405.

...2/.



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

I. 4902

However, presence of British forces and strong likelihood of wrong result precluded early decision for popular consultation (Ø) major constitutional reforms leading to free elections. Main question is, therefore, whether Brunei should be brought into Malaysia on 31st August in advance of significant constitutional reforms and popular consultation, or whether entry should be deferred until basis has been laid for securing popular support. This could take considerable time and have effect on position in other two territories.

6. British appear hopeful that publication of Lansdowne report, together with evidence of popular support, which has already been expressed for Malaysia in North Borneo and Sarawak may be sufficient to justify case in United Nations. If not, they would have to pursue further question of plebiscites for North Borneo and Sarawak. An alternative possibility that has apparently been suggested was for a proposal to be put up (perhaps by U Thant) that territories should enter Malaysia on schedule but that plebiscites should be held within 5 years to finally determine allegiance. This would follow West New Guinea model and Philippines and Indonesia might find it difficult to oppose.

7. On the whole, we consider, having Singapore experience in view that properly presented plebiscites in North Borneo and Sarawak should produce correct answer. With regard to Brunei, British could perhaps continue to state that entry into Malaysia was for Sultan subject to British advice which would depend on evidence of solutions intention to introduce satisfactory constitutional reforms.

Flanagan.

(Ø could be "of" of "or" or  
"for")

MIN. & DEPT EA  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

23rd February, 1963



## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

SRG

O. 3619

Dated: 22nd February, 1963  
0100

TO:

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.....608.Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON...408.SECRET.      PRIORITY.

For Eastman.

Your 829.

1. Our main anxiety is to impress upon British the necessity for some form of popular endorsement of Malaysia by the Borneo territories. Your 830 certainly represents an advance although rather late in the day.
2. It is important that as many devices as possible of this kind should be used and you should, therefore, keep up the pressure in London. It is not of course, necessary to represent us as wedded to any particular solution but only to the general proposition that popular endorsement of Malaysia must be demonstrated as clearly as possible.

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MIN. & DEPT E.A. (3027/1/2/3)  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

23rd February, 1963



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# TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1730 hours 20th February, 1963  
Received: 0800 hours 21st February, 1963

PRESS

TELEGRAM NO. 36

Addressed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 304, repeated Routine Ambassadors Jakarta 65, Manila 47, Washington 36 (C.B.O. please pass Canberra 36 and Saving to Commissioner General Singapore 71, U.K. Commissioner Singapore 54, Governor Jesselton 82, High Commissioner Brunei 68, Governor Kuching 85, High Commissioner Wellington 18,) British Mission New York 23 (Washington please pass).

BRUNEI

Malayan Press reports arrival of Brunei Alliance political leaders on 19th February in Kuala Lumpur.

2. Haji Hasbollah bin Haji Daud President of Alliance said they had been assured by Sultan that they would have opportunity to make counter proposals on all terms and conditions on which Brunei would join Malaysia. Delegation expressed support for decision to join Malaysia for recent British intervention and condemned Azahari.

3. Haji Ghazali President Brunei P.A.P. reported as calling for election before State formally joins Malaysia. This would be appropriate since Brunei people had begun to regard Malaya as their friend and had started to support Malaysia concept.

HIGH COMMISSIONER

Copy to Defence 22 FEB 1963



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

EAP

I.4764

FROM

DATED 21ST FEBRUARY, 1963  
1512

REC'D 22ND FEBRUARY, 1963  
0115

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

843. SECRET.

REPEATED WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK.

PARAGRAPH 7 YOUR 590 AND PARAGRAPH 8 MY 829.

MALAYSIA.

PECK AND GOLDS TELL ME THAT MALAYAN REPRESENTATIVE  
NEW YORK HAS PUT TO TUNKU (AND BRITISH ARE SUPPORTING)  
PROPOSAL THAT HE SHOULD SEND "SALES" MISSION TO SELECTED  
AFRO-ASIAN CAPITALS AND SHOULD ALSO WRITE APPROPRIATELY TO  
PRIME MINISTERS OF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES.

(LATTER STEP WOULD OVERCOME DIFFICULTY THAT MALAYA IS NOT  
REPRESENTED IN AFRICAN MEMBER COUNTRIES).

BRITISH WILL ASSIST IN EXPOSITIONS BUT RECOGNISE THAT IN  
AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES MALAYAN APPROACH IS MORE LIKELY TO BE  
EFFECTIVE.

EASTMAN.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'S

22ND FEBRUARY, 1963

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SECRET



## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

AM

TO:

0.3610

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON...606 (For External).

Sent: 21st February, 1963  
1900

Repeated:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON...407

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK...122

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR...142



SECRET. PRIORITY.

For Eastman.

Malaysia.

British High Commission has sought our agreement to brief which Tory would use in Kuala Lumpur when informing the Tunku about the recent Washington talks (British Embassy Washington telegram 495 to London and British High Commission Kuala Lumpur telegram 275 to London refers). We understand that Harriman agrees with the proposed account of the talks but does not wish impression to be given that the United States is a sponsor of Malaysia. He also reacted against Tory's idea of presentation of a piece of paper to the Tunku preferring an oral briefing only.

2. We have in mind that both the British and ourselves will be continuing to speak separately to the Tunku. British for example have just been warning the Tunku against agreeing to a conference with Philippines and Indonesia before Malaysia and we are both currently speaking to him about the advantages of continued restraint in the face of Indonesian provocation.

3. We also wish to avoid giving Tunku the impression that nature of the West's support for Malaysia is such that he can assume our support on all aspects of the formation of Malaysia and his relations with neighbouring countries. Because of the delicate issues involved, it is important that he realise he cannot assume unqualified Western support.

4. While we agree with the United Kingdom warning to the Tunku about the dangers of a conference with the Philippines and Indonesia before Malaysia we want to have the question kept quite open of having a conference after Malaysia. We also see scope in the meantime for bilateral talks by the British not only with Manila but with Djakarta.



OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

AM

0.3670

2.

5. We expect early consultation with us by the United Kingdom on the role, if any, of the United Nations in the Malaysia question. Their coming talks with Narisimhan in London may provide useful background. While early United Nations intervention, even in the form of a representative of the Secretary-General, might be quite unacceptable, it seems unwise at this stage to close our eyes to what is inevitably going to be a growing United Nations interest. A flexible approach now might ensure that this interest is a helpful one.

6. For the rest we feel that the suggested briefing has been very largely covered by views expressed by us to the United Kingdom and the Tunku in the last few weeks and it should suffice if you would go over the main points again.

7. We agree that Tory's presentation should be in written form and assume that he will emphasise the highly delicate nature of the material to the Tunku.

For Kuala Lumpur.

8. Glad of your comments on recent British reports of growing Malayan Cabinet conflict over Malaysia.

9. With reference your 131 you will see from above that we are still prepared to explore possibilities for a constructive United Nations role in obtaining acceptability for Malaysia.

10. Your 134 paragraph 2. You may follow line in paragraph 4 above.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (3027/1/2/3)  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s.

22nd February, 1963



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CONFIDENTIAL

MALAYSIA: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

Since the outbreak of the Brunei revolt in early December, 1962, Indonesian and Philippines attitudes towards Malaysia have hardened appreciably. As a result of increasing Indonesian intransigence towards the Malaysia concept, Indonesian-Malayan relations have deteriorated sharply.

On 20th January, Dr. Subandrio announced that Indonesia would begin a policy of "confrontation" towards Malaya. Dr. Subandrio accused Malaya of being an accomplice of the "neo-colonialists" and "neo-imperialists" and accused her of pursuing a hostile policy towards Indonesia. Since Malaya was "neo-colonialist" rather than fully independent, Malaysia, in the view of Dr. Subandrio, would simply be an extension of "neo-colonialism". The Tunku and other Malayan leaders reacted sharply to Dr. Subandrio's accusations. It was claimed that the Indonesian Government was undemocratic and was heavily under the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party. Both countries withdrew their Ambassadors and early this month the Malayan Government announced that it intended to increase its defence forces. Although in recent weeks there has been a diminution in the bitter public exchanges between Indonesian and Malayan leaders, relations between the two countries remain at a low point.

Despite the strengthening in Indonesian opposition towards Malaysia there have been no signs yet of Indonesian infiltration into any of the Borneo territories. The Indonesian Army Commander, Major General Jani, has however said that volunteers are waiting the order to move into British Borneo. He emphasised, however, that the public should remain calm and should not take any action without first receiving orders from the government.

On 28th January talks were held in London between the British and Philippines Governments on matters affecting general security in the South East Asian region. It was clear beforehand that the central issue at the talks would be the Philippines' claim to unspecified parts of British North Borneo. In a public address on the eve of the London talks President Macapagal welcomed British agreement to discuss North Borneo but added that the Philippines claim would be pressed not only on the basis that the Philippines "juridical and historical rights" were superior to Malaya but also "in the vital interests of Philippines national security". President Macapagal spoke of Malaysia appearing to be "a continuation of colonialism based only on an expedient of false security", and added that in the event of Malaya succumbing to communism the Philippines would then have a communist territory on their immediate southern frontier. President Macapagal also urged that a referendum should be held in North Borneo supervised preferably by the United Nations.

In the event the Anglo-Philippines talks did not resolve the issues and no prospect of a compromise over the North Borneo claim emerged. Britain, however, offered the prospect of further discussions. At the

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National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1209, 1961/794 PART 2



CONFIDENTIAL

2.

talks the Philippines suggested a round table conference between Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, Britain and possibly Australia and New Zealand to discuss problems of "security and friendly relations" in the area. This proposal has since been made public by Vice President Pelaez, the Philippines Vice President and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Philippines delegation also devoted much time to advocating the concept of a greater Malaysia confederation including not only Malaya, Singapore, and the three British Borneo territories but also the Philippines. The British delegation expressed interest in this concept but stated that the present concept of Malaysia should come into being first and that much diplomatic activity would be required before the Philippines suggestion could make serious progress.

During the talks the Philippines delegation was unyielding in its opposition to Malaysia on the grounds that it would constitute a threat to the security of the Philippines. The Filipinos were also adamant that Indonesia must be consulted. Meanwhile in the Borneo territories leaders of the pro-Malaysia parties have sent an open letter to Sukarno and Macapagal requesting them to desist in anti-Malaysia meddling. On 18th February leaders of political parties in the three Borneo territories reaffirmed once again their unqualified support for Malaysia.

The British-Malayan inter-governmental committee formed under Lord Lansdowne to consider the detailed constitutional problems posed by the incorporation of the three Borneo territories in Malaysia has now completed its work and its recommendations are soon to be submitted to the North Borneo and Sarawak legislatures for consideration. (This committee is not concerned with Brunei whose entry into Malaysia is a matter for bilateral consultations between the Brunei and Malaysian Governments.) The inter-governmental committee is concerned primarily with the task of evolving a distribution of powers between the federal and state governments in such a way that the special interests of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak, especially in the fields of education, religion, immigration, language, representation in the federal parliament, position of the indigenous peoples and citizenship would be adequately safeguarded without prejudicing the capacity of the central government to develop a united federation. It is expected that the inter-governmental committee will also submit details of a transitional administrative period following the formal transfer of sovereignty to the Central Government.

The Sultan of Brunei is now in Kuala Lumpur for detailed discussions with the Malayan Government about Brunei's entry into Malaysia.

21st February, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

LJH.

I. 4725.

FROM:

DATED: 20TH FEBRUARY, 1963.  
1805.AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED  
NATIONS,  
NEW YORK.REC'D: 21ST FEBRUARY, 1963.  
2045.

UN. 236. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION, LONDON SAV. 163,  
OTTAWA SAV. 146.MALAYSIA.COMMONWEALTH MEETING HERE TODAY, CALLED AT THE REQUEST  
OF MALAYA, WAS DEVOTED TO THE SUBJECT OF MALAYSIA.

2. MALAYAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (ONG) OPENED BY  
RECALLING THAT THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS, AT THEIR  
MEETING LAST SEPTEMBER, HAD NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE GREAT  
PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MALAYSIA.

ONG OUTLINED THE MANIFESTATIONS OF POPULAR SUPPORT IN  
SINGAPORE AND THE BORNEO TERRITORIES FOR MALAYSIA, INCLUDING  
THE SINGAPORE REFERENDUM, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCILS  
IN SARAWAK AND NORTH BORNEO, EACH WITH ELECTIVE MAJORITIES.,  
THE ELECTORAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE FIVE POLITICAL PARTIES IN  
NORTH BORNEO WHICH SUPPORTED MALAYSIA AND WHICH RECENTLY  
WON 107 OF 110 SEATS, THE THREE OTHERS ELECTED ALSO BEING  
IN FAVOUR OF MALAYSIA., THE SUPPORT FOR MALAYSIA BY ALL  
POLITICAL PARTIES IN SARAWAK EXCEPT THE SUPP (AND EVEN IT HAD  
CONDEMNED AZAHARI'S ACTION).

IN BRUNEI, AZAHARI'S PARTY HAD WON ALL 16 ELECTIVE SEATS  
LAST SEPTEMBER AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WERE THUS OPEN TO  
HIM TO EXPRESS OPPOSITION TO MALAYSIA.

INSTEAD HE HAD UNEXPECTEDLY CHOSEN THE PATH OF REVOLT  
AND HAD PROCLAIMED A NEW STATE COVERING NOT JUST BRUNEI BUT  
ALSO SARAWAK AND NORTH BORNEO.

THIS HAD BEEN IMMEDIATELY SUPPORTED BY THE P.K.I. AND LATER  
THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT., AND AZAHARI HIMSELF HAD RECENTLY  
LEFT MANILA FOR DJAKARTA.

3. ONG SAID MALAYA WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY INDONESIA'S RECENT  
THREATS INSULTS BOTH PERSONAL AND NATIONAL, AND THE ANNOUNCED  
POLICY OF "CONFRONTATION".

ALL THIS WAS VERY RECENT EVEN THOUGH THE TUNKU HAD FIRST  
ANNOUNCED MALAYSIA AS LONG AGO AS MAY 1961.

MOREOVER IT WAS A COMPLETE CHANGE FROM SUBANDRIO'S  
STATEMENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN NOVEMBER 1961 WHEN HE  
WISHED MALAYSIA WELL.

INDONESIAN POLICY WAS ALL THE HARDER TO UNDERSTAND SINCE  
MALAYA HAD BENT OVER BACKWARDS TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS  
WITH "THE BIG BROTHER OF THE AREA".

MALAYA SHORTLY AFTER INDEPENDENCE HAD CONCLUDED A TREATY OF  
FRIENDSHIP WITH INDONESIA, HAD SUPPORTED INDONESIA OVER WEST  
IRIAN, AND DURING THE WEST IRIAN CRISIS HAD DENIED THE NETHERLANDS  
FACILITIES IN MALAYA FOR MILITARY USE.

...2/

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

I.4725

INDONESIA WAS RECEIVING NO ENCOURAGEMENT IN SARAWAK AND NORTH BORNEO, THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN EACH HAD RECENTLY SENT AN OPEN LETTER TO SUKARNO ASKING HIM TO LEAVE THEM ALONE.

4. UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (DEAN), IN A SHORT STATEMENT, EMPHASIZED THAT THE BRITISH, IN DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF MALAYSIA, HAD CONSULTED NOT ONLY MALAYA BUT ALSO THE LEADERS OF THE PEOPLE IN SINGAPORE AND THE BORNEO TERRITORIES.

HE POINTED OUT THAT MALAYSIA, WITH TEN MILLION PEOPLE, COULD NOT GENUINELY BE CONSIDERED A THREAT BY INDONESIA.

BRITAIN WAS ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE THE PROJECT, SO CAREFULLY WORKED OUT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

HE SAID INDONESIA'S REAL INTENTION SEEMED TO BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WEAK STATE, CONSISTING OF THE THREE BORNEO TERRITORIES, WHICH WOULD BE WIDE OPEN TO INDONESIAN INFLUENCE.

5. MAINLY BY MEANS OF ASKING QUESTIONS THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF NEW ZEALAND (CORNER) AND PAKISTAN (ZAFRULLA KHAN) DREW ATTENTION TO INCONSISTENCIES IN INDONESIA'S PUBLIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST MALAYSIA.

INDONESIA CLAIMED THAT MALAYSIA WAS AN IMPERIALIST PLOT DIRECTED AGAINST INDONESIA.

AT THE SAME TIME INDONESIA WAS CLAIMING THAT MALAYSIA WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE A RAMSHACKLE AND UNSTABLE FEDERATION EASILY SUSCEPTIBLE TO COMMUNIST CHINESE PENETRATION.

THESE ARGUMENTS WERE HARDLY COMPATIBLE.

MOREOVER TO ARGUE AGAINST MALAYSIA ON THE GROUNDS OF ITS LIKELY INSTABILITY OVERLOOKED THE UNDOUBTEDLY GREATER INSTABILITY WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM THE FORMATION OF A STATE COMPOSED SOLELY OF THE THREE WEAK BORNEO TERRITORIES.

CORNER ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER INDONESIA WAS BEING INFLUENCED BY THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING INSIDE THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.

6. PLIMSOLL SAID THAT SINGAPORE AND THE BORNEO TERRITORIES WERE ONE EXAMPLE OF A WIDESPREAD AND INCREASINGLY PRESSING PROBLEM IN CONNEXION WITH THE ENDING OF COLONIALISM NAMELY WHAT TO DO ABOUT NON SELF GOVERNING TERRITORIES TOO SMALL OR TOO WEAK TO STAND ON THEIR OWN LEGS.

ONE SOLUTION WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN TRIED WITH SOME SUCCESS IN AFRICA WAS TO JOIN BIGGER NEIGHBOURS.

THIS WAS THE SOLUTION OFFERED BY MALAYSIA.

AUSTRALIA SUPPORTED THE CONCEPTION OF MALAYSIA AS PROVIDING THE BEST ARRANGEMENT FOR THE PEOPLE DIRECTLY CONCERNED AND FOR THE GENERAL PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE AREA.

THERE WERE CLOSE AFFINITIES BETWEEN MALAYA AND THE TERRITORIES, RACIAL MIGRATION AND THE COMMON RECENT BRITISH CONNEXION AND BACKGROUND.

INDEPENDENCE AS SEPARATE INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES FOR SINGAPORE AND THE THREE OTHERS DID NOT MAKE SENSE.

BRUNEI FOR EXAMPLE, HAD ONLY 85,000 INHABITANTS.

7. PLIMSOLL CONTINUED THAT MALAYSIA HAD BEEN MOOTED FOR MANY YEARS AND YET IT WAS ONLY NOW THAT INDONESIA HAD RAISED OBJECTIONS. THEIR REASONS WERE PROBABLY MANY, BUT ONE COULD ONLY SPECULATE ON THEM.

NEVERTHELESS, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHERS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING AUSTRALIA AND NEW

...3/

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 3 -

I.4725

ZEALAND, HAD A LEGITIMATE POLITICAL INTEREST IN THE ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE FOR MALAYSIA (NOT AN INTEREST TO BE DEFINED LEGALLY BUT STILL SOME INTEREST).

IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT THE SETTLEMENT BE AS WIDELY ACCEPTABLE AS POSSIBLE IN THE REGION AND AMONG THE PEOPLE DIRECTLY CONCERNED, AND THAT THE METHOD OF ARRIVING AT A SOLUTION BE SEEN TO BE JUST.

IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE DIRECTLY CONCERNED WERE BEING REFLECTED.

IN THIS BRUNEI WAS CLEARLY THE DIFFICULT TERRITORY.

THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI HAD AN UNDOUBTED LEGAL RIGHT TO JOIN MALAYSIA BUT EFFORTS SHOULD BE PURSUED TO DEMONSTRATE POPULAR SUPPORT.

8. PLIMSOLL DEPLORED THE INDONESIAN VERBAL ATTACKS ON THE TUNKU AND ON MALAYA.

HOWEVER HE URGED THAT THOSE ATTACKED SHOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN ANY REPLIES THEY MIGHT MAKE.

PLIMSOLL SAID HE KNEW THAT IT NEEDED TWO SIDES TO GET COOPERATION AND THAT THE INDONESIANS WERE OFTEN DIFFICULT TO PIN DOWN TO ANYTHING PRECISE AND THAT THEY SOMETIMES TOOK PROVOCATIVE STANDS.

NEVERTHELESS NOTHING WAS TO BE GAINED FROM INCREASINGLY BITTER EXCHANGES.

IT WOULD ALL NEED VERY SKILFUL HANDLING BY MALAYA AND ITS FRIENDS AND RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF PROVOCATION.

OUR AIM SHOULD BE AN OUTCOME IN BOTH SUBSTANCE AND METHOD OF ACHIEVING IT WHICH WOULD HAVE THE ACQUIESCENCE IF NOT THE SUPPORT OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

PLIMSOLL CONCLUDED BY REPEATING THAT AUSTRALIA SUPPORTED THE CONCEPTION OF MALAYSIA,

9. THE NIGERIAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE "WISHED TO ASSOCIATE NIGERIA COMPLETELY WITH THE STATEMENT JUST MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA".

10. THERE WERE NO OTHER SPEAKERS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

22ND FEBRUARY, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

EAP

I.4718

FROM

DATED

20TH FEBRUARY, 1963

REC'D

1850

21ST FEBRUARY, 1963

1835

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

830. RESTRICTED.

REPEATED SAVINGRAMS WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK.

FROM EXTERNAL.

PARAGRAPH 6, MY 829.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RESOLUTION ON 18TH FEBRUARY OF  
CONFERENCE IN JESSELTON.

BEGINS...

"WHEREAS PEOPLES OF SABAH, BRUNEI, SARAWAK AND SINGAPORE  
OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO FORM  
THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA WITH THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA,  
WE, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF PRO-MALAYSIA POLITICAL PARTIES  
ELECTED BY THE PEOPLES OF THE FIVE TERRITORIES CONCERNED IN  
CONFERENCE IN JESSELTON ON 16TH AND 17TH FEBRUARY, 1963,  
HEREBY JOINTLY AND UNANIMOUSLY PROCLAIM:

1. OUR DEEP REGRET THAT INDONESIAN LEADERS HAVE EXPRESSED OPEN  
SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS IN BRUNEI AND OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE  
REBELLION,

2. OUR SUPPORT OF THE REJECTION BY THE PEOPLE OF SABAH OF  
THE PHILIPPINES CLAIM TO SABAH,

3. OUR DETERMINATION TO REALISE MALAYSIA BY 31ST AUGUST 1963,

4. OUR UNDIVIDED SUPPORT FOR SUCH POLICIES AS MAY BE NECESSARY  
TO SECURE THE SAFETY AND INTEGRITY OF THE FIVE TERRITORIES OF  
MALAYSIA FROM HOSTILE FORCES,

5. OUR INTENTION TO ESTABLISH MALAYSIA WHICH COVETS NO OTHER  
TERRITORIES AND WHICH WISHES TO LIVE IN PEACE AND PROSPERITY  
WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBOURS, AND TOWARDS THIS END WE CALL UPON THE  
NATIONS OF THE WORLD:-

(A) TO TAKE NOTE OF THE DANGER TO PEACE AND TO THE INTEGRITY  
OF MALAYSIA POSED BY THREATS OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, AND

(B) TO ENSURE THAT TEN MILLION PEOPLES OF MALAYSIA ARE  
LEFT IN PEACE TO DECIDE THEIR DESTINY ON THEIR OWN WITHOUT  
INTIMIDATION AND INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE."

ENDS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. 3027/1/2/3  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'S

22ND FEBRUARY, 1963

RESTRICTED





DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MT

I.4716

FROM:

DATED: 20TH FEBRUARY, 1963

1840

REC'D: 21ST FEBRUARY, 1963

1830

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

829. SECRET.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA, REPEATED WASHINGTON 64, NEW YORK  
(U.N.) 14, (CANBERRA PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY).

FROM EXTERNAL.

YOUR 590.

MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA.

I SPOKE AGAIN TO PECK AND ALSO DISCUSSED YOUR PROPOSALS WITH  
C.R.O. AT HEAD OF DEPARTMENT LEVEL (GOLDS) OWING TO ILLNESS OF TWO  
RELEVANT UNDER-SECRETARIES.

BOTH ACKNOWLEDGED THE OVERALL MESSAGE AS TO URGENT NEED  
FOR MAXIMUM EFFORT AND THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO WHAT WAS  
BEING DONE AND WHAT MORE IT WAS PROPOSED TO DO.

2. HE

2. REPRESENTATIONS TO TUNKU AWAIT YOUR CLEARANCE THROUGH OLIVER  
OF PROPOSED METHOD OF APPROACH.

3. REFERENCE YOUR PARAGRAPH 2 YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT SARAWAK  
COUNCIL CONTAINS MAJORITY OF MEMBERS DIRECTLY ELECTED ON ADULT SUFFRAGE  
AND THAT ALL PARTIES EXCEPT ONE FAVOUR MALAYSIA.

IN NORTH BORNEO THE COUNCIL STILL COMPRISES ONLY OFFICIAL  
AND NOMINATED MEMBERS; UNDER VERY RECENT ELECTORAL AMENDMENT  
HOWEVER ELECTIONS ON ADULT SUFFRAGE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT BODIES  
RETURNED OVER 85 PERCENT OF REPRESENTATIVES OF PRO-MALAYSIA  
PLATFORM; THESE BODIES ARE TO ACT AS ELECTORAL COLLEGE TO  
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL THUS ENSURING CONTINUING PRO-MALAYSIA  
MAJORITY THERE; IT IS HOPED TO PRESS ON URGENTLY WITH LATTER  
PROCEDURE BUT IN MEANTIME IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT  
PRACTICALLY ALL PRESENT NOMINATED MEMBERS ARE LEADERS OF  
PARTIES VICTORIOUS IN LOCAL ELECTIONS.

4. WITH REGARD TO BRUNEI GOLDS SAID C.R.O. COMMISSIONER GENERAL  
AND LOCAL BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES WERE WORKING HARD TO TRY TO  
DEVISE SOME RESPECTABLE SHOW OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MALAYSIA.

AZAHARI HAD IN FACT OFFERED HIMSELF FOR RE-SALE ON UNACCEPTABLE  
TERMS (YOUR PARAGRAPH 6) BUT BRITISH WERE INCLINED TO SHARE  
OSMENA'S RECENTLY PUBLISHED ASSESSMENT "AZAHARI IS A LIAR AND A  
BUM" AND THOUGHT IT BETTER TO LEAVE HIM AS A PROBABLE NOBILITY  
WITH THE INDONESIANS.

THEY HAD ALSO LOOKED AT BUT PASSED OVER REMNANTS OF HIS  
FOLLOWERS IN COUNCIL.

THEY WERE STILL SEARCHING FOR OTHER POSSIBLE LEADERS, THOUGH  
WITHOUT SUCCESS SO FAR.

ANOTHER POSSIBLE LINE WAS THE SULTAN, ON COMPLETION OF  
KUALA LUMPUR TALKS, WOULD CONVENE MEETING OF LEADERS OF VARIOUS  
FUNCTIONAL RACIAL AND SOCIAL GROUPS, PUT BEFORE THEM PROPOSED  
TERMS OF ENTRY AND GUARANTEES OF GENUINE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL  
PROGRESS WITHIN MALAYSIA, AND SEEK THEIR ENDORSEMENT.

...2/



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

I.4716

POSSIBILITY OF SUCH PROGRESS BEFORE MALAYSIA HAD NOT BEEN IGNORED BUT THIS WOULD BE TRICKY AND RATHER DANGEROUS EXERCISE AND SULTAN WAS NOT EASY TO MOVE FAST AND FAR.

ON BRUNEI PROBLEM GENERALLY GOLDS REPEATED PECK'S HOPE THAT MCINTOSH COULD GET IN QUICKLY AND GET THINGS MOVING.

5. IT WOULD THEREFORE TAKE AT LEAST SOME LITTLE TIME TO PRODUCE PLAUSIBLE AND DEPENDABLE "PUBLIC LEADERS" TO TAKE PART IN YOUR PROPOSED TRI-PARTITE CONFERENCE.

ON THAT BASIS YOUR DESIRE FOR SUCH CONFERENCE BEFORE RATIFICATION BY LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF DELAYING LATTER STEPS IN NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK WHERE, FOR REASONS IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, I SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT SUCH RATIFICATION WOULD HAVE SOME MEANING IN COMMITTEE OF 24.

6. FOR REASONS ABOVE I HAVE NOT YET FOUND ANY SALE FOR YOUR PROPOSED "CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY".

TO WHAT EXTENT IS YOUR REQUIREMENT ALREADY MET BY RESOLUTION ON 18TH FEBRUARY OF CONFERENCE IN JESSELTON OF PRO-MALAYSIA POLITICAL PARTIES OF MALAYA, SINGAPORE AND THREE BORNEO TERRITORIES? (TEXT IN MY 830).

7. WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR PARAGRAPH 4 PECK ASSURED ME THAT THEY WOULD KEEP PLUGGING AWAY AT INDONESIA AND PHILIPPINES.

SUBANDRIO'S REPLY TO HOME (PARAGRAPH 6 MY 802) WAS STILL AWAITED AND ANY OPENINGS WOULD BE FOLLOWED UP.

THOMAS' VISIT TO MANILA WILL NOT BE AS INCONSEQUENTIAL AS YOU SUGGEST.

AFTER PRELIMINARY TALKS IN MANILA DURING E.C.A.F.E. HE WILL DISCUSS LATEST FILIPINO ATTITUDE IN JESSELTON, SINGAPORE AND KUALA LUMPUR AND THEN RETURN TO MANILA FOR FURTHER QUITE SERIOUS TALKS WITH FILIPINOS.

8. REFERENCE YOUR PARAGRAPH 7 GOLDS SAID THAT MALAYAN REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK WAS BEING ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE AND BRITISH MISSION WAS ALSO DOING WHAT IT COULD.

I OMITTED TO ASK ABOUT ACTION IN AFRO-ASIAN CAPITALS BUT WILL FOLLOW THIS UP.

3-5. EASTMAN.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (3027/1/2/3)  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

22ND FEBRUARY, 1963

SECRET

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199

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

RB

I.4685

FROM:

DATED: 20TH FEBRUARY, 1963  
1855

REC'D: 21ST FEBRUARY, 1963  
1118

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.

475. SECRET.

(PLEASE PASS TO DJAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR).  
REPEATED LONDON 68, U.N. NEW YORK.

MALAYSIA.

CUTHELL (DEPUTY DIRECTOR SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AFFAIRS) WELCOMED YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO SHANN AND CRITCHLEY (YOUR 365 AND 372) WHEN WE INFORMED THEM OF THEM ON 20 FEBRUARY. WE ALSO GAVE CUTHELL A GENERAL INDICATION OF SUGGESTIONS YOU ARE PUTTING TO THE BRITISH (YOUR 369 AND 389) AND OF BRITISH REACTIONS SO FAR THERETO (LONDON'S 802 TO YOU). WE STRESSED AUSTRALIAN CONCERN THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO AVERT MALAYSIA BEING FACED AT THE OUTSET BY INDONESIAN AND ALSO PHILIPPINES HOSTILITY AND AUSTRALIAN CONCERN ABOUT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT MALAYSIA WAS POPULARLY ENDORSED IN THE THREE BORNEO TERRITORIES.

2. CUTHELL SHARED YOUR INTEREST IN NEED FOR POPULAR ENDORSEMENT SAYING THIS WAS CLEARLY THE CONSENSUS OF THE QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS.

HE CONSIDERED THAT ONE OBSTACLE TO SECURING FAST AND EFFECTIVE ACTION ALONG THESE LINES WAS THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM IN LONDON WHERE RESPONSIBILITY FELL BETWEEN THE FOREIGN OFFICE, C.R.O. AND COLONIAL OFFICE.

WHILE IN WASHINGTON, WARNER HAD ALLUDED TO THIS PROBLEM AND INDICATED THAT ON HIS RETURN TO LONDON HE WOULD WORK FOR THE CREATION OF A WHITEHALL 'TASK FORCE' ON MALAYSIA WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN CONTROL.

CUTHELL ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE TUNKU WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PERSUADED OF THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR MALAYSIA IN THE THREE BORNEO TERRITORIES.

SULLIVAN (UNITED NATIONS ADVISER TO HARRIMAN) LATER TOLD US THAT STATE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTOOD THE BRITISH HAD BEEN DISCUSSING IN JESSELTON THE PROBLEM OF DEMONSTRATING POPULAR ENDORSEMENT.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY PROBLEMS RELATED TO MALAYSIA WE TOLD CUTHELL OF YOUR SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS TO BRITISH IN PARA 1(G) OF YOUR 369.

CUTHELL COMMENTED THAT STATE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN PERTURBED TO LEARN PRIVATELY FROM WARNER IN WASHINGTON THAT BRITISH PLANNING OF DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MALAYSIA HAD NOT REALLY GOT OFF THE GROUND.

.. /2



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

RB

2.

1.4685

SECRET

CUTHELL SAID THAT IT WOULD CLEARLY BE DIFFICULT FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO COME TO GRIPS WITH MALAYSIA'S POSSIBLE DEFENCE NEEDS UNTIL THE BRITISH HAD THEMSELVES COME TO A FIRM AND WORKING ARRANGEMENT WITH THE TUNKU..  
HERE AGAIN, CUTHELL THOUGHT THAT THE TUNKU MIGHT BE DRAGGING THE ANCHOR SOMEWHAT.

4. CUTHELL SAID THERE WERE SOME ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT THE TUNKU AND MACAPAGAL MIGHT BE PREPARED TO BEGIN MENDING THEIR BRIDGES.

EACH HAD RECENTLY INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO TALK TO THE OTHER AND THE USA WAS QUIETLY ENCOURAGING THE HOLDING OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THEM., THE USA DID NOT WISH, HOWEVER, TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE IN THE MATTER, SINCE IT WOULD NOT RISK BUYING INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED OR BEING PLACED IN A POSITION TO SUGGEST AN AGENDA FOR CONSULTATIONS.

AT THE SAME TIME THANAT SEEMED TO BE WELL DISPOSED TO SEE MATTERS SETTLED BETWEEN MALAYA AND THE PHILIPPINES AND IF PROBLEMS AROSE IN A COMING TOGETHER OF THE TUNKU AND MACAPAGAL THE USA MIGHT ENCOURAGE THANAT TO SERVE AS A CATALYST.

5. WE ASKED CUTHELL WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF MALAYSIA (OUR SAV. 155).

CUTHELL SAID THE MALAYAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAD NATURALLY WELCOMED THE STATEMENT, THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY (HELMU) HAD WITH DUE PROPRIETY, CHECKED THE ACCURACY OF THE RECORD, AND MACAPAGAL, AFTER A DISPLAY OF SOME SENSITIVITY, HAD ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY WITH WHICH THE PHILIPPINES HAD BEEN WELL ACQUAINTED.

6. CUTHELL DID NOT RAISE QUESTION OF INFORMING CANADA OF THE QUADRIPARTITE TALKS (YOUR 379).

7. CUTHELL ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENT REGARDING THE SUGGESTION THAT CRITCHLEY MIGHT VISIT INDONESIA.

SECRET

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s.

21ST FEBRUARY, 1963

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

197

DW


I, 4677

FROM:

Dated: 20th February, 1963.  
1700

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

Rec'd: 21st February, 1963.  
0800



134. SECRET.

Addressed Canberra 134, repeated Djakarta 28,  
Manila 7, (Canberra please pass). Savingram  
Singapore.

From Critchley.

Malaysia.

My Savingram 9.

I am concerned about continued reports of proposed meeting  
of Malaya, Indonesia and Philippines to discuss Malaysia. Such  
a meeting could hardly fail to damage Federation's position.

- (A) It could give respectability to Philippines and Indonesian  
opposition to Malaysia.
- (B) It could encourage United Nations interest in Malaysia before  
August 31st.
- (C) Philippines and Indonesia would be bound to use conference  
to argue for postponement of Malaysia and Malaya's refusal  
could only worsen relations with the other two Governments.

2. Malaysians might find it difficult to refuse categorically  
to attend such a meeting but I should like your approval to encourage  
them to avoid it. A.S.A. meeting in Manila (my telegram 132 )  
could be useful in this respect.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.  
P.M's.

21st February, 1963.

*I would agree  
with this.  
RCS*

21 FEB 1963

*Mr. Bunting*  
*Waller*  
*Tackel informed @ 22/2/63*  
*Mr. GFB*  
*1. For information*  
*2. You may leave it to have the sufficient pass on to*  
*the P.M's comment*  
*2/2/63*



196

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1945 hours, 19th February, 1963.

Received: 0820 hours, 20th February, 1963.

PRESSTELEGRAM NO. 317

Addressed High Commissioners Canberra 317, Wellington 255.

Following is text of Manila telegram addressed Foreign Office 197 February 19th, repeated for information Singapore, Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok and Saving British Mission New York and Washington.

BEGINS.

Manila Press this morning reports that at a meeting yesterday at Department of Foreign Affairs Indonesian Ambassador had preliminary discussions with S.P. Lopez about proposal by Felaes (who has entered hospital) for Summit discussions on Malaysia. Countries who it is suggested should take part are Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines and (in a mediatory role) Thailand.

2. Leading members of Congress continue to make public statements supporting Summit proposal and deploring American support for Malaysia project which is condemned as denial of the "rights of small nations to self determination". Villaresal speaker of Lower House has however suggested that Britain and American be allowed to sit in on the proposed Conference as observers.

ENDS.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

Copy to Defence 21 FEB 1963



CONFIDENTIAL

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## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

CYPRER

Despatched 1715 hours 19th February, 1963

Received: 0730 " 20th February, 1963.



PRIORITY

TELEGRAM NO. 316 CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed British High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur 456  
repeated Canberra 316, Wellington 232, Djakarta, Commissioner  
General Singapore, New York Washington, Bangkok.

Manila Telegram 197 to Foreign Office (which we are  
repeating to Canberra and Wellington).

SOUTH EAST ASIAN CONFERENCE ON MALAYSIA.

Philippine and Indonesian purpose in proposing such  
a conference would presumably be to delay Malaysia. In any  
case Britain could scarcely accept conferences competence to  
decide future of territories for which <sup>Britain</sup> British is responsible.

2. We hope therefore that Malaysians will not indicate  
any willingness to agree to any such conference before Malaysia.  
If they felt there might be advantage in welcoming idea of  
holding a conference after Malaysia was established we should  
not object although we assume they would make it clear that  
Malaysia's territorial integrity would not be subject for  
discussion.

3. We fear that Malay would be in impossible position  
at any pre-Malaysia conference. They would be under heavy  
pressure to delay Malaysia and if they reacted vigorously against  
this would find their relations with Philippines/Indonesia  
worse than before.

4. Please at your discretion speak to Malaysians  
accordingly and report their reactions.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

Copy to Defence 21 FEB 1963

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

194

MT

I.4398

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

Dated: 18th February, 1963  
1455  
Rec'd: 18th February, 1963  
2045

122. UNCLASSIFIED.

Malaysia.

Today's "Malayan Times" headlines special interview with Tunku yesterday in Alor Star in which he is reported to have said he was prepared to participate in round table conference of Southeast Asian Leaders provided conference was initiated by a "third party neutral power" which had "nothing to gain from the outcome of conference".

Other points Tunku is reported to have made in interview are;

- (a) Indonesia's active confrontation policy was attempt by Government to "console" P.K.I.
- (b) Allegation that Malaya was forming Malaysia to encircle and isolate Indonesia was "untrue and impossible".
- (c) He did not believe present strained relations would develop into armed conflict because "blood brothers" would be most reluctant to fight one another.
- (d) He reiterated Malaya's desire for friendship towards Indonesia and stressed Malaya was sincere in this.
- (e) Several years ago he had invited President Soekarno to visit Malaya but latter had taken two years even to acknowledge invitation.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

19th February, 1963



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

193

EAP

I.4571

FROM

DATED 19TH FEBRUARY, 196

1835

REC'D 20TH FEBRUARY, 196

1935

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.



463. SECRET.

PLEASE PASS TO DJAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR, COPY TO U.N. NEW  
YORK (FOR PLIMSOLL)

MALAYSIA.

LEDWARD (BRITISH EMBASSY) TOLD US 18TH FEBRUARY THAT  
HARRIMAN HAD DISAGREED WITH A BRITISH SUGGESTION THAT THE  
JOINT ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIAN INTENTIONS PREPARED FOR LAST  
WEEK'S QUADRIPARTITE TALKS (OUR TELEGRAM 373) SHOULD BE  
SHOWN TO THE TUNKU.

(WE COMMENTED THAT THE ASSESSMENT HAD BEEN PREPARED AS A  
WORKING PAPER RATHER THAN AN ASSESSMENT AGREED BY GOVERNMENTS).

FOREIGN OFFICE HAD ACCEPTED HARRIMAN'S VIEW ALTHOUGH  
TORY WAS STILL PRESSING FOR AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF SOME  
KIND TO GIVE THE TUNKU WHEN INFORMING HIM OF THE OUTCOME  
OF THE WASHINGTON TALKS.

2. WITH REGARD TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR DIVISION  
OF POWERS BETWEEN THE BORNEO TERRITORIES AND KUALA LUMPUR,  
LEDWARD MENTIONED THAT BRITAIN WAS HAVING TROUBLE IN PERSUADING  
THE TUNKU TO ACCEPT ALL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE  
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

AS THE TUNKU'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT WOULD  
BE ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN IF HE FELT WESTERN SUPPORT  
FOR MALAYSIA TO BE A FOREGONE CONCLUSION UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES,  
BRITAIN WAS BEING CAREFUL NOT TO MAKE HIM OVERCONFIDENT ABOUT  
THIS.

3. LEDWARD ALSO REMARKED THAT THE TUNKU HAD SOME INTERNAL  
TROUBLES OF HIS OWN, AS SOME OF HIS CABINET MINISTERS  
SEEMED TO BE HAVING COLD FEET ABOUT THE MALAYSIA SCHEME.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'S

21ST FEBRUARY, 196



192

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

EAP

I.4539

FROM

DATED 19TH FEBRUARY, 1961  
1650  
REC'D 20TH FEBRUARY, 1961  
0255

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

802. SECRET.

REPEATED WASHINGTON (FOR BEALE) 58 U.N. NEW YORK (FOR  
PLIMSOLL) 11.

FROM EXTERNAL

MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA.

I DISCUSSED YOUR 558 WITH PECK (ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY)  
LATE YESTERDAY.

2. HE AGREED WITH YOUR POINTS (A) (B) (F) AND (H).

BRITISH THEMSELVES ARE APPROACHING TUNKU ON LINES VERY  
SIMILAR TO YOUR 556.

3. WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR POINTS (C) (D) AND (E) BRITISH  
PROPOSE TO PUBLISH LANSLOWNE REPORT WITHIN FEW DAYS AND TO HAVE  
IT TABLED FOR DEBATE IN NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK COUNCILS IN  
EARLY MARCH SO THAT COUNCILS FORMAL APPROVALS WILL BE ON RECORD  
BEFORE SUBJECT COULD BE REACHED IN COMMITTEE OF 24.

(SEE MY 702 PARA 1 AS TO CONDITIONAL APPROVALS WHICH COUNCILS  
PREVIOUSLY GAVE FOR ENTRY INTO MALAYSIA AND AS TO SUPPORT IMPLIED  
BY PARTICIPATION OF LEADERS IN LANSLOWNE INQUIRY AND REPORT).

DRAFTING OF FULL SET OF CONSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENTS MAY NOT  
BE COMPLETED UNTIL SOME TIME LATER (PERHAPS END OF APRIL).

PECK CONTENTED, HOWEVER, THAT FULL PATTERN OF PROPOSED  
CONSTITUTIONS AND OF DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS WOULD APPEAR FROM  
LANSLOWNE REPORT AND THAT COUNCIL'S ENDORSEMENT OF THIS WOULD  
COVER SUBSTANCE OF ALL THAT WOULD APPEAR LATER IN FORMAL  
DOCUMENTS.

4. AS YOU KNOW BRUNEI IS STILL NEGOTIATING WITH KUALA LUMPUR  
ON TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF ENTRY AND PECK WAS UNWILLING TO  
GUESS HOW SOON AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED.

HE CLAIMED THAT WHITEHALL WAS STILL TRYING TO THINK OF  
WAYS OF DILUTING OPPOSITION BY PARTY RA'AYAT AND OF MUSTERING  
SOME SHOW OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR ENTRY BUT HE ADMITTED  
THAT THEY STILL HAD NO CONCRETE PLAN.

I URGED NEED FOR RAPID PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD BUT PECK  
SAID MOST MINISTRIES FELT METHOD OF APPROACH COULD BEST BE  
DECIDED IN LIGHT OF DETAILED AGREEMENT WHEN IT EMERGED FROM  
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS.

PECK ADDED THAT, IN VIEW OF DIFFICULTY OF ORGANISING  
PLAUSIBLE SHOW OF POPULAR SUPPORT, SOME OFFICIALS WERE THINKING  
IN TERMS OF BASING ENTRY SOLELY ON SULTAN'S DECISION, LEAVING  
ANY DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES TO WORK THEMSELVES OUT LATER WITHIN  
FEDERATION.

HE ALSO SAID GOVERNMENT WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT OTHER  
TWO LARGER AND MORE POPULOUS TERRITORIES.

I PUT FORWARD OBVIOUS OBJECTIONS TO LAST THREE PROPOSITIONS  
BUT MADE LITTLE HEADWAY.

...2/...

SECRET

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.4539

- 2 -

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SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

I SHALL RETURN TO ATTACK WITH PICKARD (CRO) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(PECK REFERRED TO DIFFICULTY OF DIRECT ACTION IN BRUNEI BUT ADDED IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE BRITISH WERE TRYING TO GET SULTAN TO ACCEPT MCINTOSH AS NEW HIGH COMMISSIONER.

AS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER GENERAL MCINTOSH HAD BEEN LIVE WIRE AND HE MIGHT GET SOMETHING MOVING IN BRUNEI.)

5. PECK SAW NO ATTRACTIONS IN YOUR PROPOSAL FOR EARLY JOINT MEETING OF "LEADERS" FROM THREE TERRITORIES.

HE ARGUED THAT, SO FAR AS NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK WERE CONCERNED, JOINT MEETING OF LEADERS WOULD ADD NOTHING TO ENDORSEMENT BY COUNCILS (MY PARA 3 ABOVE); SO FAR AS BRUNEI WAS CONCERNED, TERMS WERE NOT YET SETTLED AND NO "LEADER" WAS YET IN SIGHT.

DO YOU WISH ME TO PURSUE THIS PROPOSAL FURTHER OR SHOULD I CONCENTRATE RATHER ON PRESSING FOR ORGANISATION OF SOME SHOW OF POPULAR SUPPORT OR FORMAL ENDORSEMENT WITHIN BRUNEI (PARA 4 ABOVE).?

6. REFERENCE YOUR POINT (G I ASSUME YOU ENVISAGE BRITISH CONSULTING SEPARATELY WITH EACH OF OTHER THREE.

ON THAT ASSUMPTION PECK ACCEPTED YOUR PROPOSAL READILY ENOUGH, WHILE AGREEING THAT CONSULTATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE HE CLAIMED BRITAIN HAD ALREADY HAD FULLEST EXCHANGES WITH MALAYA ON SECURITY PROBLEMS; HE SAID RECENT ANGLO-PHILIPPINES DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE FOLLOWED UP BY THOMAS IN MARCH AND HE REFERRED TO FRY'S NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS WITH INDONESIANS.

(DELIVERY TODAY OF SUBANDRIO'S REPLY TO HOME'S LETTER OF DECEMBER WILL GIVE OPENING FOR FURTHER POINTS).

NEVERTHELESS I HAVE IMPRESSION THAT BRITISH STILL DONOT FEEL REAL NEED FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MORE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT AND ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THIS WOULD MATERIALLY IMPROVE POSITION. I SHALL TRY TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON PECK AND OTHERS BUT SHANN, CRITCHLEY AND MCCREDIE MAY ALSO BE ABLE TO HELP WITH LOCAL BRITISH COLLEAGUES.

EASTMAN.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (3027/1/2/5)  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'S

20TH FEBRUARY, 1965



CONFIDENTIAL  
TELEGRAM

190

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 0310 hours 19th February, 1963.

Received: 0730 hours 20th February, 1963.



ROUTINE

TELEGRAM NO. 305

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: High Commissioners Kuala Lumpur 446, Canberra 305, Wellington 225.

Following is text of Commissioner-General Singapore Telegram 05 dated 18th February to Foreign Office.

DETAILS:

1. I had a short meeting in Singapore on Saturday, February 16th with the U.S. Ambassadors from Bangkok, Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta who were here informally. I took the opportunity of emphasising the importance of President Kennedy's support for Malaysia. We all agreed on the need to pour oil on Malayian/Indonesian exchanges and to butter up Philippines as much as possible. I said Mr. Peter Thomas would be in Manila shortly. It now seems clear that the Tunku will go to Manila early in March and Macapagal is eager to welcome him. Baldwin of Kuala Lumpur pointed out that if the problem was strategic a plebiscite in North Borneo would be no answer.

2. (Sic) Points also mentioned were the likelihood of Asahari being called on to Committee of 24.

3. On the nature of any agreement between Macapagal and Sukarno no information was available and the respective Ambassadors did not think it was very deep.

4. There was no suggestion thatover that Malaysia had to be postponed or shelved.

5. Jones of Djakarta was encouraged by recent signs of increased interest in economic problems by Indonesian Government. Moreover, the Indonesians were afraid of losing U.S. aid and he learnt that Salmet Governor of the Bank of Indonesia had actually left for Washington for talks <sup>with</sup> the I.B.F.

6. The <sup>possibility</sup> of the South East Asia powers meeting in conference was raised but on the whole this was regarded as likely to be impracticable.

/8.

21 FEB 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

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National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1209, 1961/794 PART 2



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# CONFIDENTIAL TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

.. 2 ..

8. H. Stephenson of Manila was uncertain of the present Filipino position in regard to North Borneo and mentioned as a possibility arbitration on an agreed statement of facts as an alternative to a plebiscite. INDS.

SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL



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# TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

POL.29/6.

Despatched: 17.15 hours 19th February, 1963.

Received: 07.30 hours 20th February, 1963.

FRANCE.

TELEGRAM N. NO. 124.

Addressed High Commissioners, Canberra, Wellington N. No. 124,  
repeated airmail to other posts.

MALAYSIA.

Following is text of resolution adopted at two day  
conference just held in North Borneo by six major political  
parties of Malaysian region.

BRUNAI.

"Whereas peoples of Sabah, Brunei, Sarawak and  
Singapore of their own free will have expressed their  
desire to form Federation of Malaysia with the Federation  
of Malaya we the representatives of pre-Malaysia political  
parties elected by the peoples of the five territories  
concerned in conference in Jesselton on 16th and 17th  
February 1963 hereby jointly and unanimously proclaim:

1. Our deep regret that Indonesian leaders  
have expressed open support for the rebels  
in Brunei and our condemnation of the  
rebellion.
2. Our support of the rejection by the people  
of Sabah of the Philippines claim to Sabah.
3. Our determination to realise Malaysia by  
31st August 1963.
4. Our undivided support for such policies as  
may be necessary to secure the safety and  
integrity of the five territories of Malaysia  
from hostile forces.
5. Our intention to establish Malaysia which  
covets no other territories and which wishes  
to live in peace and prosperity with all

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21 FEB 1963

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# TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

-2-

its neighbours; and towards this end we call upon the nations of the world

(a) to take note of the danger to peace and to the integrity of Malaysia posed by threats of outside intervention, and

(b) to ensure that ten million peoples of Malaysia are left in peace to decide their destiny on their own without intimidation and interference from outside".

END.

2. Resolution is being despatched to Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Philippines and to Governments of North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, Singapore and Malaya. Conference has appointed Malaysia solidarity action committee to see to implementation of resolution. Sabah Alliance Party will serve as Secretariat of Action Committee.

SECRETARY OF STATE.



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

RB

0.3300

TO:

Dated: 18th February, 1963  
1900

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR .....126  
(For Critchley ) Your 121.

Australian Embassy,  
DJAKARTA.....205.  
(For Shann) Your 158.



Repeated to:

Australian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON.....372

Australian Mission to United Nations,  
NEW YORK.....156

SECRET.

Malaysia.

We have studied your assessments carefully and the following are our conclusions :

(a) Indonesian hostility to the formation of Malaysia and attempts to subvert it after its establishment are a fact of life. We must strive to diminish it, but are unlikely to be able to remove it altogether.

(b) Although face saving formulas could be devised, it is too late effectively to postpone Malaysia.

(c) We are suggesting to the British the earliest possible summoning of some joint meeting of the leaders of the three Borneo territories to pronounce on the new constitutions for the territories and the distribution of powers in the Federal structure. This meeting could be an expansion of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee and might serve to give the appearance of popular endorsement.

(d) This move will not end Indonesian or Philippine hostility, but it will at least provide an argument which Indonesia may find difficult to counter publicly since she clearly envisages the act of self-determination in West Irian as being carried out by what will be nominated councils.

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

RB

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0.3300

(e) This popular endorsement could be invaluable in the Committee of 24.

(f) We should seek as soon as possible bilateral consultation between the United Kingdom on the one hand Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines on the other on the problems of the security of the Malaysia area. This would give the British an opportunity to say what they propose to do for the defence of the weak Federation which they themselves have created.

For Sharn.

Please take an early opportunity to tell Subandrio that we are urging restraint on Tunku (our 204) and appeal to Indonesia to cease its public campaign of vituperation. You could instance Harsono's statement and urge a return to the diplomatic methods Subandrio advocates.

In conversation with Subandrio and other Indonesians you should take up their alleged fears that Malaysia will come under Chinese domination, making the point that this can best be resisted by the co-operation of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines uniting against a common enemy.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (3006/4/1)  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s,

19th February, 1963



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

IM

I.4373

FROM.

DATED. 17TH FEBRUARY, 1963  
0030

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.

REC'D. 18TH FEBRUARY, 1963.  
1700

450 SECRET.

FOR BARWICK FROM BEALE.

IN PARAGRAPH 10 OF MY 423 I SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED IF AUSTRALIA DECIDED NOT TO EXTEND ITS PRESENT AGREEMENT WITH MALAYA TO THE NEW MALAYASIAN FEDERATION.

THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME REASONS FOR THIS VIEW.

2. AS THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS IT, AUSTRALIA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT RELATE TO THE DEFENCE OF MALAYA AGAINST COMMUNISM.

IN THE OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES THE PREVENTION OF THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM ANYWHERE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, INCLUDING AN AREA SO RELATIVELY CLOSE TO US AS BORNEO, IS VITAL TO AUSTRALIA'S INTERESTS. CONSEQUENTLY THEY WOULD EXPECT US TO BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN RESISTING IT THERE.

3. AUSTRALIA HAVING STATED THAT SHE ACCEPTS MALAYSIA AS "...THE BEST AVAILABLE WAY OF MAINTAINING THE MALAYSIAN COUNTRIES AS A WESTERN-~~ALIGNED~~ GROUP" (I.E. AGAINST COMMUNISM), UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER IT STRANGE IF WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE THE SAME SUPPORT TO MALAYSIA AGAINST COMMUNISM AS WE WERE GIVING TO MALAYA (AND FOR THAT MATTER TO OTHER SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES).

4. THE ABOVE RELATES TO THE QUESTION OF EXTENDING TO MALAYSIA OUR PRESENT AGREEMENT WITH MALAYA REGARDING DEFENCE AGAINST COMMUNISM.

I THINK HOWEVER, I SHOULD ADD THAT I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION ALSO CONSIDERS THAT AUSTRALIA SHOULD, IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY, SUPPORT BRITAIN IN DEFENDING MALAYSIA AGAINST INDONESIAN AGGRESSION.

THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH TANGE IS BRINGING WITH HIM TENDS TO BEAR THIS OUT.

I ALSO HAD A TALK LAST NIGHT WITH ROGER HILSMAN ASSISTANT SECRETARY (DIRECTOR) INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH IN WHICH HE MADE THESE POINTS-

(A) IT IS NOW CLEAR, HE SAID, THAT ESTABLISHING MALAYSIA IS GOING TO BE A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT AND PROTRACTED AFFAIR THAN WE HAD ALL THOUGHT, NEVERTHELESS UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT IT FOR THE SAME REASONS AS AUSTRALIA HAS DONE (THE PRESIDENT CONFIRMED THIS AT PRESS CONFERENCE TWO DAYS AGO).

MOREOVER, UNITED STATES ARE NOW REALISING WHAT A REAL MENACE SOEKARNO MAY BECOME IN THE AREA, AND HIS SUCCESS IN PREVENTING THE FORMATION OF MALAYSIA WOULD MAKE HIM MORE SO.

2/...



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

# INWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

(B) BUT, HE WENT ON, THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MALAYSIA LIES FIRST WITH BRITAIN, AND THEN AUSTRALIA (AND NEW ZEALAND).

IF WE ASSIST THE BRITISH, UNITED STATES WILL ASSIST US BOTH IF IT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY.

IF WE STAND ALOOF, THE EFFECT UPON OUR RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES COULD BE SERIOUS.

5. IN SUCH A MATTER AS THIS, ONE COULD NOT, OF COURSE, ACCEPT AN ASSURANCE FROM AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY AS TO WHAT UNITED STATES WOULD DO.

INDEED RUSK TOLD ME LAST WEEK THAT VITAL POLICY ON THIS MATTER WOULD NOT BE DECIDED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL (HE WAS REFERRING TO HARRIMAN) BUT BY HIM.

HE ADDED "IT MIGHT EVEN BE DESIRABLE, IF ASSURANCES ARE INVOLVED, TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER".

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M'S

18TH FEBRUARY, 1963.

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# CONFIDENTIAL TELEGRAM

SECRET

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, DELHI.  
From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1615 hours 16th February, 1963.

Received: 1130 hours 18th February, 1963.

ROUTINETELEGRAM NO. 20 CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 435,  
repeated Routine Ambassador Manila 454, High Commissioner  
Kuala Lumpur 15, British Mission New York 9, High Commissioners  
Canberra 20, Wellington 4, Ambassadors Washington 115, Bangkok 5,  
Djakarta 16, (C.R.C. please pass Manila, Canberra, Wellington,  
Bangkok and Djakarta).

Your Telegram 504.

Herewith accepts with pleasure and agrees entirely  
about publicity.

HIGH COMMISSIONER

21 FEB 1963  
Copy to Defence

# CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

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## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 15.15 hours 15th February, 1963.

Received:

08.30 hours 16th February, 1963.

ROUTINE.

TELEGRAM NO. 284.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed High Commissioner Delhi No. 501, repeated High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur No. 417, British Mission New York, High Commissioners, Canberra No. 284, Wellington No. 202, Ambassadors, Washington, Bangkok, Djakarta, Manila.

Your Telegram No. 481 not repeated and Bangkok Telegrams Nos. 61 and 62 to Foreign Office (we have repeated 61 to Kuala Lumpur).

### PROPOSED VISIT TO LONDON BY NARASIMHAN.

Please inform Narasimhan that the Foreign Secretary very much regrets that owing to a long standing speaking engagement in Glasgow he will not be able to meet him on February 25th. However the Lord Privy Seal will be pleased to see him at 11 a.m. on February 25th for a general discussion of his recent tour of South East Asia. This would be followed by a talk with Lord Londonderry. Minister of State at Colonial Office who has been closely concerned with recent discussions on formation of Malaysia and with appropriate officials from Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office with object of giving Narasimhan background on Malaysia with particular reference to the process of consultation of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak.

2. In conveying this message to Narasimhan you should stress orally that as he will well understand we regard his visit to London as informal and exploratory. For this reason we do not propose to give publicity but if pressed would say that an exchange of views on United Nations problems generally took place with particular reference to Narasimhan's recent visit to South East Asia.

3. For your own information our desire to see Narasimhan does

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

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## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

-2-

not betoken any intention of committing ourselves in  
any way to United Nations intervention over Malaysia.

SECRETARY OF  
STATE.

CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET

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## TELEGRAM

SECRET

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 0200 hours 14th February, 1963.

Received: 1630 hours 14th February, 1963.

ROUTINE

TELEGRAM NO. 274

SECRET

High Commissioners Canberra 274, Wellington 194, Kuala Lumpur 393.

Following is text of Foreign Office telegram addressed British Mission New York 630 of February 13th. Repeated for information to Washington Djakarta Singapore Canberra Kuala Lumpur Wellington and Baving to Bangkok.

REQUIRE:

Washington telegram 464 of February 11th and your letter 10682/45/63 of February 7th to Wilson.

### MALAYSIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

We presume there is no risk of the Secretary-General taking the initiative before Harasimhan has returned and made his report. We should be glad to see Harasimhan in London (Djakarta Telegram 121 paragraph 3) on the assumption of course that the visit will be informal and purely exploratory.

2. The earliest opportunity for substantive United Nations discussion of Malaysia appears to be in the Committee of 14 on or about February 25th. By then we hope the agreed report of the Intergovernmental Committee on the Accession of North Borneo and Sarawak to Malaysia will have been published. This report is the result of detailed negotiations between representatives of North Borneo, Sarawak, Malaya and Britain on the terms on which the two Colonial Territories will become members of the new Federation of Malaysia and the special safeguards which they will receive. Political leaders of both Territories played a prominent part in these negotiations and will be signatories of the report. Copies

/will

SECRET



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SECRET

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

.. 2 ..

will be sent to you and other recipients of this telegram as soon as possible and we shall try to let you have summaries in advance so that you will be ready to brief colleagues and the press on publication. Unfortunately the final text has not yet been agreed because a few outstanding points are still under discussion (copies of latest telegrams are being sent to Golds in New York by bag).

3. After publication this report will be considered by the Legislatures of North Borneo and Sarawak who will vote on it probably in mid-March. The indications are that both Legislatures will produce overwhelming majorities in favour of the report. We would regard this as the final stage in the process of popular endorsement of Malaysia in these two territories. (The earlier stages were the enquiries of The Cobbold Commission and resolutions of September 1962 by the two legislatures in favour of the principle of Malaysia provided satisfactory terms could be worked out).

4. We cannot claim the people (as distinct from Government) of Brunei have demonstrated support for Malaysia. Brunei is a protectorate state not a colony and we have no power to force her into Malaysia. We have always insisted that the decision is one for the Sultan's Government. In discussion with our friends we can explain that:

- (a) There is no practical alternative for Brunei to join<sup>in</sup> Malaysia. To continue under the present Treaty with Britain would be increasingly anachronistic. An independent Brunei of two tiny enclaves would be a standing

/invitation

SECRET



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SECRET

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

.. 3 ..

invitation to foreign intrigue in Malaysia and suggest a perpetual threat to peace in the area.

- (b) If the Borneo Territories are considered together (as Aschari and others argued they should be) popular opposition in Brunei (of which total population is only 85,000) would be a very small minority compared to the rest of the Borneo Territories (totalling over one million) most of whom are in favour of Malaysia.

5. Separate reply to your letter under reference encloses timetable for Malaysia which makes it clear that no major advance on August <sup>31st</sup> is likely although we have it very much in mind to improve on this if we can. (We have not as yet consulted the Malaysians). Representatives of the constituent territories will probably sign documents embodying final agreement during day. Ratification and legislation will then be necessary by the United Kingdom and Malaya. We have as yet no timetable for Brunei but we would hope that if she does come into Malaysia it would be at the same time as the other Territories.

6. You will be receiving a full brief about United Nations discussion of Malaysia and the foregoing is only intended to assist in preliminary discussions envisaged in Washington telegram under reference. We think it is most important if possible to delay any United Nations discussion whether in

/Committee

SECRET



SECRET

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## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

.. 4 ..

Committee of 24 or elsewhere until North Borneo and Sarawak  
Legislatures have voted on the report mentioned in paragraph 3.  
Grateful for your views of feasibility of delaying tactics.  
7. Please inform Warner and Golds on arrival. END.

SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRET



SECRET

# TELEGRAM

SECRET

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 0200 hours 14th February, 1963.

Received: 1630 hours 14th February, 1963.

ROUTINE

TELEGRAM NO. 274

SECRET

High Commissioners Canberra 274, Wellington 194, Kuala Lumpur 393.

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SECRET



SECRET

174

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received: .. 2 ..

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/invitation

SECRET



SECRET

173

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

.. 3 ..

- 4 invitation to foreign intrigue in Malaysia and suggest a perpetual threat to peace in the area.
- (b) If the Borneo Territories are considered together (as Asahari and others argued they should be) popular opposition in Brunei (of which total population is only 85,000) would be a very small minority compared to the rest of the Borneo Territories (totalling over one million) most of whom are in favour of Malaysia.
5. Separate reply to your letter under reference encloses timetable for Malaysia which makes it clear that no major advance on August <sup>31st</sup> is likely although we have it very much in mind to improve on this if we can. (We have not as yet consulted the Malaysians). Representatives of the constituent territories will probably sign documents embodying final agreement during May. Ratification and legislation will then be necessary by the United Kingdom and Malaya. We have as yet no timetable for Brunei but we would hope that if she does come into Malaysia it would be at the same time as the other Territories.
6. You will be receiving a full brief about United Nations discussion of Malaysia and the foregoing is only intended to assist in preliminary discussions envisaged in Washington telegram under reference. We think it is most important if possible to delay any United Nations discussion whether in /Committee

SECRET



SECRET

172

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

.. 4 ..

Committee of 24, or elsewhere until North Borneo and Sarawak  
Legislatures have voted on the report mentioned in paragraph 3.  
Grateful for your views of feasibility of delaying tactics.  
7. Please inform Warner and Golds on arrival. END.

SECRETARY OF STATE

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

171

KA

I.3934

FROM.

DATED. 12TH FEBRUARY, 1963  
1850  
REC'D. 13TH FEBRUARY, 1963  
0545

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

702. SECRET. PRIORITY.

MALAYSIA.

REFERENCE YOUR 470 AND OUR 682.

LISTS OF FEDERAL STATE AND CONCURRENT POWERS PROPOSED IN  
LANDS DOWNE REPORT PRESENT MALAYAN PATTERN,  
AND THUS GIVE BULK OF POWERS TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

BUT IN THE CASE OF NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK FEDERAL POWERS  
IN CERTAIN FIELDS WILL BE SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATIONS TO TAKE  
ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITIONS ON WHICH TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE  
AGREED TO THE MALAYSIA PROJECT.

(AS YOU KNOW LANDS DOWNE COMMITTEE WAS NOT CONCERNED WITH  
BRUNEI WHICH IS STILL NEGOTIATING ITS OWN TERMS DIRECT WITH  
MALAYSIA. OUR 694 REFERS)

2. FOR EXAMPLE WHILE EDUCATION WILL BE CONSTITUTIONALLY A  
FEDERAL POWER IT IS PROPOSED THAT EDUCATION POLICY AND  
ADMINISTRATION IN NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK SHOULD BE  
UNDISTURBED AND REMAIN UNDER CONTROL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS UNTIL  
THOSE GOVERNMENTS AGREE OTHERWISE.

CONSTITUTIONALLY FINANCE ( WITH EXCEPTION OF STATE SALES  
TAXES) IS FEDERAL POWER BUT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE ASSURANCE  
THAT EXPANSION OF STATE SERVICES WILL BE CONTINUED AT NOT LESS  
THAN 1959-1962 RATE AND THAT IT WILL USE " BEST ENDEAVOUR "  
TO SEE THAT DEVELOPMENTS FUNDS AVAILABLE IN FIRST FIVE YEARS  
TO SARAWAK ARE NOT LESS THAN DOLLARS 300 MILLION AND TO NORTH  
BORNEO NOT LESS THAN DOLLARS 200 MILLION.

IN THE FIELD OF LAW IT WILL BE AGREED INTER ALIA THAT THE  
STATE ATTORNEY GENERALS SHOULD BE STATE OFFICERS APPOINTED  
BY THE HEAD OF STATE ON THE ADVICE OF THE CHIEF MINISTERS  
WHO WILL FIRST CONSULT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT)

FROM PANEL OF NAMES SUBLITTED BY THE STATE PUBLIC  
SERVICE COMMISSIONER.

MAIN OTHER FEDERAL FIELDS IN WHICH THERE WILL BE SAFEGUARDS  
ARE CITIZENSHIP ( YOU HAVE BACKGROUND TO THIS) TRADE AND INDUSTRY  
AND LABOUR.

3. C.R.O. EMPHASISE THAT LANDS DOWNE REPORT REPRESENTS AGREED  
POSITION ON SAFEGUARDS REACHED BY INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE  
INCLUDING POLITICIANS FROM SARAWAK AND NORTH BORNEO.  
AND THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF ARRANGEMENTS HAVING BEEN  
DECIDED BY MALAYANS AND BRITISH AND IMPOSED ON BORNEO TERRITORIES.  
TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURES APPROVED MALAYSIA SUBJECT TO  
SAFEGUARDS IN FORMULATION OF WHICH THEY HAVE THEMSELVES NOW  
PARTICIPATED.

4. COLONIAL OFFICE HAVE ASKED CRO TO EMPHASISE TO US THAT  
IT SHOULD NOT BE DIVULGED TO MALAYANS OR ANY OTHER THIRD  
PARTY ( INCLUDING AMERICANS WHO HAVE NOT YET BEEN GIVEN DETAILS )  
THAT WE HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT REPORT.

...2/...



INWARD CABLEGRAM

KA

- 2 -

I.3934

5. IN VIEW OF LENGTH AND COMPLEXITY OF REPORT WE HAVE  
ASKED WHETHER A COPY COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR YOU AS SOON  
AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY CASE BEFORE PUBLICATION.  
OFFICIALS ARE SEEKING LANSDOWN'S PERMISSION.

6. THERE WOULD BE RELUCTANCE HERE TO MAKE ALTERATIONS  
TO LANSDOWNE REPORT AT THIS STAGE.

IT IS REGARDED AS THE PRODUCT OF A LONG PROCESS OF  
CONSULTATION WITH AND NEGOTIATION BETWEEN ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

C.R.O. (BENTLIFF) HAVE TOLD US THAT IF YOU HAVE ANY VIEWS  
WHICH MIGHT AFFECT PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN REPORT THEY WOULD LIKE  
TO BE INFORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

13TH FEBRUARY, 1963



169

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

MT

I.3822

FROM:

Dated: 12th February, 1963  
2001  
Rec'd: 12th February, 1963  
0610

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.

682. SECRET.

Addressed Canberra, Washington 46.

Malaysia.

Your telegrams 470 and 471.



In absence of Pickard (ill) and Golds (in Washington) we consulted Bentliff who was at meeting with Lansdowne until 1830.

2. Bentliff said there will be no process of amendment (paragraph 2, your 470). Present constitutional arrangements will lapse and be replaced by new state constitutions. Draft state constitutions will be annexes to the Malaysia agreement which will be incorporated in a Malaysia act to be passed through United Kingdom Parliament and promulgated by Queen in Council. Present territorial legislatures will be given opportunity to approve new state constitutions before Federation. No other form of consultation is envisaged. View here is that consultation has already been carried out.

3. According to Bentliff division of powers as set out in Lansdowne report follows lines of present Malayan constitution. Owing to need to obtain Ministerial clearance text of report will not be available to us before tomorrow morning when we will cable fuller description.

For Washington. Reference the Minister's telegram 290 to you.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

12th February, 1963



168

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

LJH.

I. 3505.

FROM:

Dated: 7th February, 1963.  
1515.

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

Rec'd: 7th February, 1963.  
2000.

98. UNCLASSIFIED.

Malaysia Legal Adviser to the Sultan of Brunei announced today that Sultan intended Brunei should join Malaysia as any alternative solution to the problems of his country was "not only illusory but fraught with danger".

The Sultan intended to "establish representative institutions of government in Brunei".

Legal Adviser also stated that special position of Brunei would be safeguarded under Malaysia and that provision to achieve this would be written into the constitution of the new federation.

Final section of the statement reads "Sultan is satisfied that future prospects of his people can and will be advanced by it being agreed that Brunei on implementation of Malaya's assurances and on ending of treaty of protection with Queen Elizabeth shall on its own free will join ~~the~~ Federation of Malaysia".

"Straits Times" this morning also reports Sultan as having stated Brunei should be given not less than 10 seats in Malaysian Parliament, but that matter remained one for discussion.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.  
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES.  
P.M.'s.

8th February, 1963.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

167

JW

0.2392

TO:

Dated: 5th February, 1963,  
1510

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

85

SECRET.



Malaysia.

Thank you for assessment in your 90. Tunku has been more restrained although he has so far shown no public appreciation that Indonesia has a real interest in the security of the area and may have genuine doubts both about Malaya's ability to administer Borneo Territories or whether Malaysia will not fall under Chinese control.

2. Your paragraph 5. Britain will certainly defend the Borneo territories in the short run, but none of us are anxious to see Malaysia come into being in face of permanent hostility from Indonesia and the Philippines.

3. Suggestion in your paragraph 6 that Thais may assist in bringing Tunku and Macapagal together is good. But it is equally important that Malaya and Indonesia should get together and that the Tunku should realise that small nations without the capacity to defend themselves should not lightly embark on the luxury of quarrelling with large and powerful neighbours.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES  
P.M.'s

7th February, 1963.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

166



CONFIDENTIAL

LJH.

I. 3156.

FROM:

Dated: 4th February, 1963.  
1735.

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

Rec'd: 5th February, 1963.  
0130.

86. CONFIDENTIAL.

Visit of Sultan of Brunei.

Sultan of Brunei arrived in Kuala Lumpur last Thursday.

2. He is expected to stay at least two weeks for discussions about terms of Brunei joining Malaysia.

3. Sultan will see United Nations Under Secretary Narasimhan today, to attempt to reassure him about collapse of the rebellion and explain that inclusion in Malaysia is best course for Brunei.

4. Mentri Besar of Brunei (DATO Setia) who is to lead Brunei delegation to inter-governmental discussions here, said on arrival on Sunday, that since the collapse of the revolt, people of Brunei now realised the "necessity" of Brunei joining Malaysia. Government had accepted Brunei's entry in principle before revolt.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.  
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES.  
P.M.'s.

5th February, 1963.



CONFIDENTIAL

165

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Cypher.

POL.293/2.

Despatched: 09.30 hours 31st January, 1963.

Received: 14.00 hours 1st February, 1963.

ROUTINE.

TELEGRAM NO. 158. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed High Commissioners, Canberra No. 158, Wellington  
No. 99, Delhi No. 358, Kuala Lumpur No. 212.

Following is text of Foreign Office telegram  
addressed Djakarta No. 131 of 29th January repeated for  
information Singapore, Canberra, New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur,  
Wellington and Savig to Washington, Jesselton, Kuching  
and Brunei.

ENCLINE.

Your Telegrams Nos. 73 and 74.

I agree that Tunku's statement is unhelpful and  
gives false impression of what is actually agreed. A  
British Government statement on this point has already been  
issued by Mr. Thorneycroft in the House of Commons on  
January 28th. Text of statement and extracts from supple-  
mentaries are contained in my immediately following telegram  
(to Djakarta only) you should make full use of this in  
publicity. I should prefer not to make a further statement  
now it would only arouse more interest and speculation without  
adding to Mr. Thorneycroft's words.

END.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

- 5 FEB 1963

Copy to Defence

CONFIDENTIAL



164  
Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

TO: DELHI

RPTD: OTTAWA }  
CANBERRA } (BY AIR MAIL)  
WELLINGTON }  
KARACHI }  
COLOMBO }  
ACCRA }  
KUALA LUMPUR }  
LAGOS }  
NICOSIA }  
FREETOWN } (BY AIR MAIL)  
DAR ES SALAAM }  
KINGSTON }  
PORT OF SPAIN }  
KAMPALA }  
SALISBURY }



(Sent 22.22 hours 25th January 1963)

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY

W. No. 77

Repeated Colombo and Air Mail to Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Karachi, Accra, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, Nicosia, Freetown, Dar es Salaam, Kingston, Port of Spain, Kampala and Salisbury.

BRUNEI : MALAYSIA

Following is text of public statement made on Monday, January 21st by Sultan of Brunei.

Begins:

Now that the revolt against my person and my Government is over, my people will be anxious to know my views on the future of our beloved country Brunei.

This is the matter which has been uppermost in my mind as it affects the life and future happiness of all of us. As regards Malaysia I am convinced that it is a sound and attractive proposal and this has been borne out by the fact that before the outbreak of rebellion, the Legislative Council on July 17th 1962 had taken a decision to the effect that Brunei had agreed in principle to join Malaysia if the conditions of her entry were acceptable and beneficial to us.

It was intended that soon after this decision was taken in the Legislative Council, talks would be held between my Government and the Federation Government on the possibility of Brunei joining the Federation of Malaysia. In pursuance of this objective, a mission was sent to Malaya to discuss the plan but before any agreement could be reached a revolt broke out. Hence the delay.

I now propose to send a delegation as soon as possible to continue talks with the Federation Government. The delegation will examine the issues involved and will draft detailed recommendations governing essential terms which

/will

*Copy Refused*

27/1/63



will bring benefit to Brunei and her people, and, most important of all will ensure the safety of the State.

Ends.

Copy to:-

D. II

C.R.O.

Mr. Bentliff

Foreign Office

Mr. J.E. Cable

Colonial Office

Mr. J.D. Higham

Mr. I.H. Harris

C.R.O.

Registry (4)

Dublin

U.K. Embassy

Washington

Mr. O.G. Forster

U.K. Mission to U.N.

New York

Mr. J.A. Scott

Ottawa (6)

Canberra (6)

Wellington (4)

Karachi (4)

Accra (4)

Kuala Lumpur (4)

Lagos (6)

Nicosia (4)

Freetown (4)

Der es Salaam (4)

Kingston (4)

Port of Spain (5)

Kampala (4)

Salisbury (4)

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC DEPT.  
FE.131/36/I



163

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

JPH.

I.101.

PRESS.

Dated. 2nd January 1963.  
1035.

Rec'd. 2nd January 1963,  
1505.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

1 UNC LASSIFIED.



Malaysia and Relations with Indonesia.

Following are the main points from Tunku Abdul Rahman's New Year message.

(A) The "most outstanding development" in the Federation during 1962 was the "striking progress made in the planning and evolution of Malaysia".

(B) Malaya achieved independence under stress of Communist insurrection and "birth of Malaysia" under similar conditions will not deter us from going ahead with it". (In this context Tunku added that "threat from Indonesian Communists is very great indeed".

(C) It is our firm intention to go right ahead in a spirit of faith and patience and, if necessary, endurance with the establishment of the new Federation of Malaysia and the development of the Association of Southeast Asia".

(D) Referring to Brunei, the Tunku said that "certain political parties in Indonesia" were opposed to Malaysia and "were determined to smother it".

(E) The Tunku added that frequent attacks had taken place between the P.K.I. and Partindo and Azahari. Revolt in Brunei was, however, essentially bid for power by one man over three Borneo territories with encouragement from Indonesia but without any support in North Borneo or Sarawak.

(F) The situation in Brunei had "temporarily complicated relations with the Philippines in Indonesia although neither Government was involved".

(G) The Federation continued to wish to "maintain friendship and co-operation with other nations particularly immediate neighbours".

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.  
P.M.'s

2nd January 1963.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

162

MEH

I.32406


FROM:

Dated: 22nd December, 1962  
1820

Rec'd: 23rd December, 1962  
0800

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR

464. RESTRICTED.



At meeting with Foreign Press correspondents in Kuala Lumpur this morning, Tunku made following points:-

- (1) Malaysia would go on.
- (2) Indonesian Communist Party would continue to make trouble in Brunei.
- (3) Federation would increase its defence spending (if necessary at the expense of development) and special police force would be restored to emergency peak at 45,000 men (an increase of 20,000).
- (4) He was unhappy about the security position in Singapore, but could do nothing about it. He would continue to clean up the Federation.
- (5) Philippines was not to blame for what happened in Brunei but he would ask for postponement of A.S.A. Meeting until conditions were less awkward. He did not see how he could visit the Philippines while Azahari was there.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

23rd December, 1962

RESTRICTED  
RESTRICTED  
RESTRICTED



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

COPY NUMBER 3

TOP SECRET

JPH.

I.32068.

Dated. 19th December 1962.

2341.

Rec'd. 20th December 1962.

0200.

FROM:

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE.

321

TOP SECRET.

PRIORITY.

Reference your telegram 604.

The Singapore and British Representatives on the Internal Security Council went to Kuala Lumpur on Saturday ready to execute what they thought was an agreed plan with the Federation for arrests including some Barisan Socialist Assemblymen and one or two Federation Members of Parliament. When the Tunku changed his mind (according to them) Lee would not agree to arrest of these Assemblymen nor to a modified programme excluding them. He in turn is furious with the Federation but remains pro merger and Malaysia.

2. Efforts this week by the British to get renewed work and contacts on issue have failed. There seems little prospect of early resumption of consultation unless events drive the parties together.

3. The recommendation for action is based partly on actual security threat and partly because of a favourable political opportunity to meet the Federation's standing demands. The New Zealand and American representatives are in the picture and I think are inclined to share my view that such a sweeping security operation was of doubtful wisdom although it is a subject on which I do not entirely trust my own judgement.

Jockel.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (3024/2/9)  
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.  
P.M.'s

20th December 1962.

TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET



160

## DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

SRG

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

DATED. 18TH DECEMBER, 1962  
1950

FROM:

REC'D. 19TH DECEMBER, 1962  
1525AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.3407. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.(PLEASE PASS SINGAPORE, DJAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR AND MANILA).  
REPEATED U.N. NEW YORK, LONDON 937.

OUR 3406.

MALAYSIA-PHILIPPINES ATTITUDE.

BELL (DIRECTOR SOUTHWEST PACIFIC) SAID 18TH DECEMBER THAT INITIAL PHILIPPINE ENTHUSIASM FOR REVOLT SEEMED TO HAVE WANED.

THERE WAS QUITE WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION IN THE COUNTRY THAT THERE WERE DANGERS IN BECOMING INVOLVED IN BRUNEI AFFAIR.

THE PRESS, WITH ONLY ONE EXCEPTION, WAS WARNING THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST INVOLVEMENT.

MACAPAGAL HIMSELF WAS MAINTAINING THAT PHILIPPINES HAD NO GOVERNMENTAL POSITION ON REVOLT AND THAT HE WISHED TO SEE HOW SITUATION DEVELOPED BEFORE REACHING FINAL ATTITUDE.

2. IN VIEW OF THIS SOUNDER PHILIPPINE ATTITUDE BRITISH FELT, AND STATE DEPARTMENT CONCURRED, THAT MANILA WAS AS GOOD A PLACE AS ANY FOR AZAHARI TO BE, SINCE HE WAS BOTTLED UP THERE.

3. MACAPAGAL'S ATTITUDE WAS STILL FAR FROM SATISFACTORY AND HE STILL SEEMED TO REGARD MALAYSIA AS A GREATER DANGER THAN INDONESIA.

STATE DEPARTMENT FOR ITS PART WANTED TO SEE MALAYSIA COME INTO BEING AND A.S.A. CONTINUE TO BE BUILT UP.

UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR MANILA HAD, THEREFORE, SPOKEN TO FILIPINO LEADERS IN ATTEMPT TO DISABUSE THEM OF THEIR FEARS OF MALAYSIA AND TO DIRECT THEIR THINKING TO THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE AREA (OUR 3377), AND HAD BEEN URGING BRITAIN ALSO TO TALK TO THEM ON BASIS OF THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE AREA.

BELL EXPRESSED HOPE THAT MINISTER WOULD FEEL ABLE TO TALK ON THE SECURITY ASPECT DURING HIS VISIT TO PHILIPPINES.

-----

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

19TH DECEMBER, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

I.31909

Dated: 18th December, 1962,

Rec'd: 18th December, 1962,  
1830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,  
MANILA.

415

SECRET.

SECRET

Prime Minister from Barwick.

I have had an opportunity for a long talk with the British and American Ambassadors. Not surprisingly I find them preoccupied with Malaysia. They both feel strongly that an Australian voice would be effective partly because it would be new but principally because the broad considerations of security which leads us to see merit in an outcome favourable to the emergence of Malaysia, would have an appeal to the Filipinos.

2. The Americans are impatient of Britain's failure to talk to Filipinos much earlier. Even now I feel the British lack a proper sense of urgency.

3. The British Ambassador (Pilcher) considers the Filipinos want satisfaction on two points :-

- (a) some financial satisfaction for the heir of the Sultan of Sulu and adventurers who surround them; and
- (b) some long term arrangement under which traditional pattern of immigration and trade between Sulu and North Borneo might be preserved.

4. They visualize that once talks with the Filipinos commence (preferably in London), sub-committees would be established to cover these matters. My concern is whether, having regard to the deadline of August 1963 which has been established for the coming into being of Malaysia, time will permit such leisurely procedures. Pilcher seems still to be awaiting instructions following what the British regard as reasonably successful outcome to his first talk with the President.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

19th December, 1962.

SECRET

SECRET



158

# TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, CANBERRA

Despatched: 11.15 hours. 14th December, 1962.  
Received: 08.30 hours. 15th December, 1962.

## ROUTINE

TELEGRAM W. NO. 701.

Following is text of Singapore telegram No. 580 dated 13th December to Colonial Office.

BEGINS.

Following is text of message sent yesterday by Lee Kuan Yew (Prime Minister of Singapore) to Donald Stephens (Leading Politician) in North Borneo as reported in Malayan Times.

BEGINS.

## MALAYSIA.

Congratulations on your determined stand against foreign forces interfering in Malaysia. Developments since the rebellion on Saturday underline the dangers we have anticipated in discussions in the Malaysia Solidarity Committee a year ago. Because of rapid progress towards Malaysia those who have designs on our territories have been forced to show their hand so early by providing the means for arms and training in order to take over not just Brunei but also Sabah and Sarawak. We should all be grateful for this premature foreign intervention because it will only hasten the inevitable realisation and consolidation of Malaysia.

ENDS.

ENDS.

SECRETARY OF STATE.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

PK.

Record of Conversation with : Dr. Goh Keng Swee, Minister for Finance  
Singapore.

on : 15th November, 1962. 61/794

Officers Present : Secretary  
Mr. R.L. Harry

Main Subjects: Political Situation in Singapore; Effects of  
Establishing Malaysia; Indonesian Policy;  
Attitudes to Sino-Indian Conflict.

Sir Arthur Tange asked Dr. Goh to describe the party situation in Singapore.

61/643 Dr. Goh said that the Peoples Action Party had no proper majority but were able to carry on. He said the Tunku was giving some encouragement to Lim Yew Hock, although Lim had only two colleagues in the Assembly. The Singapore Government was having some trouble with the students but was avoiding a head-on clash and had been successful in handling a recent strike by invoking the help of the parents. Dr. Goh said he was somewhat worried about the tough methods which might be used by the Federation after achievement of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur methods were much more direct. They would be likely to clap two or three hundred Communist supporters into jail.

The Secretary asked what would be the position of Singapore after joining Malaysia as regards the imposition of customs duties etc.

Dr. Goh said that there was already a Federation Customs Office in Singapore and this would continue. Singapore would be a free entrepot port and its own products would have free entry into the Federation but imported goods would have to pay the Federation duty.

62/363 The Secretary mentioned our concern about the Philippines claim to North Borneo.

Dr. Goh said that he was greatly concerned about this. He thought the Philippines hoped to get something for themselves as a result of their claim but he did not think it would delay the achievement of the Malaysia Federation.

61/794 Dr. Goh said he was much more concerned about Indonesian policy. He thought there were signs that the Indonesians might make

Distribution

Secretary  
Acting Secretary  
Mr. Brennan  
S. & S.E.A.  
E.R.

Trade  
Treasury  
P.M.'s

Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Djakarta, Manila.

Report prepared by R.L. Harry.

CONFIDENTIAL



2.

further claims e.g. to Portuguese Timor.

The Secretary asked whether there had been any defined attitudes among the different groups in the Federation and Singapore on the Sino-Indian border conflict.

61/484

Dr. Goh said that opinions had tended to run on racial lines. The Malays and Indians had strongly supported the Indian case. The Chinese had tended to be sympathetic with the Chinese claims. For this reason there had been a gentlemen's agreement not to talk about the subject. Only the Tunku who had been over in India had made a statement on India on his return sympathetic to the Indian cause.

Mr. Harry asked whether Dr. Goh had managed to have all the talks he wanted with the various companies in Australia such as H.H.P. about the steel mill and with I.C.I. and with the Development Finance Corporation.

Dr. Goh said he had had quite useful talks and would be having further talks with the Delfin Group in Sydney the following day.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

195

.GS I.25042  
SENT. 10TH OCTOBER, 1962  
2000  
FROM. REC'D. 11TH OCTOBER, 1962  
0540  
AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

5002. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED U.N. NEW YORK 258, WASHINGTON 554.  
...SAVINGRAM KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, SINGAPORE.

MALAYSIA.

WARNER (HEAD S.E.A. DEPT FOREIGN OFFICE) TOLD US TODAY THAT  
HER MAIN PRESENT WORRY LAY IN PHILIPPINES ATTITUDE TOWARDS  
NORTH BORNEO.

IT NOW SEEMED LIKELY THAT PHILIPPINES WOULD RAISE MATTER  
FORMALLY AT UNITED NATIONS.

HE HAD NO INFORMATION HOWEVER WHETHER THE PHILIPPINES HAD ANY  
PARTICULAR COMMITTEE IN MIND IN THE EVENT THAT FORMAL INSCRIPTION  
WERE SOUGHT.

HE CONFIRMED FOREIGN OFFICE VIEW THAT SINCE MATTER HAD NOW  
ASSUMED CHARACTER OF TERRITORIAL CLAIM THERE NO LONGER SEEMED  
PROSPECT OF FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT.

TUNKU'S INITIAL ATTITUDE HAD NOT HELPED SINCE HE HAD FAILED  
IN EARLY STAGES TO TAKE SERIOUSLY U.K. WARNINGS THAT MATTER COULD  
HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR MALAYSIA.

SUBSEQUENTLY WHEN CONFRONTED WITH NOTE FROM FILIPINOS TUNKU  
HAD REACTED STRONGLY TO THE POINT OF ALL BUT EXCLUDING HIS PERSONAL  
ATTENDANCE AT FORTHCOMING A.S.A. MEETING.

UNITED KINGDOM WERE ADDRESSING FURTHER COMMUNICATION TO  
PHILIPPINES WHICH WOULD BE COLD AND UNCOMPROMISING BUT NO OTHER  
ACTION WAS CONTEMPLATED AT THIS STAGE.

WERE PHILIPPINES TO PURSUE MATTER IN I.C.J., U.K. WOULD NOT FEEL  
UNDULY DISTURBED AND WOULD NOT FEEL THAT PLAN TO BRING MALAYSIA  
INTO BEING IN AUGUST 1963 WOULD BE ENDANGERED.

TRANSFER COULD BE EFFECTED EVEN IF MATTER WERE STILL BEFORE  
COURT.

IF MATTER WERE TO BE RAISED IN U.N. WHOLE ATMOSPHERE COULD  
BE MUCH DISTURBED WITH CONSEQUENT DANGER TO ACCOMPLISHMENT OF  
MALAYSIA SCHEME, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT COMMUNIST BLOC WOULD PROBABLY  
FIND IT DIFFICULT TO TAKE SIDES.

FOREIGN OFFICE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT REASSURED BY SUBANDRIO'S  
RECENTLY REPORTED STATEMENT THAT INDONESIA MADE "NO CLAIM" TO  
BORNEO TERRITORIES BUT U.N. PRESSURE FOR FULL SELF DETERMINATION  
IN BORNEO MIGHT ON THE ONE HAND SUIT INDONESIA AND COMMUNIST  
BLOC AND ON THE OTHER LEAD TO SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR MALAYA AND  
UNITED KINGDOM.

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

.GS

I.25042

- 2 -

THERE WAS UNFORTUNATELY AMPLE TIME BEFORE AUGUST 1963 FOR SITUATION IN BORNEO TO BE FOULED UP.

U.S. DIFFICULTIES IN THEIR OWN RELATIONS WITH PHILIPPINES APPEARED TO PRECLUDE POSSIBILITY OF U.S. EXERCISING USEFUL INFLUENCE.

COMMENTING ON WARNER'S STATEMENT THAT U.K. WAS NOT ENCOURAGING TUNKU TO ATTEND A.S.A. MEETING WE SAID THAT SUCH A COURSE MIGHT NEVERTHELESS OFFER ADVANTAGES FOR PURPOSE OF HEADING OFF PHILIPPINES ACTION IN U.N.

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MIN.&DEPT E.A,  
MIN.&DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

11TH OCTOBER, 1962



*please put on polyfile*

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.  
From: Acting British High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur  
Number: 666 Despatched: 0450 GMT 10th September, 1962.  
Repeated: United Kingdom Commissioner-General  
for South-East Asia, Singapore. Number: 167  
United Kingdom Commissioner, Singapore. Number: 122  
His Excellency the Governor, North Borneo. Number: 130  
Officer Adminstrating the Government  
Sarawak. Number: 120  
British High Commissioner, Brunei. Number: 115  
British High Commissioner, Canberra. Number: 52  
British High Commissioner, Wellington. Number: 52  
British High Commissioner, Delhi. Number: 17  
British High Commissioner, Karachi. Number: 18



193

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY

Malaysia: Defence Aid

Before leaving for London on 8th September, Tun Razak, Acting Prime Minister told press that Malaya would approach Commonwealth countries for contributions of aircraft and ships as well as seconded personnel for Malaysia's defence build-up if Britain is unable to meet her requirements.

2. Following are extracts from Sunday Mail of 9th September:-

"Of course, we shall see what Britain has to offer us.

"We hope to get some free supplies of big transport planes and naval vessels, also officers and other ranks on secondment to manage and maintain this equipment until our own men are available.

"We may have to approach other Commonwealth countries for assistance, especially for secondment of officers and other ranks.

"Their equipment and ours are about the same. They are standardised. Their officers and men received the same type of training as our officers and men".

As far as aid from Commonwealth countries was concerned, the government would probably look towards India, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand.

Tun Razak said: "It is quite natural for us to expect monetary and material aid from Britain as we are relieving her of defence responsibilities in the area, especially in Singapore.

"There is no doubt that the State Government of Singapore will also have to pay its share towards the Malaysia defence budget. The exact sum has not yet been worked out."

"It is not an easy thing to balance the expenditure for defence and development projects, especially when both are going on at the same time.

/ "Our.....

*Copy Defence  
Done 12/10/62*



OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Number: 666

Despatched: 0450 GMT 10th September,  
1962.

EN CLAIR

- 2 -

PRIORITY

"Our present defence budget, amounting to about \$90 million for this year, is less than 10 per cent of the total budget."

Generally the defence budget for Malaysia was likely to top the \$180 million mark -- almost 100 per cent increase in expenditure.

The increased expenditure was certain to be borne substantially by Britain's contribution to the defence budget.

It would therefore not affect the development projects, for which money had already been allocated or earmarked.

Action Officer: Mr. Jenkins.

PN.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM **GUARD.**

RB

I.24524

FROM,

DATED: 4TH OCTOBER, 1962  
1635

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,  
NEW YORK.

REC'D: 5TH OCTOBER, 1962  
1745



UN. 1348. SECRET AND GUARD.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION, OTTAWA SAV. 793, LONDON SAV. 886,  
THE HAGUE SAV. 133.

MALAYSIA.

THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION HAS TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE  
THAT ISMAIL (MALAYAN MINISTER OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND  
CHAIRMAN OF MALAYAN DELEGATION HERE) HAS INDICATED TO  
THE AMERICANS HERE SOME CONCERN ABOUT MALAYA'S POSITION IN  
THE UNITED NATIONS IN REGARD TO NORTH BORNEO TERRITORIES.  
HIS CONCERN STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT CONSULTATION HAS  
NOT BEEN WITH THE POPULATION OR WITH ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES  
BUT PRIMARILY WITH BRITISH AUTHORITIES AND NON-ELECTED  
PERSONS.

WITH THIS IN MIND ISMAIL SHOWED AN INTEREST IN HOW  
SELF-DETERMINATION WAS TO BE EXERCISED IN WEST NEW GUINEA  
AND QUESTIONED WHETHER IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THIS, IT WOULD  
REALLY BE NECESSARY TO HAVE A LEBISCITE.

PLIMSOLL.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.,  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES  
P.M., 'S.

6TH OCTOBER, 1962

151  
SECRET

SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

150

ED.

I.24013.

Dated: 29th September, 1962.  
1518.

Rec'd: 30th September, 1962.  
0830.

FROM:

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE.



218. CONFIDENTIAL.

For J.I.B. Representative.

Commissioner-General's Office have been considering  
general question of status of officials with particular reference  
to Malaysia. We will report as soon as possible.

E.A.  
DEFENCE.  
P.M'S.

30th September, 1962.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



# OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

:GS

0.17453

PRESS

Sent: 28th September, 1962  
1800

TO:

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR. ... 448.



REPEATED:

Australian Embassy,  
DJAKARTA. .... 710.

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE. .. 435.

UNCLASSIFIED.

Malaysia.

Following is an extract from Minister's statement on  
26th September in general debate at United Nations General  
Assembly:

Begins:

The Australian Government has watched with sympathetic  
interest the progress towards the realization of the establish-  
ment of a Federation of Malaysia to include Malaya, Singapore,  
North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei.

This is an imaginative and far-sighted development in  
an area of immediate interest to us, based on the most exten-  
sive, practicable consultations between the Governments and  
peoples concerned, and it could make an important contribution  
to the stability of South East Asia. Moreover, it represents  
a new step in the process of decolonization bringing, as it  
would, four territories in various stages of dependence to full  
independence within Malaysia. Australia also considers that  
a stable, viable state of this nature would play a more effect-  
ive role in South East Asia and in this organization than the  
states concerned could hope to do separately.

There are other situations in South and South East  
Asia which are of concern to Australia but which I shall not  
discuss on this occasion. West New Guinea, for example,  
would have called for special and lengthy mention if I had not  
spoken on it last Friday when the General Assembly adopted a  
resolution on the recent agreement between Indonesia and the  
Netherlands.

Ends.

.../2



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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# OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

:GS

0.17453

- 2 -

A/MIN.&DEPT E.A.  
MIN.&DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

28th September, 1962



147  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

DW

I.23535

FROM:

Sent. 25th September, 1962.  
1700

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

Rec'd. 25th September, 1962.  
2200

359. RESTRICTED.

Repeated Savingram London, Manila, Djakarta.

In long statement yesterday reviewing national scene Tunku referred to recent comments on Malaysia attributed to former Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamiojojo. While reaffirming friendship for Indonesia Tunku warned in strong terms against interference in Malaysian Affairs.

2. Tunku also described Filipino claim to North Borneo as "unfortunate" and said that any issue obstructing the harmony of Asain countries could jeopardise the Asian relationship. He added that British rights to North Borneo had been unquestioned for nearly 100 years.

3. Tunku's comment is strongest Malayan statement yet on Philipppinoes and Indonesian interest in Borneo territories.

4. Text by bag.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.  
P.M's.

26th September, 1962.

RESTRICTED



146

DW

## DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.22966

From:

Sent. 18th September, 1962.  
1810Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.Req'd. 19th September, 1962.  
0830.351.CONFIDENTIAL.

Singapore 26.

From Critchley.

Malaysia.

Your telegram 435.

The Federation is worried about the Borneo petition. The Malaysians fear that it may appeal to the Committee of Seventeen and be exploited by the Russians. Particularly in view of the emphasis placed on the right of self-determination. They also believe that it could be raised in the Fourth Committee while the Committee of Seventeen is adjourned.

2. The request that Federation or Union of Borneo Territories should be brought about with the Sultan of Brunei as Constitutional Head accords with long-standing policy of Azahari and Party Rakyat in Brunei. It would not be popular with SUPP but was presumably the price for Party Rakyat's support.

3. The leader of Pasok Momogun has been criticised by other North Borneo leaders for signing the petition and has admitted that he did so under pressure from SUPP and Party Rakyat. The Malaysians believe there is a good chance of inducing him to withdraw his support.

4. Malaysians believe that if necessary the British should take the lead in opposing the petition on the ground that the Cobbold Commission had already sounded public opinion and that the people interviewed could speak for the great majority of the population. They also have in mind organising, if necessary, petitions from the Pro-Malaysian parties in North Borneo and Sarawak. They are aware, however, of their weaknesses in Brunei where Party Rakyat has just won overwhelming victory in elections.

5. Ghazali is discussing tactics with British officials in London. I understand they feel that adjournment of committee provides breathing space and that there is not much need to consider counter measures at present.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A. (3027/1/2/3).  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.  
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES.  
P.M8s.

19th September, 1962.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

1.22500

MT

FROM.

DATED. 13TH SEPTEMBER, 1962  
1803

REC'D. 14TH SEPTEMBER, 1962  
0945

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS,  
NEW YORK.

UN1211. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION, OTTAWA BAG SAV.699, LONDON SAV.795.

MALAYSIA.

SECRETARIAT HAS RECEIVED COMMUNICATION FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF THREE POLITICAL PARTIES IN SARAWAK, NORTH BORNEO AND BRUNEI SUBMITTING A MEMORANDUM ON THE MALAYSIA PLAN AND REQUESTING AN ORAL HEARING.

(TEXT BY BAG)

THE MEMORANDUM REVIEWS THE HISTORY OF THE MALAYSIA PLAN AND ASKS THAT (A) THE UNITED NATIONS INTERVENE IN THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK ON THE GROUND THAT SUCH A TRANSFER WAS A DENIAL OF THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE CONCERNED AND (B) THAT ALTERNATIVELY THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT A PLEBISCITE BEFORE SUCH TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND (C) REQUESTS THAT A FEDERATION OR UNION OF THE BORNEO TERRITORIES BE BROUGHT ABOUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE, WITH THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI AS CONSTITUTIONAL HEAD.

A/MIN. AND DEPT E.A.  
MIN. AND DEPT TERRITORIES  
MIN. AND DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

14TH SEPTEMBER, 1962

RESTRICTED



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LJH.

I. 22406.

DATED. 12TH SEPTEMBER, 1962.  
1626.

REC'D. 13TH SEPTEMBER, 1962.  
1915.

FROM.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,  
NEW YORK.

UN. 1202. CONFIDENTIAL.

LONDON SAV. 789.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION, OTTAWA SAV. 693,

MALAYSIA.

THE MALAYAN MISSION HAS TOLD US THAT THEIR INFORMATION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PETITIONERS FROM BRUNEI AND SARAWAK ASKING FOR HEARINGS CONCERNING THE MALAYSIA PLAN HAD COME FROM:-

(A) REPORTS IN MALAYAN NEWSPAPERS AND -

(B) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FROM THE U.S. THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE TWO TERRITORIES HAD APPLIED FOR VISAS TO ENTER THE U.S.

2. THE MISSION THOUGHT THAT IF PETITIONERS WANTED A HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS, THEY WERE MORE LIKELY TO APPLY TO THE FOURTH COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAN TO THE COMMITTEE OF SEVENTEEN.

OUR INFORMANT SPECULATED THAT THE PETITIONS COULD BE SUBMITTED IN CONNEXION WITH THE ASSEMBLY ITEM ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION FROM NON SELF GOVERNING TERRITORIES.

HE APPEARED CONCERNED ABOUT THE HANDLING OF SUCH PETITIONS MAINLY BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN NO POPULAR CONSULTATION ABOUT MALAYSIA IN THE BORNEO TERRITORIES LIKE THE SINGAPORE REFERENDUM.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
A/MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES,  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.  
P.M.'s.

13TH SEPTEMBER, 1962.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL





CONFIDENTIAL

143

SINGAPORE - MERGER WITH MALAYA

In a referendum on 1st September the voters in Singapore approved by a substantial majority the People's Action Party Government's terms for merger with the Federation of Malaya as part of a Greater Malaysia embracing Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo,

The alternatives offered were:

A. Merger terms as agreed between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew whereby the Central Government would retain responsibility for Internal Security, Defence and External Affairs but grant Singapore local autonomy in Education and Labour matters. The Singapore State Legislature would remain in existence and Singapore would have 15 seats (less than proportionate representation) in the Federal lower house. Following merger Singaporeans would be entitled to "Malaysian citizenship". (357,000 in favour).

B. Complete merger as a Malayan State "in accordance with the constitutional documents" of the existing Federation of Malaya. (In practice about half the people of Singapore would fail to qualify for citizenship and local autonomy in Education and Labour would not have been granted). (9,000 in favour).

C. Entry into Malaysia "on terms no less favourable than the terms for the Borneo territories". (8,000 in favour).

In the original negotiations (November 1961) between the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew it was agreed that on merger Singaporeans would be entitled to Malaysian nationality but not citizenship. In practice this would have meant little more to Singaporeans than the right to carry a "Malaysian" passport and the consequent right to protection overseas as a national of the "Federation of Malaysia". Singaporeans would have still been denied within Malaya (and the Borneo Territories) the normal advantages of citizenship of these territories.

The Barisan Socialis (a Communist front) and other, less extreme, opposition groups in Singapore, attacked the agreements of November, 1961, on the ground that they implied only "second-class" citizenship in Malaysia for Singaporeans. The P.A.P. Government, which no longer commands an absolute majority was sensitive to these criticisms. Accordingly, Lee Kuan Yew extracted from the Tunku at the Malaysia talks in London in July 1962, concessions on the Singapore citizenship issue. It was agreed that, as well as a common nationality, there would also be a common citizenship of the new Malaysian Federation. It was specifically stated, however, that Malaysian citizens resident in Singapore would not be allowed to vote or stand as candidates in elections in Malaya unless they satisfied residential and other stringent qualifications for citizenship under existing Malayan law. (This proviso clearly reflects the Malayan Government's determination to minimise the risk of subversion from Singapore and to protect the privileged position of the Malays.)

Commenting on the new citizenship formula, the two leaders said:

(Lee Kuan Yew) - "There will be complete equality and parity between all citizens, whether they are in Malaya, Singapore or the Borneo territories. The only thing is that the right to vote and the right to stand for election, outside the State where a citizen is registered as a voter, is not automatically transferable."

CONFIDENTIAL



2.

(Tunku Abdul Rahman) - ".....we have agreed upon constitutional arrangements under which Singapore citizens will not only be nationals of the Federation of Malaysia but they will be citizens of Malaysia and will, as citizens, enjoy in Singapore rights, corresponding in all respects to those enjoyed by other citizens of Malaysia as a whole".

As a result of Lee Kuan Yew's assurances that Singaporeans would get full Malaysian citizenship rights except the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections, outside Singapore, a number of groups in Singapore (e.g. the Chinese Chamber of Commerce) previously opposed to the Government's merger terms, withdrew their opposition. This development, despite the fact that the terms of the referendum favoured the Government in any case, was an important factor in the large vote supporting the Government's case. Results (in round figures) were -

Alternative A	357,000
" B	9,000
" C	8,000

There were also 144,000 blank votes (mainly representing Barisan Socialist followers who are opposed to merger under any terms giving power over Internal Security to the Central Government) and 2,000 "uncertain" votes.

With a strong endorsement of its terms the way is now clear for the P.A.P. Government to negotiate with the Federation Government the final details of merger. These negotiations are due to be completed during the next five months after which further talks between the British and Malayan Governments on progress toward Malaysia will be held.

7th September, 1962.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

.GS

1.21693

SENT. 5TH SEPTEMBER, 1962  
1748

FROM.

REC'D. 6TH SEPTEMBER, 1962  
0355

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

4337. CONFIDENTIAL.



REPEATED KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE.

FROM EXTERNAL.

MALAYSIA.

GOLDS (C.R.O.) WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE US MUCH  
DETAIL ON THE LANSDOWNE MISSION'S WORK SINCE ALTHOUGH  
LANSDOWNE AND BRITISH MEMBERS RETURNED HERE LAST WEEK-END  
THEY HAVE BEEN MEETING TOGETHER AT LANSDOWNE'S HOUSE AND THERE  
HAS BEEN LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN THEIR IMPRESSIONS.  
LANSDOWNE IS TO REPORT TO SANDYS TODAY.

2. GOLDS SAID THAT THE MAIN CONCLUSION OF THE MISSION WAS THAT  
SARAWAK WOULD PRESENT FEW PROBLEMS BUT THAT THERE WAS STILL  
A SUBSTANTIAL JOB OF WORK TO BE DONE IN NORTH BORNEO.

LANSDOWNE HAD EXPRESSED THE OPINION IN A REPORT SENT  
BEFORE HIS RETURN TO ENGLAND THAT RAZAK HAD BEEN RATHER STARTLED  
TO DISCOVER HOW STRONG THE FEELING WAS IN NORTH BORNEO ON A  
NUMBER OF THE POINTS THAT REMAINED TO BE SETTLED.

LANSDOWNE THOUGHT THIS WAS ONE OF THE MOST USEFUL RESULTS  
OF THE MISSION.

RAZAK HAD PREVIOUSLY TENDED TO WAVE ASIDE BRITISH ASSESSMENTS  
OF THE VIEWS OF THE BORNEO PEOPLES AND CLAIM THAT THE MALAYANS  
UNDERSTOOD THESE PEOPLE MUCH BETTER THAN THE BRITISH DID.

THE LEADING EXAMPLE WAS THE RELIGIOUS ISSUE.

WHEN THE BRITISH HAD TOLD THEM THERE WAS OPPOSITION  
IN NORTH BORNEO TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAM AS THE STATE  
RELIGION THE MALAYANS HAD BRUSHED THIS ASIDE AND SAID THEY WOULD  
BE ABLE TO PERSUADE DONALD STEPHENS AND OTHERS THAT THEY  
HAD NO CAUSE FOR CONCERN.

IT HAD THEREFORE BEEN SALUTARY FOR RAZAK TO FIND THAT  
STEPHENS REALLY DID TAKE A STRONG LINE ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT  
HE WOULD NOT BE FOBBED OFF WITH GENERAL ASSURANCES BUT WANTED  
SPECIFIC GUARANTEES WRITTEN INTO THE CONSTITUTION.

ON OTHER POINTS SUCH AS LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION RAZAK HAD  
HAD TO FACE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A REAL QUESTION OF  
PROVIDING NORTH BORNEO WITH FIRM GUARANTEES.

3. THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY  
THE HOLDING OF A "PREPARATORY MEETING", AND VARIOUS WORKING  
PARTIES (FINANCE, ADMINISTRATION, JUDICIARY ETC.) HAVE BEEN  
SET UP.

THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE IS EXPECTED  
TO TAKE PLACE ABOUT MID-OCTOBER.

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



INWARD CABLEGRAM

.GS

I.21693

- 2 -

4. C.R.O. ARE OF COURSE VERY PLEASED WITH THE RESULT OF THE REFERENDUM IN SINGAPORE. GOLDS SAID IT WOULD "IMMENSELY STRENGTHEN" LEE KUAN YEW'S POSITION.

A LOT OF DOUBTERS HAD CLIMBED BACK ONTO HIS BAND-WAGON AND THERE WAS NOW ROOM FOR CONFIDENCE THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD ON UNTIL MERGER WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY.

GOLDS HOWEVER SEES DIFFICULTIES AT THE END OF THE ROAD ARISING FROM THE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS PLACED ON THE CITIZENSHIP SOLUTION BY LEE KUAN YEW AND THE TUNKU.

WHILE THIS HAS BEEN SATISFACTORILY GLOSSED OVER FOR THE TIME BEING THROUGH THE TUNKU'S RATHER VAGUE STATEMENTS THERE WILL HAVE TO BE FURTHER CLARIFICATION WHEN IT COMES TO THE POINT OF DRAFTING THE RELEVANT ARTICLE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

WHILE THE POSITION ON VOTING RIGHTS NOW SEEMS CLEAR GOLDS SEES RESIDUAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS RIGHTS OF SINGAPORE CITIZENS TO ENTER THE FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE.

MIN.&DEPT E.A.  
MIN.&DEPT TERRITORIES  
MIN.&DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

6TH SEPTEMBER, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



(38)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

EAP.

I.21549

Dated : 4th September, 1962  
1814  
Rec'd : 4th September, 1962.  
2300

FROM :

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE.



193. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Kuala Lumpur 24.

Singapore Referendum.

Although somewhat loaded, referendum questions and complete Government control of propaganda machinery leave some doubt whether the people of Singapore genuinely accepted that merger proposals represent the best arrangement for Singapore or were badgered into choosing least objectionable of three alternatives, large majority for proposals has, nevertheless, been received with considerable satisfaction. Realism and common sense of Chinese Community as shown by comparatively small total blank votes, in spite of intense grass roots campaign by Barisan Socialists, is regarded as particularly gratifying. Result is vindication of Lees' decision to submit merger proposals to popular vote in spite of misgivings of Advisors including British Commission. Lees' ability to cope with extreme left has also been demonstrated. Possibility of Barisan Socialists mustering sufficient support for further major effort to block merger now appears remote (although it cannot be entirely discontinued) and party is likely to concentrate on planning strategy for post-Malaysia period (also will P.A.P.)

2. Whether Singapore vote will have effect on North Bornea situation is uncertain. There is some hope, however, that a large majority for merger on terms which will leave control of Central Government in immediate future in Malayan hands may help to contract opposition to Malaysia for Borneo groups suspicious of effects of Malay domination.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'S

5th September, 1962.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

137

RB

I.19664

FROM:

Dated: 11th August, 1962  
1413

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE.

Rec'd: 11th August, 1962  
1939

178. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Kuala Lumpur 23.

Reference telegram No. 177.

Marshall's statement reflects his poor opinion of Lee Kuan Yew and is designed to deny him the credit for getting better terms. Lee had in fact, foreseen that Marshall would come back from London saying that the British had got them for him.

2. Moore saw Lee today and there were no recriminations, in fact, matter was not mentioned. I would not think a public formal denial on our part is necessary unless Lee should want it.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
P.M's.

12th August, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



136

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

PJ.

I.19661.

Dated: 11th August, 1962.  
1400.

FROM:

Rec'd: 11th August, 1962.  
1800.

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE.

177. UNCLASSIFIED PRIORITY.



Singapore.

In press interview last night on his return Mr. David Marshall is reported as denying that only the Russians and the Poles showed any interest in New York. He said the Australian and Italian Representatives were startled by some of the facts disclosed.

2. He referred to pending changes in the citizenship terms. He said it was likely that Malaysia citizenship would be offered to all Singapore citizens. He said this was done at the instigation of the British and Australian Governments. It was the main reason for Britain's request that Lee join the talks. He had good reasons for thinking Australia and Britain had made strong representations to the Tengku. According to the report he said the Australian and British Governments were fully conscious that there would be no stability in Malaysia if there was no identical citizenship for the citizens of the five territories.

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MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES  
MIN. & DEPT IMMIGRATION  
P.M.'s

12th August, 1962.



SECRET

175  
**Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office**

TO: OTTAWA  
CANBERRA  
WELLINGTON  
DELHI (ACTING H.C.)  
KARACHI  
COLOMBO (ACTING H.C.)  
ACCRA  
KUALA LUMPUR (ACTING H.C.)  
LAGOS (ACTING H.C.)  
NICOSIA (ACTING H.C.)  
FREETOWN (ACTING H.C.)  
DAR ES SALAAM  
KINGSTON  
SALISBURY  
DUBLIN



61/794.

(Dated 10th August, 1962)

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W.No.423 }  
DUBLIN No.212 } SAVING SECRET

MALAYSIA

My W.Nos.337 and 419.

Talks on the formation of Malaysia began in London on 17th July and continued until 31st. The Malayan delegation was led by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and included the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Tun Abdul Razak, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Tan Siew Sin, as well as officials from various departments. On the British side the Prime Minister presided at the opening and closing meetings. At other meetings the Commonwealth Secretary or Lord Lansdowne Minister of State at the Colonial Office presided.

Singapore

2. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, joined the talks on 29th July. En route to London he had appeared (at his own request) before the Committee of Seventeen at the United Nations to explain the position of the Singapore Government with regard to his forthcoming referendum on the merger proposals agreed between the Federation and Singapore Governments in November, 1961. (Paragraph 3 of Foreign Office Intel No.13 of January 12th 1962 refers). This had been the subject of accusations by petitioners from the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly. (The petitioners complained that the choice given to voters in the referendum was too restricted and wished it to include the possibility of independence as well as the various types of merger with Malaya). Lee had previously visited London in May. He then stressed with British Ministers the urgency of the establishment of Malaysia since owing to the weakness of his party's political position he doubted his ability to maintain effective support in Singapore for a Malaya-Singapore merger for more than a few months longer (see paragraph 4 below).

British View of Talks

3. The line that we took with the Malaysians throughout the discussions was that the Cobbold Report (which has now been /published

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Copy forwarded to Defence for information on 27.8.62.

SECRET

28 AUG 1962



published as Cmd.1794) sets out the views of an entirely independent Commission, which could not bind either Government by its recommendations. The Commission was however of great importance in establishing the possible areas of agreement between the Governments before the talks began. The Commission also played a useful role in spreading the concept of Malaysia throughout the Borneo territories among the wide cross section of peoples met there.

During the London talks we had, essentially, to reconcile three things:-

- (a) Our need to assure the future of Singapore within Malaysia at the earliest possible date; since the present opportunity, if lost through the fall of the pro-merger Government, would almost certainly never recur and Malaysia is the only solution which would ensure stability in the area and the continued utility of our base.
- (b) The Tunku's refusal to take on Singapore without the simultaneous incorporation in Malaysia of the Borneo territories.
- (c) The need to ensure a smooth and gradual takeover of the Borneo territories in view of their backwardness and other special problems, and the retention for this purpose of a substantial number of the present British personnel.

#### Malayan Position

4. The Tunku showed himself to be very concerned with the Singapore problem and in particular the position of Lee's Government the stability of which has been uncertain. Both Lee and the Tunku consider that merger is the only way to prevent Singapore coming eventually under communist control. The Tunku was however emphatic that he could not envisage the admission of Singapore into the Federation prior to the Borneo territories. To do so would tip the balance of population in favour of the non-Malay population by 869,000 which would be contrary to the mandate he had received from Parliament and his party. The Tunku therefore insisted on the simultaneous entry of the Borneo territories. He also felt bound to refuse any suggestion that British Governors should be retained in North Borneo and Sarawak after the transfer of sovereignty. This he felt would open him to severe attacks as an instrument of "British imperialism" and would provide the communists with a chance to create dissension.

#### Agreed Proposals

5. The Agreement now reached with the Malaysians is not to be published, although as you will have seen, some of its provisions have been made public in the joint statement of 1st August. Following is a summary of the main provisions. Detailed aspects of starred items will be for consideration in the Intergovernmental Committee referred to in item (d) below.

- (a) Malaysia will be brought into being by 31st August, 1963 with the simultaneous transfer of British sovereignty over Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak to Malaya.
- (b) Defence arrangements will remain as set out in Cmd.1563 (paragraphs 6 and 7 of Foreign Office Intel No.13 of 1961).

/(c) Should



- (c) Should the British and Malayan Governments consider it desirable Malaysia can be brought into being at an earlier date though in that case the present Governors of Sarawak and North Borneo would be retained with their present powers but no longer responsible to Her Majesty's Government until August, 1963. (Note. This provision is intended to safeguard as far as possible against the fall of the present Singapore Government.)
- (d) An Intergovernmental Committee under British chairmanship (Lord Lansdowne) will work out detailed constitutional and administrative arrangements including the special safeguards for the Borneo Territories and the delegation of Federal powers to the State Governments during a transition period. (As announced in the Joint Public Statement the detailed constitutional arrangements and safeguards will be drawn up after consultation with the legislatures of the two territories.)
- (e) The Heads of State in North Borneo and Sarawak will be appointed by His Majesty The Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting in his discretion but after consultation with the Chief Minister. However, in the case of the first appointments the Malayan Government will consult the British Government before tendering advice to His Majesty.
- \*(f) Under the new State Constitutions for North Borneo and Sarawak the Governor will be a constitutional Head of State and will appoint as Chief Minister, to preside over the Executive Council, a person who is likely to command the confidence of a majority in the Assembly. Until the latter is fully elected the State Secretary, State Legal Adviser and State Financial Officer (who are likely to be expatriates for some years to come) will be ex officio members of both Legislative Assembly and Executive Council.
- (g) The States of the new Federation will not have the right of secession.
- (h) Representation in the Federal Parliament will be weighted to take account of the size as well as the population of the Territories.
- (i) The initial acquisition of Malaysian citizenship in the Borneo Territories will be broadly as recommended by the Cobbold Commission. Thereafter the procedure for acquisition and termination will follow the existing provisions of the Constitution of Malaya. The arrangements for citizenship for the inhabitants of Singapore will be substantially as set out in paragraph 14 of Singapore Cmd.33 of 1961 dealt with in Foreign Office Intel. No.13 referred to above. But the nomenclature used in that paragraph will be amended so that Singapore citizens will be citizens of Malaysia (i.e. not just "nationals") while retaining their Singapore citizenship but there will be reciprocal restrictions on franchise rights i.e. citizens of Singapore will not be allowed to vote or stand for election in any part of Malaysia outside Singapore (and vice-versa). Borneans, like present citizens of the Federation of Malaya, will be citizens of Malaysia only.

/ (j)



- \*(j) Legislative lists will follow the present Constitution of Malaya except as otherwise agreed between the Malayan and British Governments following detailed consideration by the Intergovernmental Committee.
- \*(k) The Borneo Territories will have a High Court from which appeals will lie to the Federal Supreme Court.
- \*(l) There will be freedom of religion in accordance with the Constitution. Measures to reassure the Borneo peoples about this will be one of the tasks of the Intergovernmental Committee.
- \*(m) The national language will be Malay but English will continue to be an official language in North Borneo and Sarawak for as long as the Borneo Territories desire.
- \*(n) The Borneo Territories will have certain special powers to control immigration, including immigration from other parts of Malaysia.
- \*(o) Indigenous races will enjoy a special position analogous to that of the Malays in the present Federation.
- \*(p) Education will be a Federal subject but the Intergovernmental Committee will consider the problem of languages of instruction and of the delegation of powers to State or local education bodies in the Borneo Territories.
- \*(q) The adjustment of tariffs will be effected by stages.

#### Brunei

6. The Legislative Council of Brunei passed a resolution on 17th July approving a message from the Sultan supporting the principle of Malaysia with the proviso that the terms of entry negotiated "should not diminish the status of Brunei as a constitutional state". It was agreed in our discussions with the Tunku that the inclusion of Brunei in Malaysia would be welcomed and separate negotiations on conditions for entry of Brunei are expected in the autumn.

#### The Philippine Claim

7. The agreement reached by Her Majesty's Government and the Malayan Government on the future of the Borneo Territories is much resented by the Philippine Government, who say it cannot affect the validity of their own claim to North Borneo (Foreign Office Intel No.89 of June 1st). We are resisting their pressure for discussions on this subject on the grounds that they have not so far produced a prima facie case. We hope to prolong the present exchange of Notes as much as possible and to avoid a major quarrel with the Philippines until "Malaysia Day" is near enough for us to be able to count on the co-operation of the Malayan Government, who have so far shown reluctance to play an active part in the dispute which they profess to regard as a purely Anglo-Philippine matter at this stage.

#### Conclusions

8. While many points - some of importance - remain to be resolved by the Inter-governmental Committee, the signing of the agreement represents an important first step towards safeguarding the future of this area both from the defence and economic aspects. The Borneo Territories were too small and undeveloped to stand on their own as independent territories. In conjunction with Malaya and Singapore  
/they



-5-

they will form a viable unit which in the light of the past record of the Federation Government has every prospect of successful development.

(To Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington.)

9. You may draw on above in conversations with Commonwealth authorities stressing secrecy. Representatives of Canada/Australia/New Zealand Houses in London have been given this background.

(To others.)

10. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 are strictly for your own information.

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132

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

TO: KUALA LUMPUR (ACTING H.C.)  
KUCHING  
JESSELTON } (SAVING)(VIA. COLONIAL OFFICE)  
SINGAPORE }  
BRUNEI }

RPTD: OTTAWA  
CANBERRA  
WELLINGTON

(Dated 10th August, 1962).



No.136 SAVING UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed Kuala Lumpur No.136 Saving, and Saving to Kuching, Jesselton, Singapore and Brunei, repeated Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington as Z.No.58 Saving.

Following is text of Tunis telegram No.25 Saving dated 10th August to Foreign Office. Begin:

Al Amal (Neo Destour) has commented as follows on the arrangements announced by Mr.Duncan Sandys about the coming into being of the Malaysia Federation:-

"By this arrangement Britain has given greater proof than she has done in any of her past experiments that she continuously seeks safeguards for the future: for she has chosen to prepare for the freedom of Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore in such a way that this freedom will not result in the emergence of weak and poor little states which will have to seek help from the government which has ruled them in the past or from any other government, and thus slip back in the direction of concealed colonialism... This agreement also has another meaning, namely that Britain understands that the real significance of giving independence is to transform ties which bind two human groups together from the ancient ones of subservience and subjugation to new ones of mutual interest and advantage. We have seen that Britain has been careful to provide solutions for the various countries which it has ruled which ensure that independence does not at a later stage turn out to be a source of evil either to those to whom it has been granted or to Britain herself. There is no doubt that this experiment is worth watching because it will have an influence on the future of this sensitive region of the Philippines, Indochina, Indonesia and particularly of Borneo Island, which is divided into two sectors, the south which is part of Indonesia and the north which will be included in this new Malaysia Federation. Ends.

Copy to be forwarded to Defence for information on 27.8.62



DW  
FROM.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.19348

SENT. 8th August, 1962.  
1735

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

REC'D. 9th August, 1962.  
0250

3830. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED WASHINGTON 414, U.N. NEW YORK 191.  
REPEATED SAVINGRAM SINGAPORE, KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA.

FROM EXTERNAL.

MALAYSIA.

I SAW WALLACE, COLONIAL OFFICE, THIS AFTERNOON.  
HE WILL BE ACCOMPANYING LANSLOWNE TO THE BORNEO TERRITORIES  
THIS WEEKEND.

THE MISSION HAS THREE PURPOSES:

- (1) TO EXPLAIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MALAYSIA TO  
LEADERS IN THE TERRITORIES AND TO REASSURE THEM ABOUT  
THE FUTURE WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL SHORTLY  
BE WITHDRAWING.
- (2) TO EXPOSE RAZAK TO OPINION THERE WHICH MAY BRING HOME  
TO MALAYAN LEADERS THAT EVERYTHING IS NOT GOING TO BE AS  
EASY AS THEY SOMETIMES THINK AND ALSO TO GET HIM KNOWN  
IN THE AREA.
- (3) TO REASSURE THE EXPATRIATE STAFF IN THE HOPE THAT AS MANY  
AS POSSIBLE OF THEM WILL STAY.

FOR THIS PURPOSE THEY ARE TAKING WITH THEM ROGERS (NOW  
WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) WHO  
HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN RUNNING THE OVERSEAS SERVICES.

2. I HAD A LONG DISCUSSION WITH WALLACE ABOUT THE  
COBBOLD REPORT AND THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TUNKU AND  
LEE KUAN YEW ABOUT CITIZENSHIP BUT TURNED UP NOTHING NEW.

WALLACE DID, HOWEVER, SAY THAT MOORE, SELKIRK'S DEPUTY, HAS  
SOME PERSONAL DOUBTS ABOUT MALAYSIA ARISING FROM HIS FEELING  
THAT THE MALAYANS MAY TURN OUT TO BE LACKING IN THE NECESSARY  
CAPACITY TO MAKE A GO OF IT.

3. I SUBSEQUENTLY SAW WARNER, FOREIGN OFFICE, TO DISCUSS  
THE CLAIM OF THE PHILIPPINES TO NORTH BORNEO.

HE HAS PROMISED ME A COPY OF THE BRITISH NOTE  
DELIVERED IN MANILA WHICH WHILE MAINTAINING BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY  
DELIBERATELY MISUNDERSTANDS FILIPINO DEMANDS AND BEGS FURTHER  
QUESTIONS.

THIS IS PART OF A DELIBERATE POLICY OF DRAWING OUT  
DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE PHILIPPINES.

THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAS NO INTENTION OF GETTING  
INTO LEGAL ARGUMENTATION ON THE MATTER AND REGARD IT ENTIRELY  
AS POLITICAL SUBJECT.

WARNER REFUSED TO ANSWER MY QUESTION WHETHER THE PHILIPPINES  
HAD A GOOD LEGAL CASE CLAIMING THAT THIS WAS IRRELEVANT.

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

IT WOULD BE CRAZY IN VIEW OF THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ALLOW SUCH A SUBJECT FOR INSTANCE TO GET INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT.

4. THE BRITISH HAVE RECEIVED ANOTHER NOTE FROM THE PHILIPPINES ACCUSING THEM OF COLLUDING WITH THE MALAYANS TO DO THEM, PHILIPPINES, OUT OF THEIR RIGHTS.

THE FOREIGN OFFICE WELCOMES THIS IN THAT IT WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF FORCING THE MALAYANS THEMSELVES INTO THE ARGUMENT.

SO FAR THE TUNKU HAS INSISTED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM DOES ALL THE WORK.

5. WARNER SEEMS TO EXPECT THAT THIS ARGUMENT MAY BECOME RATHER NASTY BUT THE UNITED KINGDOM IS PREPARED TO RIDE OUT THE STORM AND WOULD NOT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE HANDING THE TERRITORY OVER.

SHANN.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.  
P.M's.

9th August, 1962.

CONFIDENTIAL



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

GS

I.18981

SENT. 3RD AUGUST, 1962  
1555

REC'D. 4TH AUGUST, 1962  
0150

FROM.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

3759. SECRET.

REPEATED KUALA LUMPUR 17, SINGAPORE 15.

FROM EXTERNAL.

MALAYSIA.

OUR TELEGRAM 3724.

GOLDS, C.R.O., LAST NIGHT GAVE CANADIANS, NEW ZEALANDERS AND OURSELVES FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS.

2.. GOLDS FIRST DISCUSSED THE SINGAPORE CITIZENSHIP ISSUE.  
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN LEE KWAN YEW AND THE TUNKU ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT LEE HAD DEMANDED THAT THE PROJECTED MALAYSIAN NATIONALITY BE DROPPED AND THAT THERE SHOULD ONLY BE EQUAL CITIZENSHIP FOR ALL CITIZENS IN THE NEW FEDERATION.

HE TOLD THE BRITISH THAT IF HE COULD NOT OBTAIN THIS HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO REFUTE CHARGE THAT HE HAD NEGOTIATED SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP FOR SINGAPORE.

HE ASKED THEM TO HELP HIM WITH THE TUNKU ON THIS ISSUE.

GOLDS SAID THEY HAD FIRST REPLIED TO LEE THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT WITHOUT CONSULTING THEM IF MISUNDERSTANDINGS HAD ARISEN HE WOULD HAVE TO SORT THEM OUT HIMSELF.

HOWEVER LEE HAD INSISTED THAT HE COULD NOT SURVIVE UNLESS HE WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN A MORE FAVOURABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP AGREEMENT.

IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT HE OBTAIN THIS IF THE WHOLE PLAN WAS NOT TO FALL THROUGH.

BRITISH HAD, THEREFORE, SOUGHT WITH LEE TO OBTAIN A FORMULA FROM THE TUNKU WHICH COULD BE SOLD IN SINGAPORE.

3.. THE ARRANGEMENT UPON WHICH THEY HAVE SETTLED IS THAT ALL CITIZENS IN THE FEDERATION WILL BE MALAYSIAN CITIZENS.

THERE WILL, HOWEVER, BE AN ADDITIONAL SINGAPORE CITIZENSHIP.

ALL CITIZENS OF SINGAPORE WILL BE MALAYSIAN CITIZENS BUT OTHER MALAYSIAN CITIZENS WILL NOT OF COURSE HAVE SINGAPORE CITIZENSHIP.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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GOLDS SAID THAT THIS SATISFIED LEE KWAN YEW SINCE IT WOULD ENABLE HIM TO CLAIM WITH SOME PLAUSIBILITY THAT FAR FROM GETTING A WORSE DEAL FOR SINGAPOREANS THAN THE BORNEANS HAD OBTAINED HE HAD GOT A BETTER DEAL, NAMELY MALAYSIAN CITIZENSHIP AS WELL AS GREATER AUTONOMY.

THE TUNKU HAD AGREED TO THIS ARRANGEMENT BECAUSE HE HAD REALISED THAT IT DID NOT, IN FACT, EXPOSE HIM TO THE DANGER THAT SINGAPORE CITIZENS WOULD FLOOD INTO THE REMAINDER OF THE FEDERATION AND AFFECT THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

IT WAS NOT THOUGHT LIKELY THAT THE CHINESE WOULD WANT TO EMIGRATE FROM SINGAPORE PROVIDED THAT CONDITIONS THERE REMAINED SATISFACTORY.

ALSO THE SECURITY ORDINANCE GAVE THE FEDERATION GOVERNMENT VERY WIDE POWERS TO PREVENT SINGAPOREANS RESIDING ELSEWHERE IN THE FEDERATION.

THE MAIN SAFEGUARD, HOWEVER, WAS THAT SINGAPORE CITIZENS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GO ON THE ELECTORAL ROLL ELSEWHERE IN THE FEDERATION.

THIS WOULD BE MADE EXPLICIT IN THE RELEVANT LEGISLATION.

GOLDS AGREED THAT THIS WOULD TAKE MUCH OF THE FORCE OUT OF ANY CLAIM BY LEE THAT HE HAD GOT A BETTER DEAL FOR THE SINGAPOREANS.

GOLDS SAID, HOWEVER, THAT LEE WAS OF THE OPINION THAT HE COULD COUNTER THIS BY POINTING OUT THE COMPARATIVE EASE WITH WHICH SINGAPORE CITIZENSHIP COULD BE ACQUIRED.

4.. LEE KWAN YEW HAS YET TO AGREE WITH THE TUNKU WHEN THE ABOVE AGREEMENT IS TO BE ANNOUNCED.

5.. GOLDS WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE NEGOTIATIONS ARISING OUT OF THE COBBOLD REPORT.

6.. HE SAID THAT BRITISH GOVERNORS WOULD STAY ON UNTIL 31ST AUGUST 1963 (OR ANY EARLIER DATE THAT MIGHT BE DETERMINED FOR TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY) AND WOULD THEN BE REPLACED BY CONSTITUTIONAL HEADS OF STATE WHO WOULD BE APPOINTED BY THE YANG DI PERTUAN AGONG.

THE PRESENT CHIEF SECRETARIES WOULD REMAIN AS HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE AFTER THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY.

THE CHIEF SECRETARY, THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY AND THE LEGAL OFFICER (ALL OF WHOM WILL IT IS HOPED AGREE TO CARRY OVER FROM THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION) IN EACH OF THE TERRITORIES WILL BE EX OFFICIO MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE ASSEMBLY BECOMES FULLY ELECTED.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

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MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ASSOCIATED WITH INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT WILL ACQUIRE RESPONSIBILITIES ONLY GRADUALLY.

ALTHOUGH PRESSED ON THE EXECUTIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND PROVISIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT GOLDS DID NOT FILL IN THE DETAILS.

HE, SUBSEQUENTLY, QUOTED A BRIEF EXTRACT FROM THE SECRET HEADS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE TUNKU WHICH INDICATED THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WOULD NOT BE CALLED MINISTERS AND THAT DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WOULD BE CHANNELLED THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY (WHO WOULD HIMSELF BE A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL).

THE TIMING OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT WILL BE A MATTER FOR THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

7.. WITH REGARD TO THE TRANSFER OF POWERS GOLDS SAID IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY ALL SUBJECTS EXCEPT EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, INTERNAL SUBVERSION AND DEFENCE WOULD BE DELEGATED BACK TO THE NEW STATES.

IT WAS AGREED THAT WHEN SOVEREIGNTY WAS TRANSFERRED THERE SHOULD BE THE MINIMUM ALTERATION OF PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS.

HOWEVER, DETAILS OF THE TRANSFER WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BY THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

GOLDS SAID THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS IN THE FINANCIAL FIELD THAT WOULD REQUIRE SOME FAIRLY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

IN PARTICULAR THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF DEVELOPMENT AID FUNDS.

AID WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE CHANNELLED THROUGH THE FEDERATION GOVERNMENT (WHO WOULD WANT TO TAKE THE CREDIT FOR IT) WITHOUT DISRUPTING EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS.

8.. ON SAFEGUARDS GOLDS SAID NEARLY ALL THE WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE BY THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

THE MALAYSIANS WERE OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY COULD SECURE AGREEMENT THAT ISLAM SHOULD BE THE STATE RELIGION BY BRINGING LEADERS OF OTHER SECTS IN THE TERRITORIES OVER TO MALAYA FOR A VISIT WHERE THEY COULD BE CONVINCED OF THE REALITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM THERE.

THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES ON OFFICIAL LANGUAGES WERE NOT TOO GREAT.

THE MALAYANS WANTED TO KEEP A TEN YEAR LIMIT ON ENGLISH AS AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE AND THE BORNEANS WANTED THIS ERASED.

GOLDS SAID THAT AS LONG AS PASSIONS WERE NOT AROUSED THIS WOULD BE NEGOTIATED.

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THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGES OF INSTRUCTION PROMISED TO BE MORE DIFFICULT.

9.. GOLDS SAID THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WANTED TO AVOID BECOMING INVOLVED IN BARGAINING BETWEEN BRUNEI AND THE FEDERATION.

HE THOUGHT THE SULTAN WOULD INSIST ON TERMS AT LEAST AS FAVOURABLE AS THOSE FOR NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK.

HE WOULD, THEREFORE, PRESUMABLY WANT TO KNOW WHAT THE LANSDOWNE COMMITTEE CAME UP WITH.

HIS PRESTIGE WAS INVOLVED AS SENIOR RULER WITH AMBITIONS TO BE THE NEXT YANG.

BRUNEI WILL PROBABLY SIGN THE FORMAL AGREEMENT IN JANUARY ALONG WITH U.K., MALAYA, SINGAPORE, NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK.

10.. PRESNT PLANNING IS THAT LANSDOWNE SHOULD GO OUT TO THE TERRITORIES IN ABOUT A WEEK'S TIME.

HE AND RAZAK WOULD NOT BE PRESENT FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK.

IN LANSDOWNE'S ABSENCE A BRITISH OFFICIAL WOULD ALWAYS BE IN THE CHAIR.

THEY WOULD BE IN THE TERRITORIES WHEN THE ASSEMBLIES WERE DEBATING THE ISSUE.

THUS THERE WOULD, INEVITABLY, BE AN INTERACTION BETWEEN THE COMMITTEE AND THE ASSEMBLIES.

THE DELIBERATIONS OF EACH WOULD AFFECT THOSE OF THE OTHER.

11.. GOLDS CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE HOPED OUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE AS GENEROUS AS POSSIBLE TO THE NEW FEDERATION.

THE TUNKU HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE EASY FOR HIM WITH CURRENT LOW PRICES FOR TIN AND RUBBER TO TAKE ON THE NEW RESPONSIBILITIES.

FURTHERMORE IT WOULD HELP TO ALLAY THE DOUBTS OF THE "HARD CORE" 20% IN THE TERRITORIES IF THE TUNKU COULD ANNOUNCE THAT HE HAD SECURED SUBSTANTIAL NEW DEVELOPMENT MONIES FOR THEM.

12.. SEE ALSO OUR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

MIN. & DEPT.E.A.  
P.M.'s

4TH AUGUST, 1962

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PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

125

ATG:GG

THE PRIME MINISTER:

MALAYSIA

I attach a United Kingdom guidance telegram, against the possibility that you might be asked questions on this next week.



.....A.T. Griffiths...  
(A.T. Griffith).

*Ran*

10 AUG 1962

3rd August, 1962.

*file*



CONFIDENTIAL

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## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1935 hours 1.8.62  
Received: 0800 hours 2.8.62

URGENT

CONFIDENTIAL

W.419

REPEATED PRIORITY: SALISBURY, DUBLIN 98 AND IMMEDIATE UKCOM SINGAPORE.

My telegram W337.

### MALAYSIA

Agreement was reached in the Anglo-Malayan Ministerial talks on 31st July. An agreed joint statement has been issued today 1st August at 1430 hours G.M.T. For text see L.P.S.

2. At your discretion you should make the points in the following paragraphs.
3. This is an important achievement in line with established British policy of democratic evolution in our dependent territories.
4. Malaysia as a viable and prospering economic unit will be a focus of stability in South East Asia.
5. As specified in the statement the arrangements for the Borneo territories will contain safeguards regarding certain matters of special interest to the people of the territories.
6. The future defence arrangements were agreed between the British and Malayan Governments last November (Cmd.1563). These involve the continued use of Singapore as a base.
7. The legislatures of North Borneo and Sarawak will be consulted on constitutional arrangements and safeguards. (Singapore Legislature has already approved by large majority principle of merger and Prime Minister of Singapore proposes in addition to hold referendum.).
8. On the question of the Philippine claim to North Borneo you may say that so long as we remain responsible for the territory we shall resist the claim in the interests of the people of North Borneo and also because of our undoubted legal rights.

*Copy to Reference  
2/8/62*

CONFIDENTIAL

/9.



CONFIDENTIAL

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## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

- 2 -

9. If questioned about the arrangements for Brunei you should refer to last paragraph of statement and <sup>add</sup> that these are matters for negotiation with the Sultan.
10. You will receive by L.P.S. text of Secretary of State's replies to main supplementaries in House of Commons. You should also draw on these as necessary. Full text follows Saving.
11. You should note that date for establishment of Malaysia is "by" (repeat by) and not "on" 31st August but should not draw special attention to this.

SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SECRET

SRG

I.18982

DATED. 3RD AUGUST, 1962  
1602

FROM.

REC'D. 4TH AUGUST, 1962  
0212

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.



3760. SECRET.

REPEATED SINGAPORE 16, KUALA LUMPUR 18.

FROM EXTERNAL.

MALAYSIA:

OUR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

GOLDS GAVE ONLY THE MOST GENERAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT DISCUSSIONS (WHICH HE SAID HAD TAKEN PLACE DURING THE TUNKU'S VISIT) ON A SECURITY ACTION AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS IN SINGAPORE.

HE SAID, INTER ALIA, THAT BRITAIN HAD NO INTENTION OF SHIRKING RESPONSIBILITIES OR HANDING OVER A SINGAPORE WHICH WAS ABOUT TO GO UP IN FLAMES.

BUT THEY COULD NOT AGREE TO CARRY THE BUNDLE UNTIL THEY WERE TOLD WHAT WAS IN IT.

WE INFER FROM THIS THAT THE TUNKU HAS BEEN ASKED TO PROVIDE SOME DETAILED INDICATION OF WHAT EXACTLY HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE DONE.

2.. GOLDS SAID THAT THE FORMULA "BY 31ST AUGUST" IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ON THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN CHOSEN DELIBERATELY WITH SINGAPORE IN MIND.

THE MAIN DANGER TO LEE IS THAT ONE OR MORE OF HIS PRESENT SUPPORTERS MIGHT DECIDE TO JUMP OFF HIS BANDWAGON.

IF THIS HAPPENED LEE COULD SAY THAT HE HAD AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE BRITISH AND MALAYANS THAT THE MERGER COULD BE CARRIED THROUGH AT VERY SHORT NOTICE AT ANY TIME BEFORE 31ST AUGUST 1963 IF NECESSARY.

IT IS THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD HELP LEE TO DETER ANY DESERTERS FROM MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITHDRAWING THEIR SUPPORT.

SECRET

SECRET

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
P.M's

4TH AUGUST, 1962



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SECRET

GS I.18981  
SENT. 3RD AUGUST, 1962  
1555  
REC'D. 4TH AUGUST, 1962  
0150  
FROM.  
AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.



3759. SECRET.

REPEATED KUALA LUMPUR 17, SINGAPORE 15.  
FROM EXTERNAL.

MALAYSIA.

OUR TELEGRAM 3724.

GOLDS, C.R.O., LAST NIGHT GAVE CANADIANS, NEW ZEALANDERS AND OURSELVES FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS.

2.. GOLDS FIRST DISCUSSED THE SINGAPORE CITIZENSHIP ISSUE.  
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN LEE KWAN YEW AND THE TUNKU ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT LEE HAD DEMANDED THAT THE PROJECTED MALAYSIAN NATIONALITY BE DROPPED AND THAT THERE SHOULD ONLY BE EQUAL CITIZENSHIP FOR ALL CITIZENS IN THE NEW FEDERATION.

HE TOLD THE BRITISH THAT IF HE COULD NOT OBTAIN THIS HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO REFUTE CHARGE THAT HE HAD NEGOTIATED SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP FOR SINGAPORE.

HE ASKED THEM TO HELP HIM WITH THE TUNKU ON THIS ISSUE.

GOLDS SAID THEY HAD FIRST REPLIED TO LEE THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED THE HEADS OF AGREEMENT WITHOUT CONSULTING THEM IF MISUNDERSTANDINGS HAD ARISEN HE WOULD HAVE TO SORT THEM OUT HIMSELF.

HOWEVER LEE HAD INSISTED THAT HE COULD NOT SURVIVE UNLESS HE WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN A MORE FAVOURABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP AGREEMENT.

IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT HE OBTAIN THIS IF THE WHOLE PLAN WAS NOT TO FALL THROUGH.

BRITISH HAD, THEREFORE, SOUGHT WITH LEE TO OBTAIN A FORMULA FROM THE TUNKU WHICH COULD BE SOLD IN SINGAPORE.

3.. THE ARRANGEMENT UPON WHICH THEY HAVE SETTLED IS THAT ALL CITIZENS IN THE FEDERATION WILL BE MALAYSIAN CITIZENS.

THERE WILL, HOWEVER, BE AN ADDITIONAL SINGAPORE CITIZENSHIP.

ALL CITIZENS OF SINGAPORE WILL BE MALAYSIAN CITIZENS BUT OTHER MALAYSIAN CITIZENS WILL NOT OF COURSE HAVE SINGAPORE CITIZENSHIP.

.../2

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GS

I.18981

- 3 -

MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ASSOCIATED WITH INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT WILL ACQUIRE RESPONSIBILITIES ONLY GRADUALLY.

ALTHOUGH PRESSED ON THE EXECUTIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND PROVISIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT GOLDS DID NOT FILL IN THE DETAILS.

HE, SUBSEQUENTLY, QUOTED A BRIEF EXTRACT FROM THE SECRET HEADS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE TUNKU WHICH INDICATED THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WOULD NOT BE CALLED MINISTERS AND THAT DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WOULD BE CHANNELLED THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY (WHO WOULD HIMSELF BE A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL).

THE TIMING OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT WILL BE A MATTER FOR THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

7.. WITH REGARD TO THE TRANSFER OF POWERS GOLDS SAID IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY ALL SUBJECTS EXCEPT EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, INTERNAL SUBVERSION AND DEFENCE WOULD BE DELEGATED BACK TO THE NEW STATES.

IT WAS AGREED THAT WHEN SOVEREIGNTY WAS TRANSFERRED THERE SHOULD BE THE MINIMUM ALTERATION OF PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS.

HOWEVER, DETAILS OF THE TRANSFER WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BY THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

GOLDS SAID THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS IN THE FINANCIAL FIELD THAT WOULD REQUIRE SOME FAIRLY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

IN PARTICULAR THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF DEVELOPMENT AID FUNDS.

AID WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE CHANNELLED THROUGH THE FEDERATION GOVERNMENT (WHO WOULD WANT TO TAKE THE CREDIT FOR IT) WITHOUT DISRUPTING EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS.

8.. ON SAFEGUARDS GOLDS SAID NEARLY ALL THE WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE BY THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

THE MALAYSIANS WERE OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY COULD SECURE AGREEMENT THAT ISLAM SHOULD BE THE STATE RELIGION BY BRINGING LEADERS OF OTHER SECTS IN THE TERRITORIES OVER TO MALAYA FOR A VISIT WHERE THEY COULD BE CONVINCED OF THE REALITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM THERE.

THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES ON OFFICIAL LANGUAGES WERE NOT TOO GREAT.

THE MALAYANS WANTED TO KEEP A TEN YEAR LIMIT ON ENGLISH AS AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE AND THE BORNEANS WANTED THIS ERASED.

GOLDS SAID THAT AS LONG AS PASSIONS WERE NOT AROUSED THIS WOULD BE NEGOTIATED.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.18981

GS

- 4 -

THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGES OF INSTRUCTION PROMISED TO BE MORE DIFFICULT.

9.. GOLDS SAID THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WANTED TO AVOID BECOMING INVOLVED IN BARGAINING BETWEEN BRUNEI AND THE FEDERATION.

HE THOUGHT THE SULTAN WOULD INSIST ON TERMS AT LEAST AS FAVOURABLE AS THOSE FOR NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK.

HE WOULD, THEREFORE, PRESUMABLY WANT TO KNOW WHAT THE LANSDOWNE COMMITTEE CAME UP WITH.

HIS PRESTIGE WAS INVOLVED AS SENIOR RULER WITH AMBITIONS TO BE THE NEXT YANG.

BRUNEI WILL PROBABLY SIGN THE FORMAL AGREEMENT IN JANUARY ALONG WITH U.K., MALAYA, SINGAPORE, NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK.

10.. PRESNT PLANNING IS THAT LANSDOWNE SHOULD GO OUT TO THE TERRITORIES IN ABOUT A WEEK'S TIME.

HE AND RAZAK WOULD NOT BE PRESENT FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK.

IN LANSDOWNE'S ABSENCE A BRITISH OFFICIAL WOULD ALWAYS BE IN THE CHAIR.

THEY WOULD BE IN THE TERRITORIES WHEN THE ASSEMBLIES WERE DEBATING THE ISSUE.

THUS THERE WOULD, INEVITABLY, BE AN INTERACTION BETWEEN THE COMMITTEE AND THE ASSEMBLIES.

THE DELIBERATIONS OF EACH WOULD AFFECT THOSE OF THE OTHER.

11.. GOLDS CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE HOPED OUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE AS GENEROUS AS POSSIBLE TO THE NEW FEDERATION.

THE TUNKU HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE EASY FOR HIM WITH CURRENT LOW PRICES FOR TIN AND RUBBER TO TAKE ON THE NEW RESPONSIBILITIES.

FURTHERMORE IT WOULD HELP TO ALLAY THE DOUBTS OF THE "HARD CORE" 20% IN THE TERRITORIES IF THE TUNKU COULD ANNOUNCE THAT HE HAD SECURED SUBSTANTIAL NEW DEVELOPMENT MONIES FOR THEM.

12.. SEE ALSO OUR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

MIN. & DEPT.E.A.  
P.M.'s

4TH AUGUST, 1962

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,  
CANBERRA.

FOR THE PRESS

Released only in Canberra.

PR 86

3rd August, 1962.

MALAYSIA.

Statement by the Minister for External  
Affairs.



The Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, said today that the decisions reached in principle in the recent talks in London between the British and Malayan Governments represent an important step towards the realization of Tunku Abdul Rahman's imaginative concept of a Federation of Malaysia comprising Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo.

While there are many detailed constitutional and administrative arrangements still to be settled, the substantial progress which has so far been achieved appears to open the way to the establishment by August 1963 of a strong and harmonious state dedicated to peace, stability and progress in the area.

The Australian Government has followed these negotiations with sympathetic interest. We already have close and friendly relations with the proposed partners in the new Federation and it is our hope that these will be advanced and strengthened by what is now taking place.



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

GS

I.18759

SENT. 1ST AUGUST, 1962  
1712

FROM.

REC'D. 2ND AUGUST, 1962  
0500AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.3724. UNCLASSIFIED.MALAYSIA,

IN THE COURSE OF A STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THIS  
AFTERNOON MR DUNCAN SANDYS ANNOUNCED THAT -

"THE BRITISH AND MALAYAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOW DECIDED IN  
PRINCIPLE THAT, SUBJECT TO THE NECESSARY LEGISLATION, THE  
PROPOSED FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO BEING  
BY 31ST AUGUST 1963.

TO GIVE EFFECT TO THIS DECISION, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS INTEND  
TO CONCLUDE, WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, A FORMAL AGREEMENT WHICH,  
AMONG OTHER THINGS, WILL PROVIDE FOR -

(A) THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY IN NORTH BORNEO, SARAWAK AND  
SINGAPORE BY 31ST AUGUST 1963.

(B) PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SINGAPORE AND  
THE NEW FEDERATION, AS AGREED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF MALAYA  
AND SINGAPORE.

(C) DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS AS SET OUT IN THE JOINT STATEMENT BY  
THE BRITISH AND MALAYAN GOVERNMENTS DATED 22ND NOVEMBER 1961 AND

(D) DETAILED CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING SAFEGUARDS  
FOR THE SPECIAL INTERESTS OF NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK, TO BE  
DRAWN UP AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE LEGISLATURES OF THE TWO  
TERRITORIES.

THESE SAFEGUARDS WILL COVER SUCH MATTERS AS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,  
EDUCATION, REPRESENTATION IN THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT, THE POSITION  
OF THE INDIGENOUS RACES, CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP  
AND THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

IN ORDER THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW FEDERAL SYSTEM MAY  
BE EFFECTED AS SMOOTHLY AS POSSIBLE AND WITH THE LEAST DISTURBANCE  
TO EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, THERE WILL BE, AFTER  
THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY, A TRANSITION PERIOD, DURING WHICH A  
NUMBER OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS WILL BE DELEGATED  
TEMPORARILY TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS.

AN INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE, ON WHICH THE BRITISH, MALAYAN, NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK  
GOVERNMENTS WILL BE REPRESENTED.

ITS TASK WILL BE TO WORK OUT THE FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL  
ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FORM OF THE NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

GS

I.18759

- 2 -

THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, LORD LANSDOWNE, WHO WILL BE THE CHAIRMAN OF THIS COMMITTEE, AND THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA, TUN ABDUL RAZAK, WILL PROCEED SHORTLY TO SARAWAK AND NORTH BORNEO TO CONDUCT DISCUSSIONS.

IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATION, THE BRITISH AND MALAYAN GOVERNMENTS ARE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF RETAINING THE SERVICES OF AS MANY OF THE EXPATRIATE OFFICIALS AS POSSIBLE.

THE MINISTER OF STATE WILL DISCUSS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE TERRITORIES AND WITH THE STAFF ASSOCIATIONS HOW THIS BEST CAN BE DONE.

THE BRITISH AND MALAYAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE INFORMED THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI OF THE AGREEMENT THEY HAVE REACHED AND HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME THE INCLUSION OF THE STATE OF BRUNEI IN THE NEW FEDERATION."

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MIN.&DEPT.E.A.,  
P.M.'s

2ND AUGUST, 1962



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**



PJ.

I.18376.

Dated: 28th July, 1962.  
1100.

FROM:

Rec'd: 28th July, 1962.  
1200.

Australian Embassy,  
MANILA.

271. UNCLASSIFIED.

At Press Conference yesterday evening 27th July President Macapagal announced his proposal for a greater Malayan confederation comprising the Philippines, Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawa, and North Borneo. Other main points made by the President are as follows:-

- (A) He re-iterated his government's strong anti-communist policy.
- (B) The Philippines will continue to pursue its claim to North Borneo.
- (C) If the necessity of ascertaining the wishes of the North Borneo inhabitants regarding their future should arise, the Philippines will support their desire to exercise this right preferably in a plebiscite under United Nations Auspices.
- (D) Other qualified countries can join the confederation later. Asked why Indonesia is not included, the President said it is always advisable to start a project in area of greater possibility for success.
- (E) The proposal, if adopted, will have the effect of superseding the British - proposed Federation of Malaya.

2. According to the press, the President believed the existing Malaysian plan to be British inspired. He added that Asians should not accept a European project as a substitute project, planned and carried out by Asians themselves in the true and enduring interest of the Asian world.

3. Present at the press conference were Vice President Pelaez, Senator Sumulong and representative Ramos (Chairman of Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees respectively).

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MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

(Ø For a")

29th July, 1962.



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GS

I.18252

SENT. 26TH JULY, 1962  
1910

REC'D. 27TH JULY, 1962  
0510

FROM.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

3643. SECRET.

REPEATED KUALA LUMPUR 15, SINGAPORE 14, NEW YORK 188.

MALAYSIA.

LEE KWAN YEW IS ARRIVING HERE FROM NEW YORK TOMORROW TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS ON CITIZENSHIP ASPECTS.

C.R.O. (TAYLOR, IN ABSENCE OF GOLDS) SAY THEY SEE THESE AS A FURTHER GROWING OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT SINCE LEE KWAN YEW AND THE TUNKU ARE EACH CLAIMING THAT THE OTHER HAS DISTORTED UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED EARLIER.

TAYLOR SAID THE TUNKU HAD REACTED STRONGLY AGAINST THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE REFERENDUM, SAYING THAT LEE ALREADY KNEW THAT IT WAS AGREED THAT THE BORNEANS SHOULD GET FULL FEDERATION CITIZENSHIP.

2. TAYLOR CONFIRMED THAT PRESENT HOLDING IS DUE TO INABILITY SO FAR TO AGREE ABOUT TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (OUR 3612 AND 3539).

FROM HIS GUARDED REMARKS IN AMPLIFICATION OF THIS WE UNDERSTAND THAT, FOLLOWING FAILURE TO GET ANYWHERE WITH PROPOSALS FOR TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT TO BE CARRIED OUT AFTER FORMAL TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY (SEE OUR 3539 AND PREVIOUS MESSAGES), BRITISH SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET LEGITIMATE DESIRES OF BORNEANS AND, WOULD THEREFORE, NEED TO HAVE A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BEFORE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY THUS DELAYING MERDEKA FOR SOME TIME.

IF TUNKU WOULD NOT AGREE TO SOME ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH BRITISH OFFICIALS COULD BE KEPT ON AFTER MERDEKA BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE OBLIGED TO RETAIN SOVEREIGNTY SO THAT ENOUGH BORNEANS COULD BE TRAINED TO TAKE OVER THE ADMINISTRATION BEFORE MERDEKA.

3. TAYLOR DESCRIBED THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE TALKS AS "VERY CRITICAL".

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
P.M.'s

27TH JULY, 1962

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LAS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.17918

Dated: 23rd July, 1962.

Rec'd: 24th July, 1962.  
1751  
0830

FROM:

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE.

163 SECRET

Repeated Kuala Lumpur 21.

Reference my telegram 160 Lee and Dr Goh have now left for London without indicating true purposes of visit. At Lee's request British Deputy Commissioner has also left for London. Lee is adamant that he cannot accept the federation interpretation of paragraph 14 of the White Paper on merger. For background of citizenship see my memorandum 1394 No 909 and No. 1931 of 1961.

2. Reference paragraph 5 of my telegram No.155 the opposition Council of Joint Action has made a statement urging the casting of blank ballots. This should help to justify in New York the Government's provisions for counting votes.

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MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES  
P.M.'s

24th July, 1962.

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The new Federation of Malaysia - embracing Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei - will come into being by August 31st, 1963.

This successful outcome of the Malaysia Conference was announced to the House of Commons today, Wednesday, by the Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys, following two weeks of intensive discussions in London.

Mr. Sandys said that the British Government had accepted "almost all" the recommendations put forward unanimously by the Cobbold Commission which earlier this year toured North Borneo and Sarawak to find out how local people felt about joining in a Federation. The report of the Commission was published as a White Paper today to coincide with the announcement that the new Federation will be born next year.

Mr. Sandys told the House that a major programme of legislation would be necessary in the next six months to provide for the transfer of sovereignty in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore, for detailed constitutional arrangements to be made within the territories and for various other matters.

"Safeguards will be sought on such matters as religious freedom, education, representation in the Federal Parliament, the position of the indigenous races, control of immigration, citizenship and the State constitutions" he said.

An intergovernmental committee, headed by Lord Lansdowne, would be set up to work out the "future constitutional arrangements and the form of the necessary safeguards".



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TEXT OF MR. SANDYS STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

"The British and Malayan Governments have received and studied the Report of the Commission under the Chairmanship of Lord Cobbold which visited North Borneo and Sarawak earlier this year to ascertain the views of the inhabitants on the proposal to create a Federation of Malaysia embracing Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. The Report is being published today and is now available in the Vote Office."

"The two Governments are most grateful to the Commission for their valuable report and have accepted almost all the recommendations on which the Commission were unanimous. The two Governments have noted in particular that the Commission were unanimously agreed that a Federation of Malaysia is in the best interests of North Borneo and Sarawak and that an early decision in principle should be reached."

"In the light of this Report and of the Agreement reached between the Government of Malaya and the Government of Singapore, the British and Malayan Governments have now decided in principle that, subject to the necessary legislation, the proposed Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being by 31st August, 1963."

"To give effect to this decision the two Governments intend to conclude within the next six months a formal Agreement which among other things will provide for:-

- "(a) The transfer of sovereignty in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore by 31st August, 1963.
- (b) Provisions governing the relationship between Singapore and the new Federation as agreed between the Governments of Malaya and Singapore.
- (c) Defence arrangements as set out in the joint statement by the British and Malayan Governments dated 22nd November, 1961 and
- (d) Detailed constitutional arrangements, including safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak to be drawn up after consultation with the Legislatures of the two territories (Command Paper 1563)."

/"These



"These safeguards will cover such matters as religious freedom, education, representation in the Federal Parliament, the position of the indigenous races, control of immigration, citizenship and the state of constitutions."

"In order that the introduction of the new Federal system may be effected as smoothly as possible and with the least disturbance to existing administrative arrangements, there will be, after the transfer of sovereignty, a transition period during which a number of the Federal constitutional powers will be delegated temporarily to the State Governments."

"An inter-Governmental committee will be established as soon as possible on which the British, Malayan, North Borneo and Sarawak Governments will be represented. Its task will be to work out the future constitutional arrangements and the form of the necessary safeguards."

"The Minister of State for the Colonies, Lord Lansdowne, who will be the Chairman of this Committee, and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Tun Abdul Razak, will proceed shortly to Sarawak and North Borneo to conduct discussions."

"In order to maintain the efficiency of the administration, the British and Malayan Governments are agreed on the importance of retaining the services of as many of the expatriate officials as possible. The Minister of State will discuss with the Governments of the territories and with the Staff associations how this best can be done."

"The British and Malayan Governments have informed the Sultan of Brunei of the Agreement they have reached and have made it clear that they would welcome the inclusion of the State of Brunei in the new Federation".



LAS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I.17781

INWARD CABLEGRAM

DATED - 20TH JULY, 1962.

1803  
REC'D - 21ST JULY, 1962.  
0410

FROM

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

3540 SECRET.

REPEATED SINGAPORE 12 AND KUALA LUMPUR 13 (CANBERRA PLSE PASS)-  
FROM EXTERNAL.

SINGAPORE SECURITY.

IN THE DISCUSSION REPORTED IN OUR TELEGRAM 3539  
SUSSEX SAID THAT PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE BIGGEST PROBLEM WITH  
THE TUNKU IN THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WILL BE THE ACTION HE WANTS  
TAKEN AGAINST THE UNITED FRONT IN SINGAPORE.

ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON THE TUNKU PRESSED MR SANDYS TO  
AUTHORISE PHASE 2 ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS ACTION COULD ONLY BE  
TAKEN IF THE BRITISH WERE ASSOCIATED WITH IT AND THAT IT WOULD  
MAKE IT FAR EASIER FOR THE FEDERATION GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE  
A REPRESSIVE POLICY AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS AFTER MERGER IF THEY  
COULD SAY THEY WERE ONLY CONTINUING ACTION ALREADY INITIATED  
BY THE BRITISH.

2. SUSSEX SAID THAT SANDYS REPLIED THAT IF LEE KWAN YEW  
THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO TAKE THE PROPOSED ACTION NOW HE WAS  
QUITE ABLE TO DO SO "WITHOUT US", BUT THAT IN ANY CASE THE  
BRITISH VIEW AT PRESENT WAS THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO  
A VIOLENT CLASH WHICH WOULD GRAVELY PREJUDICE THE CHANCES OF  
GREATER MALAYSIA.

SUSSEX (WHO WAS AT THE MEETING) SAID THAT THE TUNKU HAD  
PRESSED VERY HARD ON THIS POINT.

HE HAD OBTAINED AN ASSURANCE FROM SANDYS TO GIVE IT  
FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

3. ACCORDING TO SUSSEX, MOORE HAS ADVISED VERY  
STRONGLY AGAINST MOVING ON TO PHASE 2 ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD  
RALLY INCREASED SUPPORT TO THE UNITED FRONT, CAUSE SERIOUS  
OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE, AND MAKE MERGER IMPOSSIBLE.

SUSSEX SAID IN THE LIGHT OF THIS ADVICE IT WOULD NOT BE  
EASY TO AGREE TO THE TUNKU'S REQUEST.

IT WAS HARD TO SEE THE POINT OF TAKING SOME ACTION WHICH  
MIGHT PREVENT GREATER MALAYSIA BEING REALISED.

BUT ON THE OTHER HAND THE TUNKU WAS "VERY INSISTENT." SUSSEX  
SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WOULD BE SAID TO THE TUNKU NEXT WEEK  
ON THIS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
P.M.'s

21ST JULY, 1962.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

JRR

INWARD CABLEGRAM 17780

SENT - 20TH JULY, 1962.  
1715  
RECD - 21ST JULY, 1962.  
0400

FROM

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

3539 SECRET

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 3539, REPEATED KUALA LUMPUR 12, SINGAPORE  
11, MANILA 6.

MALAYSIA.

AFTER AN INITIAL PURELY FORMAL SESSION WITH MR MACMILLAN ON TUESDAY THE TUNKU HAS HAD TALKS WITH DUNCAN SANDYS WHICH WERE ADJOURNED ON WEDNESDAY EVENING FOR A 'STEERING COMMITTEE' UNDER LORD LANSDOWNE TO WORK ON DETAILS, PARTICULARLY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS.

2. COLONIAL OFFICE (SUSSEX) SAY THAT WHILE THE EARLY TALKS WERE CORDIAL THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CONCRETE PROGRESS AS YET, THE MEETINGS SO FAR HAVING SERVED MAINLY TO CLARIFY THE POSITIONS AND ACCORDING TO SUSSEX TO UNDERLINE THE DISTANCE THERE IS AT PRESENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

THE BRITISH ARE EXPOUNDING A SCHEME UNDER WHICH GOVERNORS, WHO SHOULD BE APPOINTED ON JOINT RECOMMENDATION OF QUEEN AND YAND DI PERTUAN AGONG, WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE TO ANYBODY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BE VESTED IN THE FEDERATION BUT THERE WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT THAT FOR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD THE GOVERNORS WOULD HAVE FULL AUTHORITY.

THIS PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO ENABLE RETENTION OF EXPATRIATE PUBLIC SERVANTS WHILE REDUCING TO MINIMUM AUTHORITY RETAINED BY BRITISH (WHICH WOULD ONLY RELATE TO CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE EXPATRIATES).

SUSSEX SAYS THAT THE MALAYANS OBJECT THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD STILL BE TOO OPEN TO INTERPRETATION THAT SUBSTANCE OF BRITISH COLONIAL AUTHORITY WAS BEING MAINTAINED AND ONLY THE SHADOW OF SOVEREIGNTY TRANSFERRED TO THE FEDERATION.

IT WOULD BE AMMUNITION FOR THOSE WHO CALL THE TUNKU AN 'IMPERIALIST STOOGE'.

BRITISH 'FIRST ALTERNATIVE' PROPOSAL IS THEREFORE BEING MADE TODAY. THIS IS THAT IN ADDITION TO GOVERNORS AND EXECUTIVE COUNCILS THERE SHOULD BE STATE COUNCILS IN EACH OF THE NEW STATES WHICH WOULD HAVE FINAL AUTHORITY IN CASES OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNORS AND EXECUTIVE COUNCILS.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERATION WOULD SIT ON THESE STATE COUNCILS.

3. THE MALAYAN POSITION IS THAT CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NEW STATES SHOULD FROM THE FIRST BE AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE TO THOSE OF EXISTING STATES OF THE FEDERATION.

TO ENSURE BORNEAN VIEWS WERE REPRESENTED AT THE CENTRE EACH OF THE NEW STATES WOULD HAVE A MINISTER IN KUALA LUMPUR.

BRITISH ARE OBJECTING THAT-

(A) BORNEO TERRITORIES ARE NOT YET READY FOR THIS (E.G. NO POLITICIANS WITH EXPERIENCE NECESSARY TO SERVE AS

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM

MINISTERS).

(B) IF THERE IS NOT SOME ARRANGEMENT BY WHICH H.M.G. RETAINS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EXPATRIATE PUBLIC SERVANTS THERE WILL HAVE TO BE A COMPENSATION SCHEME. MORE THAN HALF OF THEM WILL LEAVE AND THERE WILL BE ADMINISTRATIVE BREAKDOWN WHICH WOULD BE THE RUIN OF THE WHOLE SCHEME.

SUSSEX SAYS THAT THE MOST HOPEFUL SIGN SO FAR IS THAT THE MALAYANS HAVE NOT ENTIRELY RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FIRST GOVERNOR MIGHT BE BRITISH (THOUGH RESPONSIBLE OF COURSE TO THE FEDERATION). THIS LEAVES ROOM FOR ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES FOR RETAINING THE EXPATRIATES WHICH THE BRITISH REGARD AS ESSENTIAL AND WHICH THEY CLAIM THE MALAYS ALSO WANT.

HOWEVER SEE OUR 3401, PARA 2 WARNER SAID AGAIN THIS MORNING THAT MINISTERS DO NOT REGARD THE RETENTION OF BRITISH GOVERNORS AS PRACTICAL POLITICS.

4. SUSSEX SAID IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE TUNKU AND DUNCAN SANDYS WOULD RESUME THEIR TALKS ON MONDAY ON THE BASIS OF THE LANSDOWNE COMMITTEE'S WORK (WHICH IS PROCEEDING OVER THE WEEK-END) SUSSEX THINKS THAT THERE WILL BE SOME VERY HARD BARGAINING AGAINST THE CLOCK ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK BEFORE AGREEMENT IS REACHED.

5. WARNER AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIRMED TO MR SHANN THIS MORNING THAT THE TUNKU AND MR SANDYS WILL BE RESUMING THEIR TALKS AFTER THE WEEK-END.

WARNER MENTIONED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING WELL AND SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT BEFORE THE TUNKU'S DEPARTURE THERE WOULD BE AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE DATE OF MALAYSIA DAY.

6. WARNER ALSO SAID THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE INTENDED TO CONTINUE DELAYING ANY REPLY TO THE PHILIPPINES ON NORTH BORNEO. ACCORDING TO SUSSEX SANDYS IS GOING TO TACKLE THE TUNKU EARLY NEXT WEEK REGARDING HIS UNHELPFUL POSITION ON THIS MATTER.

7. SEE ALSO OUR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM (NOT TO MANILA).

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
P.M's.

21ST JULY, 1962.



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## DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DW

## INWARD CABLEGRAM L17749

FROM.

Sent: 20th July, 1962.  
1822Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE.Rec'd: 20th July, 1962.  
2000169. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Repeated Kuala Lumpur 29.

Malaysia.

Reports of clear cut decision of Committee of Seventeen not to send observer to Singapore and in particular permanent part of India in the debate were welcome developments here. The latest press reports are that the Indians may back pedal and agree to hear petitioners. British are making representations in Delhi to prevent this.

2. Lee has been invited to London to join talks on 24th. According to British Commission the issue of getting improved citizenship terms is one that has to be thrashed out. Lee may fly to New York tomorrow en-route to London.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES  
P.M's.

21st July, 1962.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I. 17051

FROM:

Dated: 12th July, 1962  
1730Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.Rec'd: 13th July, 1962  
0830295. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Singapore 25.

Malaysia.

Your 362. There has been little local  
and no official reaction to Marshall's application.

2. Ministry of External Affairs today cabled  
Delegation in New York that issue is purely for Singapore Govern-  
ment and in any case referendum law which application opposes has  
now been passed by democratically elected Government of Singapore.  
(Malayans do not intend to publicise their stand unless questioned).

3. British High Commission believes that Marshall  
may have originally applied to Committee of Seventeen after  
telling Lee Kuan Yew that he would withdraw application if Lee  
could obtain better agreement on citizenship for Singapore from  
Tunku before latter left for London. Even if this were so, it  
is most unlikely the Tunku would make further concessions on  
citizenship.

MIN, & DEPT E.A.  
MIN, & DEPT DEFENCE  
MIN, & DEPT TERRITORIES  
P.M's

13th July, 1962

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM

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FROM.

I.16990

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.

SENT. 11TH JULY, 1962

2000

RECD. 12TH JULY, 1962

0610

3401. SECRET.

(PLEASE PASS TO KUALA LUMPUR 11, SINGAPORE 10).

MALAYSIA.

GOLDS (C.R.O.) SAYS TUNKU IS ARRIVING ON 16TH. DURATION OF HIS STAY IS INDEFINITE, BUT C.R.O. ARE ASSUMING IT WILL BE ABOUT A WEEK.

2. GOLDS SAID THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN HELD UP AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MONTH BY A LETTER FROM THE TUNKU TO MR. MACMILLAN WHICH SHOWED THAT THE MALAYANS HAD COMPLETELY MIS-UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION REGARDING THE COBBOLD REPORT AND THE LETTERS COVERING THE POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT (OUR TELEGRAM 3152 PARA 5). THE TUNKU APPARENTLY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION WERE NOT ACTING AS REPRESENTATIVES OF H.M.G. BUT WERE GENUINELY INDEPENDENT (THE MALAYAN MEMBERS WERE WORKING ON REFERENCE TO KUALA LUMPUR). WHEN HE READ THE VIEWS OF THE BRITISH MEMBERS ON THE POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT HE TOOK THESE TO BE PROPOSALS BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. HE HAD BEEN ASSURED (IN A LETTER FROM MACMILLAN) THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE AND THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DID NOT FEEL IN ANY WAY BOUND TO THE VIEWS OF THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AS SET OUT IN THE LETTERS. GOLDS TOLD US TODAY THAT IN FACT THE C.R.O. AND MINISTERS HAD NEVER REGARDED AS A STARTER THE BRITISH COMMISSIONER'S VIEW THAT ACTUAL AUTHORITY SHOULD REMAIN IN THE HANDS OF BRITISH GOVERNORS. ONLY THE COLONIAL OFFICE HAD SUPPORTED THIS VIEW, AND THEY MAINLY FOR THE REASON (PARAGRAPH 5 (III) OF OUR 3152) THAT IT WOULD MAKE IT MUCH EASIER FOR BRITISH OFFICIALS TO STAY ON (WHICH THE MALAYANS ALSO WANTED). OUTSIDE THE COLONIAL OFFICE IT HAD ALL ALONG BEEN RECOGNISED THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS POLITICALLY QUITE UNREALISTIC IN 1962 AND IN ANY CASE UNDESIRABLE FROM THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW, SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT ONLY BE AN OBVIOUS CAUSE OF FRICTION WITH THE MALAYANS BUT WOULD ALSO MEAN THAT THE BRITISH WOULD BE BLAMED FOR ANYTHING THAT WENT WRONG.

3. GOLDS INDICATED THAT THERE HAS BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF EXASPERATION HERE OVER THE TUNKU'S MISUNDERSTANDING AND SOME OF THE THINGS HE HAS BEEN SAYING ABOUT BRITISH POLICY. THE TUNKU'S REMARKS ON THE NEED FOR ACTION AGAINST COMMUNISTS IN SINGAPORE SEEM TO BE CAUSING PARTICULAR IRRITATION. GOLDS SAID THAT IT WAS PERHAPS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE TUNKU SHOULD THINK THAT AS THE BRITISH WERE LEAVING THEY HAD NOTHING TO LOSE BY STRONG ACTION. BUT THE TUNKU WAS BEING "VERY ORIENTAL" ABOUT SINGAPORE AND THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION HERE TAKE THE SORT OF ACTION HE APPEARED TO



INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.16990

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HAVE IN MIND BEFORE SUCH TIME AS HE WAS FULLY COMMITTED TO MERGER. GOLDS WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON WHAT THIS MIGHT MEAN IN TERMS OF TIMING BUT INDICATED THAT THE BRITISH FEAR IS THAT AFTER THEY HAD TAKEN THE DESIRED ACTION AGAINST THE SUBVERSIVES THE TUNKU MIGHT NEVERTHELESS DECIDE TO PULL UP THE LADDER. GOLDS ADDED THAT IN ANY CASE THE BRITISH ARE NOT CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR SUCH ACTION. IT WOULD BE ONE OF THE MATTERS DISCUSSED WITH THE TUNKU.

4. GOLDS ASKED THAT THE CONTENTS OF PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE BE TREATED AS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE.

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MIN & DEPT E.A.  
P.M.'s

12TH JULY, 1962.

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM

PJ.

I.16550.

Dated: 6th July, 1962.  
1130.

FROM:

Rec'd: 7th July, 1962.  
1715.Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.290. SECRET.

Repeated London 14, Singapore 24.

From Critchley.

Malaysia -

Tunku agreed this morning to leave for London 14th July. ✓  
He is to have talks with MacMillan 16th July, with more general  
talks beginning the following day. Razak, Tan Siew Sin,  
Sheridan (Attorney-General) and a legal adviser will accompany  
him. Ghazali and Fenner (Commissioner of Police) will also go  
as advisers but they will not participate in the talks.

2. Earlier this week prospects of agreement seemed bleak.  
After detailed consultations with Ministers on the Cobbold report  
Tunku sent strong message to MacMillan Monday evening. His main  
criticisms were directed at the following British proposals:-

- (a) Sovereignty only to be transferred over to External  
Affairs, Defence and Counter-Subversion (i.e. local  
police forces remain separate.)
- (b) British Governors and Chief Secretaries not only  
continue in office but exercise full authority.
- (c) British Administration Officials to be retained  
till they can be replaced by Borneo officers, and  
those who leave before this can be done to be replaced  
by further British officials.

3. In these circumstances Tunku said that police did not  
seem practical and concluded by suggesting that the British should  
retain sovereignty during the transitional period. When the  
British considered Borneo territories were ready Malaysia could  
be reconsidered.

4. I understand Tory commenting on Tunku's above message  
drew attention to the Ø position, particularly in the light of  
Singapore developments. He suggested that with loss of majority  
Lee's Government could only retain office for few months and its  
future depended on the progress of Malaysia. If Malaysia were  
postponed, Government could not survive for long and Barisan Socialis  
could be expected to take over. As far as the Federation was  
concerned this would mean the end of the merger.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.16550.

Tunku would consider Singapore lost to Communism and would close the cause-way (as threatened earlier this year) treating Singapore as a foreign state.

5. This morning Tunku received reply from MacMillan with assurance that the British Government intended to transfer Government of Borneo territories to new Federal State. He admitted that respective rights and duties of central and local governments would have to be worked out but that there was no desire on the part of Britain to maintain authority during the transitional period.

6. MacMillan emphasised that London discussions and decisions should not be limited by Cobbold report. Beyond this, the British Government would welcome free discussion on all points and Malaysians could advance their own proposals.

7. On receiving this, Tunku said his main concern was policy of divided authority (as recommended in Cobbold's covering letter to the report) was not intended. Assured that the Cobbold report does not matter he is now prepared to negotiate but he has re-emphasised that the intention of British Governors and the present administration would not be acceptable. State Secretaries could remain but there should be Malaysian Governors and Chief Ministers based on some form of representative Government, however, rudimentary.

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MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
P.M.'s

(Ø group apparently  
7th July, 1962. omitted.)



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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SRG

I. 16097

Dated: 1st July, 1962  
2010

FROM:

Rec'd: 2nd July, 1962  
0830

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.



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283. SECRET.

Repeated London 13, Singapore 23.

Tunku told the Minister yesterday that if he accepted the British views in the Cobold Report he would lose his own self-respect as well as respect of his people. The British wanted to use him to solve subversion problems while they continued in Administration of Borneo as before. In particular, they wanted to retain the Governors as Chief Executives and even had the "impudence" to suggest that if expatriate Civil Servants retired they should be replaced by officers recruited in the United Kingdom.

2. Tunku said he still hoped an understanding could be reached that would enable him to go to London but it was essential that he should be able to demonstrate to the World, and the Malayan people in particular, that Malaysia meant independence for the Borneo Territories. They should start off a unified people and not with part of them continuing under a "Colonial" Administration. Albeit under Malaya Sovereignty. If British thought Borneo Territories were not ready for incorporation it would be better to forget about Malaysia for the time being.

3. Tunku also said the British wanted him to take over Singapore to clear up the "mess" but this was not fair and they should take action against Communist subversion before Malaysia so that it could get off to a good start. Strong methods would need to be used to deal with the Singapore Communists. For Malaysia to have to use these methods at outset might well be disastrous. He had proposed Malaysia to help the British to counter Communist Subversion in the area. But they would make task impossible unless they changed their opinions.

A/ MIN & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

2nd July, 1962

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.15864

DATED - 28TH JUNE, 1962

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REC'D - 29TH JUNE, 1962

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FROM

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,  
LONDON.3152 SECRETREPEATED SAVING KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE  
MALAYSIA.

C.R.O. (GOLDS) BRIEFED CANADIANS, NEW ZEALANDERS AND OURSELVES THIS AFTERNOON ON THE MAIN POINTS OF THE REPORT, OUTSTANDING POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT, AND ARRANGEMENTS AS AT PRESENT ENVISAGED. HE SAID THAT NO OTHER COUNTRIES WERE BEING INFORMED AT PRESENT (THOUGH SIMILAR INFORMATION WOULD PROBABLY BE GIVEN TO UNITED STATES "A LITTLE LATER") AND EMPHASISED BRITISH CONCERN THAT THE MALAYANS SHOULD NOT LEARN THAT WE HAD BEEN GIVEN ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE COMMISSION'S DELIBERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. GOLDS SAID THE COBBOLD REPORT WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. THE FINDINGS WERE

(A) THE INHABITANTS OF THE BORNEO TERRITORIES WERE NOT OPPOSED TO MALAYSIA. (OF SOME 4,000 PERSONS INTERVIEWED BY THE COMMISSION ONLY ABOUT 20% EXPRESSED OPPOSITION OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER TO THE PROPOSAL. GOLDS SAID THAT IT DID NOT OF COURSE FOLLOW AS THE TUNKU CLAIMED YESTERDAY THAT 80% OF THE POPULATION WERE IN FAVOUR OF THE PROPOSAL.)

(B) IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE BORNEO TERRITORIES THAT THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA BE ESTABLISHED. (LORD COBBOLD HIMSELF ADDED A RIDER TO THIS TO THE EFFECT THAT IN HIS VIEW THIS ONLY HELD TRUE IF SINGAPORE ALSO FORMED PART OF THE FEDERATION. GOLDS SAID THEY DID NOT KNOW WHY COBBOLD THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PUT THIS IN SINCE OBVIOUSLY BOTH GOVERNMENTS WANTED SINGAPORE IN THE FEDERATION.)

3. GOLDS DESCRIBED THE PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS AS FOLLOWS:

(I) BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHOULD REACH AN EARLY DECISION ON PRINCIPLE ON THE TERRITORIES JOINING MALAYSIA. THIS DECISION TO BE SUBJECT TO SUBSEQUENT DEBATE IN THE TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURES. (GOLDS SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE AN IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DECISION SHOULD BE RATIFIED BY A MAJORITY OF UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS IN THE LEGISLATURES. PRESENT THINKING WAS THAT THE DEBATES WOULD TAKE PLACE ABOUT EARLY AUTUMN.)

(II) THERE SHOULD BE NO RIGHT OF SECESSION FROM THE FEDERATION.

(III) THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA SHOULD BE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT FEDERATION OF MALAYA APPROPRIATELY AMENDED. BORNEO TERRITORIES TO HAVE BASICALLY SIMILAR STATUS TO THAT OF THE EXISTING STATES OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA.

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM I.15864

(IV) THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD BE MADE FOR THE NEW STATES SHOULD NOT BE OPEN TO ALTERATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE PREVIOUS CONSENT OF THE STATE GOVERNMENTS.

(V) PROVISION SHOULD BE MADE TO ENSURE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE INHABITANTS OF THE BORNEO TERRITORIES IN THE EDUCATIONAL, COMMERCIAL AND OTHER FIELDS, INCLUDING PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW FEDERATION.

(GOLDS SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR FROM THE REPORT WHAT PRECISE ARRANGEMENTS THE COMMISSION HAD IN MIND. THEY APPEARED TO BE THINKING BOTH OF THE NEED TO SAFEGUARD THE FUTURE POSITION OF THE ABORIGINAL POPULATION, AND OF THE NEED TO PROTECT THE POSITION OF THE PRESENT INHABITANTS OF ALL RACES VIS A VIS THE MAINLANDERS. GOLDS COMMENTED THAT WHILE THE LATTER ASPECT WOULD BE COVERED PRINCIPALLY BY THE STATES IMMIGRATION POWERS THERE WERE SUCH MATTERS AS ENSURING PLACES FOR BORNEANS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA AND IN OTHER FEDERAL SPHERES).

(VI) THE FIRST GOVERNOR UNDER MALAYSIA IN EACH STATE SHOULD BE APPOINTED BY THE YANG DI PERTUAN AGONG ON THE JOINT RECOMMENDATION OF THE QUEEN AND THE AGONG.

(VII) THERE SHOULD BE A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD DURING WHICH IT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO RETAIN THE EXPATRIATE PUBLIC SERVANTS. DURING THIS PERIOD THERE SHOULD BE AS LITTLE CHANGE AS POSSIBLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION.

(VIII) THE FEDERATION SHOULD BECOME IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MALAYSIA.

4. GOLDS SAID THAT THE MAIN DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MALAYAN AND BRITISH MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION CONCERNED THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE REPORT CONTAINED NO INDICATION AS TO THE LENGTH OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OR WHAT FORM THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD TAKE, EXCEPT FOR SAYING THAT EXPATRIATE PUBLIC SERVANTS SHOULD REMAIN THE REPORT WAS SILENT ON THE QUESTION HOW THE GOVERNMENT WAS TO BE CARRIED ON DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THIS WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH AND MALAYAN MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION HAD BEEN UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT AND IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO SET ASIDE THESE ASPECTS FOR DISCUSSION DURING THE TUNKUS VISIT NEXT MONTH.

GOLDS SAID THAT THE BASIC DIFFERENCE OF APPROACH BETWEEN THE BRITISH MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION AND THE MALAYANS WAS THAT THE FORMER FELT STRONGLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, CLEARLY DESCRIBED AND OF A FIXED DURATION (BETWEEN 3 AND 7 YEAR) LEADING UP TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF MALAYAN. THE MALAYANS ON THE OTHER HAND WANTED THE FINAL POSITION TO BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY AND THOUGHT OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AS A MINIMUM OF ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE TERMINATED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

5. GOLDS SAID THE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES HAD BEEN RECORDED IN CONFIDENTIAL LETTERS AND WERE AS FOLLOWS -

(1) THE MALAYAN MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION CONSIDER THAT A FULL MINISTERIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE SET UP IMMEDIATELY IN EACH OF THE TERRITORIES. THE BRITISH MEMBERS THINK THIS WOULD BE VERY PREMATURE AND CONSIDER THAT AT FIRST THE EXISTING FORM OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE RETAINED WITH EVOLUTION DURING

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INWARD<sub>3</sub> CABLEGRAM<sub>5864</sub>

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD TO FULL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

(II) THE BRITISH MEMBERS THINK THE FIRST GOVERNORS IN EACH OF THE TERRITORIES DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD SHOULD RETAIN THE EXISTING GOVERNORS POWERS AND SHOULD ALSO BE BRITISH. THE MALAYANS THINK THE GOVERNORS SHOULD ONLY BE HEADS OF STATE ACCEPTING THE ADVICE OF THEIR CHIEF MINISTERS. THE MALAYANS DO NOT AGREE THAT THE FIRST GOVERNORS SHOULD BE BRITISH

(III) THE MALAYANS AGREE ON THE NEED TO KEEP BRITISH EXPATRIATE ADMINISTRATORS IN THE TERRITORIES FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BUT ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT AS A CONSEQUENCE THAT THE EXPATRIATES MUST REMAIN RESPONSIBLE TO A BRITISH AND NOT A FEDERATION CHIEF OFFICIAL. (GOLDS EXPLAINED THAT IF THE BRITISH COLONIAL SERVANTS WERE TO BE ASKED TO REMAIN IN THE TERRITORIES IN THE SERVICE OF AND RESPONSIBLE TO "A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT" H. M. G. FOLLOWING PRECEDENT WOULD BE OBLIGED TO OFFER THEM THE ALTERNATIVE OF RETIREMENT WITH COMPENSATION. EXPERIENCE INDICATED THAT HALF OF THEM WOULD RETIRE).

(IV) THE MALAYANS CONSIDER THAT ALL THOSE SUBJECTS WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME EXCLUSIVELY FEDERAL SHOULD AT THE BEGINNING BE HANDED OVER TO THE FEDERATION WHICH WOULD THEN DELEGATE BACK CERTAIN EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS TO THE STATES FOR THE DURATION OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

THE BRITISH MEMBERS AGREE TO ALL THE FEDERAL SUBJECTS BEING FORMALLY HANDED OVER TO THE FEDERATION FROM THE BEGINNING BUT THINK THAT ALL THE POWERS AND ALL THE FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE DELEGATED BACK TO THE STATES INCLUDING INTERNAL SECURITY (WHICH THE MALAYANS DID NOT WANT TO DELEGATE BACK TO THE STATES) EXCEPT FOR COUNTER-SUBVERSION ACTIVITIES. GOLDS EXPLAINED THAT ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT EXPLICITLY BROUGHT OUT IN THE LETTERS IT APPEARED THAT WHAT THE COMMISSIONERS MEANT BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN "POWERS" AND "FUNCTIONS" WAS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLICY MAKING POWERS AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS. THE BRITISH THOUGHT THAT WHATEVER THE THEORETICAL POSITION THE PRATICAL POSITION SHOULD BE THAT THE STATES SHOULD START OFF WITH THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS AND THE POLICY MAKING POWERS AND THAT TRANSFER SHOULD BE COMPLETED AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

6. GOLDS MENTIONED TWO FURTHER POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT NOT RELATING TO THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THE MALAYANS WANTED ISLAM RECOGNISED AS THE STATE RELIGION WHILE THE BRITISH SAID THERE SHOULD BE COMPLETE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. THE MALAYANS WANTED A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO A TEN YEAR PERIOD FOR ENGLISH AS AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE WHILE THE BRITISH THOUGHT ANY SUCH REFERENCE UNNECESSARY. GOLDS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THESE LAST TWO POINTS, THOUGH THEY WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY HANDLED BECAUSE OF THEIR EMOTIONAL OVERTONES, WOULD BE FAIRLY EASY TO SETTLE WITH THE TUNKU.

7. GOLDS SAID THAT IT HAS BEEN AGREED WITH THE TUNKU THAT THE REPORT SHOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED UNTIL AFTER HE AND THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT. THE PRESENT DATE FOR THE TUNKUS ARRIVAL IS 15TH JULY AND IT IS EXPECTED HE WILL STAY ABOUT TEN DAYS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

29TH JUNE, 1962

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97

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

CYRIL  
POL. 29/6

Despatched: 1755 hours 28th June, 1962

Received: 0850 hours 29th June, 1962.

*Priority.*

TELEGRAM NO. 357 SECRET

61/794  
5 JUL 1962

Addressed British High Commissioners Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington W.No.357. Repeated for information to Kuala Lumpur, and Savign to other Posts, Dublin 178 Savign and Savign to Washington, Djakarta, Saigon, Bangkok, Manila, Tokyo, Singapore.

### MALAYSIA-CORPUS COMMISSION.

British and Malayan Ministers announced last November in London their agreement that a Federation of Malaysia (embracing Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak) was "a desirable aim" but before final decision was taken a joint British/Malayan Commission should ascertain views of peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak and make recommendations in light of their assessment of these views. Commission under Lord Cobbold as Chairman and consisting of 2 British and 2 Malayan members spent over two months in Borneo in spring this year and completed their report to Malayan and British Governments on 21st June.

2. Report is now under study and the first step is for two Governments to discuss what they are to do in light of it. Malayan Prime Minister is now expected in London from about 15th July for this purpose. We hope a public announcement will be possible after these talks. Until then neither Government has any intention of publishing report.

3. Report findings. These include

- (a) Substantial majority in North Borneo and Sarawak are in favour of joining Malaysia (though various political and racial groups urged necessity of various conditions and safeguards)
- (b) It is in interests of both territories to join (Lord Cobbold adds rider that Singapore's inclusion is also essential).

*Copy Mr. Gordan  
Defence 5/7/62*

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## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

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4. Agreed Recommendations. These include

- (a) British and Malayan Governments should reach early decision in principle on territories joining Malaysia subject to results of subsequent debate in the territorial legislatures
- (b) On inauguration of New Malaysia Federation (which would replace existing Malayan Federation) sovereignty over territories should be transferred to it with no right of secession
- (c) New Malaysian Constitution should be based on existing Malayan Constitution subject to certain special provisions for two territories which could not be altered by Federal Government without State Government's positive concurrence (thus ultimate position of Borneo States would be broadly similar to that of existing Malayan States)
- (d) First Governor in each territory should be appointed by the Agong on joint British/Malayan nomination
- (e) Some form of transitional period necessary during which essential to retain services of present British expatriate staff (to whom Commission pay many tributes) and to minimise changes in present form of administration.
- (f) Defence and external affairs to become Federal immediately (but see 5 (e) below.

5. Points of Difference. (Transitional period) report makes no recommendation about form of any transitional period (para. 4(e) above). There was disagreement in Commission of this which led Tunku at one point to threaten to withdraw the Malayan Members.

/Basic



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**SECRET**  
**TELEGRAM**

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received

3.

Basic points of difference about this are set out in confidential letters from Chairman. In substance they are :-

- (a) British Members want clearly marked transitional period (of from 3 to 7 years). Malayan Members while accepting necessity for certain transition measures (see below) want complete Greater Malaysia set up straight away.
- (b) Malayan Members think full Ministerial system with a chief Minister can be set up at once in two Borneo States. British consider that while this should be developed as quickly as possible it must take some years. To begin with existing system of Government must continue with Head of Government having same powers as at present.
- (c) British Members think Head of Government i.e. Governor must be British. Malaysians though apparently ready to keep title of Governor think of him as a Constitutional Head of State and do not see the necessity for him to be British.
- (d) All agree it is essential to keep British staff without whom there would be serious danger of breakdown <sup>is</sup> Malayan Members do not explain how this <sup>is</sup> to be done under system they propose which would involve transferring staff to another Government: according to precedent this would involve offering option to retire with compensation. Many might prefer to retire and this is important additional reason for British Members' recommendations of maintenance of some form of British control during transitional period.

/(e)



SECRET

94

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received

4.

- (c) <sup>which</sup> Malayan Members think all subjects who are eventually to be Federal should be handed over to new Federation at once but Federation would delegate its executive functions but not control of policy on some of the subjects to State Governments. Internal security would not be one of subjects so delegated. British Members would like to see an agreement whereby control (including policy control) of any such subjects including internal security (except anti-subversive activities) was handed back for first few years either to British Government or if that is not acceptable to States.

6. Other points of difference. There was also some disagreement (reflected in report) between British and Malayan Members of Commission on

- (a) Whether Islam should be state religion and
- (b) Position of English as one of official languages.

7. We expect discussion with Tunku will be mainly related to resolving foregoing problems. You will note that there is virtually no disagreement over ultimate position of Borneo territories in Malaysia.

8. Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington only: you may inform Commonwealth authorities stressing secrecy. Please explain it would cause acute embarrassment if Malaysians or Borneo Leaders learned that we had given information to any other Governments.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

90

MEH

I. 15802

FROM:

Dated: 28th June, 1962  
1720

Rec'd: 29th June, 1962  
0030

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

274. UNCLASSIFIED.

Tunku announced publicly yesterday that according to Cobbold report, majority of people in Borneo Territories want Malaysia "very quickly" Less than twenty percent were against it. Tunku announced four-man Committee (Razak, Tan Siew Sin, Sumbanthan and Dr. Ismail), which under his Chairmanship is considering the report.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
DEFENCE  
P.M's

29th June, 1962



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

89

MEH

I. 15675

FROM:

Dated: 27th June, 1962  
1525

Rec'd: 27th June, 1962  
1910

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR



271. UNCLASSIFIED.

"Malayan Times" quotes source close to Prime Minister is saying that he is "quite happy" with the Cobbold Commission Report and is "confident that Malaysia will soon take shape without any serious hitch". According to same report the Tunku will leave for London during the second week of July accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance as well as officials.

Director of Information services is quoted in same report as saying the Federation Government does not consider dispute between Britain and Philippines over North Borneo would delay or prejudice the Malaysia project.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

28th June, 1962



61/794

88

A+C

30/5/62

2. Garner had nothing to say on either the Commonwealth or on Malaysia that has not been reported to you, except that Brown, as a member of the Chequers Committee, is to get a copy of the Chadwick Report at once. He seemed to have no ideas on the Commonwealth except in relation to the impossibility of damming

.../2

GS

I.13055

- 2 -

SECRET

the flood of new members. Special consultation arrangements for the Old Commonwealth do not seem to have been thought of much, except as something which will now be "easier" because of the camouflage provided by the greatly increased numbers. One "idea" that seems to have been agreed is that the "unsatisfactory" Chequers week-ends will be abandoned. Dinner parties will take their place. Bunting's suggestion that this was all very well for the United Kingdom who would retain their own relations with each member but not too satisfactory for anyone else got no reaction.

61/794.13055

62/558



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JRR

I.15094

Sent: 21st June, 1962,  
1530  
Rec'd: 22nd June, 1962.  
1000

FROM:

Australasian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

264 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Bangkok 815 for Minister and Critchley,  
London 11, Singapore 21.

Malaysia.

Our telegram 257 to Canberra.

Virtually certain, Tunku will not be leaving for London talks until early July and will be here for Minister's visit. He expects to receive copy of Cobbold Commission Report at weekend and will want some time to study and discuss it before King of Thailand's visit which ends 27th and meeting of Parliament now scheduled for 25th (Ø) + 29th June.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
P.M's.

22nd June, 1962.

87  
61/594  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

AM

FROM:

I.14526

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

Sent: 15th June, 1962

1655

Recd: 16th June, 1962

0830

257. SECRET.

Repeat Minister please.

Repeated London 10, Singapore 19.

From Critchley.

Malaysia.

My 252.

Malayan mood changed yesterday to optimism and Tunku now talks of leaving for London on 28th with Razak, Ismail and Tan Siew Sin.

2. Specific recommendations have been avoided and British have made concessions that will permit signing of report probably today. For example Borneo Governors are to be appointed by Yang Di-Pertuan Agong on Joint Nomination of Agong and Queen. There are however complicated details still to be negotiated. Tunku plans to study these as soon as Ghazali returns with the report in the next few days.

3. I have drawn Tunku's attention to Minister's visit. He is well aware of its importance and hopes he may be able to delay departure until July 2nd.

A/MIN & DEPT E.A.  
P.M.'s.

16th June, 1962

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

LAS

I.14113

Dated: 12th June, 1962.

1530

Rec'd: 13th June, 1962.

0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

252 SECRET

Repeated London 9, Singapore 18.

From Critchley.

Malaysia.

Razak told me last night that Tunku's visit to London for Malasia talks may be delayed indefinitely. Notwithstanding straight talk by Sandys with Cobbold difficulties over the Borneo territories were continuing. In particular Watherston and Abell appeared to be holding out for retention of British Governor and British responsibility in fields other than Defence, External Affairs and Internal Security.

2. Razak said he had just telegraphed Ghazali instructing him not to submit minority views but to refuse to sign unsatisfactory report. Tunku would not go to London to negotiate but only if there were agreement in advance. Otherwise Malaysia project would have to be postponed. It was the British who wanted Malaya's help in solving problems of Singapore and Borneo territories. If there were no Malaysia and British could not control Internal Security situation in Singapore, Malaysians would be obliged to close causeway.

3. Razak was in angry mood. He claimed Borneo Governor had interfered and if there was to be Malaysia the sooner they were out of the way the better.

A/ MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
P.M's

13th June, 1962.

85  
61/794  
15 JUN 1962  
SECRET

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SECRET



INWARD CABLEGRAM

TM.

I.13730.

FROM:

Dated: 7th June, 1962.  
1450.  
Rec'd: 8th June, 1962.  
0830.

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

241. SECRET

Addressed Canberra, repeated Singapore 17, London 8.

From Critchley.

Malaysia.

My telegram 240.

Tory reported by emergency telegram Tunku's adverse reactions to proposed Cobbold Report and need for early remedial action.

2. Yesterday he was instructed to tell Tunku that British Government was distressed by Tunku's reactions and hoped he would do nothing without further discussions. The message added that the British Government was determined to go ahead with the proposals and the Tunku could be assured that the real decisions would be taken by the two Governments.

3. Tunku told me last night that he understood that Cobbold had now been asked to redraft sections of the Report including recommendations.

A/MIN & DEPT E.A.  
P.M.'s.

8th June, 1962.



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## INWARD CABLEGRAM

TM.

I.13673.

FROM:

Dated: 6th June, 1962.

1940.

Rec'd: 7th June, 1962.

0640.

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.

2636. SECRET.

Addressed Canberra, repeated Washington 275, New York 121, Singapore, Moscow, Paris, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Ottawa, Geneva, Vientiane, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore.

From External.

Warner (Foreign Office) made the following points this afternoon:

(A) Malaysia.

Cobbold report was now not expected to be signed before next week, and the Tunku is apparently becoming increasingly nervous about it. The Foreign Office is horrified to discover the extent to which the Colonial Office is suggesting the continuation of British colonial administration in Borneo after Malaysia comes into being. They feel that the Colonial Office's suggestions are politically quite unreal. Warner thinks that it is on this point that the main difficulties are arising with the Cobbold Commission.

(B) Laos.

The Foreign Office reflects some of the optimism in Addis's latest report on prospects for the meeting of the Princes tomorrow. Part of this stems from Souvanna Phouma's unusually satisfactory interview with the King. Addis is, moreover, confident that Souvanna Phouma will not return to Paris on the 15th, if there seems to be some prospect of a settlement. While the Foreign Office does not set much store by Phoumi's present reasonableness, they feel that on this occasion Souphanouvong may be the nigger in the woodpile.

Shann.

A/MIN & DEPT E.A.,  
P.M.'s

7th June, 1962,

*Copy for Q/1805*

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ATG



*With the Compliments  
of the  
Official Secretary*

*Office of the High Commissioner  
for the United Kingdom,  
Canberra, A.C.T.*



## INWARD CABLEGRAM

TM.

I.13245.

FROM:

Dated: 1st June, 1962.  
1730.Rec'd: 2nd June, 1962.  
0412.Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.2543. CONFIDENTIAL.Addressed Canberra 2543, repeated Australian High Commission,  
Kuala Lumpur 9 and Australian Commission, Singapore 6 (Canberra please  
pass)

From External

Malaysia.

G.R.O. (Bentliffe) have told us that Gobbald report is not yet finished. It is taking longer than expected to get an agreed formulation on "several points" (Bentliffe did not say which points - but it is not hard to guess). Bentliffe said officials were expecting agreement on terms would be reached some time next week but that no date had been mentioned.

A/MIN & DEPT E.A.  
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE.  
P.M.'s

2nd June, 1962.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

:GS

I.12896

Sent: 29th May, 1962  
1410

Rec'd: 30th May, 1962  
0230

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.

2431. SECRET.

Addressed Canberra, repeated Washington 254, New York  
117, Saving Kuala Lumpur, Singapore.

From External.

Malaysia.

I carried my discussion with Golds further this morning with Wallace at the Colonial Office. He was able to be a little more precise about timing, and suggested that if all went well the Cobbold report would be published this week, the Tunku would be here next month, a general blessing from the Tunku and the British Government would follow, coinciding with the release of the report, and that the question would then be considered in the late summer in the Borneo Legislatures (such as they are), and there would perhaps then be a conference in London of all the parties concerned which would set a time some time in 1963 for the coming into being of Malaysia. Wallace seems to have in mind for the latter a date perhaps earlier than August 1963.

2. The Colonial Office perhaps is slightly less optimistic than the Commonwealth Relations Office about the chances of eventual success. They are encouraged by a marked change in favour of Malaysia in Borneo, which stems in part from the ill-advised activity of the Communists during the visit of the Cobbold Commission. Knowing that the British authorities must some day leave, the Borneans now see perhaps more clearly the need for something to take its place.

3. Wallace confirmed that Golds had said about the main difficulties that lie in the way. Citizenship, in relation to what Lee Kwan Yew has agreed with the Tunku for Singapore, may be the main one, and Lee Kwan Yew is hoping that Borneo will get less than Singapore, although the achievement of this is unlikely. The kind of transition from British rule is a problem, and the Colonial Office too is worried that the Tunku may be included to accept more than his political strength in Malaya justified. This would be particularly so if he were to accept what the British regard as the most desirable outcome, which is that under a Malaysian cover the entire British administration, including Governors, should continue for some years.

4. Wallace regards Lee Kwan Yew's present attitude of relaxed confidence as justified, although he is worried by the extend of continued colonial rule in the Territories, as he feels that criticism he has met in Yugoslavia and elsewhere that he is condoning the

.../2



**INWARD CABLEGRAM.**

IGS

I.12896

- 2 -

continuance of imperialism may, in these circumstances, be difficult to answer. Lee Kwan Yew has also told the Colonial Office that he would not wish any further Communists to be locked up until after his referendum. But Wallace seems to have a clearer picture of when the referendum is likely to take place, which is November.

5. I asked Wallace how the United Kingdom now felt about the question of defence. Were they satisfied that the kind of restrictions that we face on the movement of forces from Malaya itself would not be likely to be applied to Singapore? Wallace says that this would be most unlikely, and that the Defence authorities in England are satisfied that their freedom of action in Singapore will not be impaired. It is unlikely, however, that any attempt will be made to spell this out in legal documents, as this might only precipitate the situation which the Defence people faced in Nigeria. Lee Kwan Yew has again expressed the opinion in London that the United Kingdom forces should stay in Singapore.

6. In general, Wallace feels that most responsible leaders in all of the Territories concerned, are now satisfied, as is Cobbold, that Malaysia would be a good thing in itself, and not just a neat way of tidying up British colonial responsibilities in the area. It is difficult for these people to see any practicable alternative, and the possibility of others, especially Indonesia, becoming interested before long is a factor.

Shann.

A/MIN.&DEPT.E.A.  
A/MIN.&DEPT.DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

30th May, 1962



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

GS

I.10918

Sent: 10th May, 1962  
1650

FROM:

Rec'd: 11th May, 1962  
0830

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

197. SECRET.

Repeated Singapore 12.

From Critchley.

The Tunku did not state categorically in House that "deadline" for Malaysia was August 1962 but nevertheless this is his hope. He said Singapore would have to decide on merger by August or he would consider closing causeway. He had said earlier (our telegram 173) that he would go to London before August for "final talks" on Malaysia and Minister for Transport (Sardon) did say in House on 2nd May "we hope to have Malaysia by 31st August".

2. Malaysians take an optimistic view of Borneo developments. They have always tended to assume that the Cobbold report will be favourable and although constitutional changes may take some time that they will be in a position to proclaim Malaysia on Merdeka Day.

3. Tunku's statement reflects continuing Malayan anxiety about Singapore. There is an increasing tendency to consider that the threat of Communist subversion must be dealt with firmly as a precondition for merger. At the weekend Razak told me that with the Cobbold Commission's report on the way, the proposal for incorporating the Borneo territories had gained a momentum that would be difficult to stop. He thought that this progress need not be influenced by delay over Singapore.

MIN.&DEPT.E.A.(3027/1/2/3)  
MIN.&DEPT.DEFENCE  
P.M.'s

11th May, 1962

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CH KW



# TELEGRAM

CYPHER.

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 19.45 hours. 8th May, 1962.

Received: 03.30 hours. 9th May, 1962.

ROUTINE.

TELEGRAM No. 618. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed British High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur No. 401,  
Canberra No. 618, Wellington No. 368.

Following is text of Colonial Office telegram  
addressed to Acting United Kingdom Commissioner Singapore  
No. 200 of 7th May. Repeated Kuala Lumpur, Canberra,  
Wellington.

BEGIN.

LEE KUAN YEW.

Following announcement being issued by Colonial  
Office for use not before 1100 hours G.M.T. on Tuesday  
8th May.

BEGIN.

Visit of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew Prime Minister of the  
State of Singapore to the United Kingdom.

Mr. Lee Kuan Yew the Prime Minister of Singapore  
will be visiting the United Kingdom from 11th May to 19th  
May, 1962 in response to a long-standing invitation by  
Mr. Harold Macmillan. The visit is being made in the course  
of a tour by Mr. Lee which includes also Rangoon, Delhi,  
Cairo, Belgrade, Rome, Geneva, Copenhagen, Tokyo and Hong Kong.  
He will be accompanied by his wife.

While in London Mr. Lee will have discussions on the  
preliminary arrangements to be made before the proposed  
merger of the State of Singapore with the Federation of Malaya  
within a Federation of Malaysia. These arrangements concern  
the transfer of responsibility for Foreign Affairs, Defence  
and Security to the Central Government of the proposed Federation.



# TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

-2-

In addition to Mr. Macmillan Mr. Lee is expected to see the Colonial and Commonwealth Secretaries and the Minister of (group mining).

Mr. Lee's party will include his political Secretary Mr. Jek Tuen Thong and his Private Secretary, Mr. Liew Khai Yeong. They will be staying at Grosvenor House, Park Lane, W.1.  
END.

2. As you will see this announcement is substantially the same as in your Telegram No.194 agreed by Federation (High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur's telegram No.215).

3. Please inform Singapore Government as necessary. Please also inform Hockenhull. We leave it to High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur to inform Malaysians at his discretion.

4. Telegram is being repeated to Canberra and Wellington with reference to C.R.C. Telegrams No.538 to Canberra and No.319 to Wellington.  
END.

SECRETARY OF STATE.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.**

AM

TO:

0.7409

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

Sent: 7th May, 1962  
1250

244. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

61/794

Malaysia.

Tunku is reported to have told Parliament 28th April that August 1962 was deadline for Malaysia.

Glad urgent confirmation and tentative assessment of significance of statement.

MIN & DEPT E.A. (3027/1/2/3)  
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'s.

7th May, 1962

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

214



## UNITED KINGDOM COMMISSION FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY

This copy to  
Mr. Vines.

No. 3 29th March - 11th April 1962.

copied to G.M. File.

PART I - INTERNAL AFFAIRSMalaysia

Not surprisingly, the reactions to the Tunku's recent speeches have concentrated on his remarks (re-echoed in a further speech by Tan Siew Sin, Finance Minister of the Federation, when he opened a new M.C.A. branch in Singapore on 4th April) about the possibility of the causeway being closed and of other dire consequences if Singapore refused Merger. Leading articles in both the English and Chinese press have been mild in tone, the general line being that no offence was intended and that the warning was unnecessary since no-one opposed Merger in principle. On the other hand, Barisan Sosialis, who have now started a house-to-house canvass against Merger, are insisting that there would be no need for threats if the White Paper proposals could be supported on their merits. The same point was made by Lim Kean Siew, Secretary General of the Malaysia Socialist Conference, in a speech to the Singapore National Union of Journalists in which he also warned the British Government to think again whether it would be wise to push through Merger in its present form. Lee Kuan Yew himself commenting on the Tunku's warning said that the basic position had always been that Singapore could not do without the Federation and vice-versa. Some people thought that blunt talking was good, others did not. He himself believed in it.

2. On the whole it seems clear that the Tunku's intervention has been resented by many Chinese in Singapore and it has certainly had the effect of raising the temperature of the Merger debate here.

3. Considerable interest has also been aroused by the Tunku's remarks, following his return to Kuala Lumpur, about a letter he had received stating that people who had hitherto opposed Merger and Malaysia did not oppose it now. He said he could not reveal from whom the letter came but that he would not describe it as having come from a Communist. He added "I don't think they are Communists but we know who they are". Subsequently, it emerged that the letter was written by Lim Chin Siong as Secretary General of Barisan Sosialis and although he refused to disclose its contents he made it clear that his letter did not mean that Barisan Sosialis was dropping its opposition to P.A.P. Merger proposals. One interpretation of this intriguing manoeuvre is that it was intended to drive a wedge between the P.A.P. and the Tunku by assuring him that Barisan Sosialis was a reasonable and constitutional party that supported Merger in principle. Whatever the impression made on the Tunku, his reported comments have been taken here to mean that he does not regard Lim Chin Siong as a Communist, and the result will certainly be to make it more difficult for the Federation to justify repressive action against Barisan Sosialis.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

SRG

I. 9247

Dated: 18th April, 1962  
1655

FROM:

Rec'd: 18th April, 1962  
2135

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

173. UNCLASSIFIED.

Prime Minister told Malay Mail correspondent today he would visit London before August for final talks with British Government on Malaysia following completion of Cobbold Commission Report.

The Tunku added he would not attend Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference on Common Market because of other commitments if it were held in September.

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MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
P.M.'s DEPT.  
P.M.'s

18th April, 1962



CONFIDENTIAL

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## TELEGRAM

CYPHER

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1915 hours 9th April, 1962.  
Received: 1000 hours 10th April, 1962.

ROUTINE.

TELEGRAM NO. 538 CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed British High Commissioners Canberra 538, Wellington 319, repeated U.K. Commissioner Singapore, British High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur 321.

TOUR BY LEE KUAN YEW.

Lee intends to visit Britain in early May during course of tour abroad when he will visit among other countries Burma, India, Pakistan, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Italy, Switzerland, Denmark and Japan.

2. While here Lee proposes to discuss with Ministers preliminary arrangements to be made before Singapore, joins Malaysia for transfer of responsibility for Foreign affairs, defence and security.
3. Announcements about visit will be made soon.
4. Please inform Australian/New Zealand authorities.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

CONFIDENTIAL



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CONFIDENTIAL  
TELEGRAM

CYPHER

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1915 hours 9th April, 1962.  
Received: 1000 hours 10th April, 1962.

ROUTINE.

TELEGRAM NO. 538 CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed British High Commissioners Canberra 538, Wellington  
319, repeated U.K. Commissioner Singapore, British High  
Commissioner Kuala Lumpur 321.

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defence and security.

3. Announcements about visit will be made soon.

4. Please inform Australian/New Zealand authorities.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

CONFIDENTIAL



thought however that there had tended to be too much concentration in SEATO on the planning organization rather than on the broader provisions. He thought it should be strengthened by more attention being paid to the anti-subversion programme, particularly in the north-east of Thailand, where the need was demonstrated. Australia had made its own proposal to replace the original Thai voting proposal, which was not acceptable to the other members. This had led to procedural difficulties. The Minister thought Thailand was less restive but that it may not be fully satisfied on voting provisions. However, a solution acceptable both to Thailand and the other members may yet be found.

(iv) Aid to Vietnam.

The High Commissioner asked whether Australia intended to increase its aid to Vietnam. The Minister said that the U.S.A. was supplying Vietnam's military requirements and Australia would not duplicate U.S. efforts in this field. However, Australia was looking for ways in which to apply aid to Vietnam's rural areas, where a restoration of confidence in the Government was the most urgent need. The villagers tended to feel forgotten and neglected by the Government in Saigon. In reply to a question by the High Commissioner, the Minister doubted whether Russia and Communist China were likely to increase their pressure to the point of a major conflict in South Vietnam at the present time. His personal view was that the major Communist powers did not want open escalating hostilities in the area.

61/794

(v) Malaysia.

The Minister considered that the Tunku was proceeding at great speed towards the realisation of the concept of a Greater Malaysia; he was possibly outrunning opinion in the Borneo Territories. He thought that Greater Malaysia was a possibility, but not a certainty and in any event its final form might not be in accordance with the Tunku's present thinking.

(vi) Australia-New Zealand Co-operation.

The High Commissioner referred to current "resentment" in certain New Zealand circles over Australian trade policies. (The farming community in New Zealand was extremely vocal.) He said that the trade imbalance between Australia and New Zealand was a matter of concern to his Government and he also referred to repercussions in New Zealand to Australian quarantine regulations on such items as New Zealand potatoes. He hoped that the proposal for a Quarantine Union between the two countries would eventuate.

The High Commissioner expressed the view that there was room for a greater exchange of ministerial visits between the two countries and referred to Mr. Marshall's recent discussions with Mr. McEwen in Australia, and Mr. McEwen's subsequent agreement in principle to visit New Zealand in June. The New Zealand Government was now wondering whether Mr. McEwen would find it possible to visit New Zealand on his way home from Europe. Such a visit would be most useful. The Minister agreed, but pointed out that Mr. McEwen might not find it possible to do as the High Commissioner suggested at the end of an exhausting overseas visit and in view of his commitments in Australia.

On the subject of Australian-New Zealand relations, the Minister said that the two countries had tended to drift apart in recent years. New Zealand had maintained close ties with Britain, while Australia had become less close as time went on.

ORIGINAL ON 62/248

CONFIDENTIAL



ED.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I.5947.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

Dated: 12th March, 1962.  
1835.  
Rec'd: 13th March, 1962.  
1230.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

116. CONFIDENTIAL.

Savingram London, Sav 2. Singapore.

Greater Malaysia.

My press telegram No. 115.

The Prime Minister told me at Reception this morning that he was seriously concerned about the attitude of British Civil Servants in Borneo territories. He had expected a stronger lead to the local population in support of Greater Malaysia from them. He had "warned" both Tory and Sir William Goode here of Malayan dissatisfaction but there had apparently been no improvement in attitude of officials in the field and he had felt obliged to make public statement.

2. The Tunku has been somewhat discouraged by talks with Dato Wong and Ghazali who were in Kuala Lumpur at weekend about the scale of opposition to Greater Malaysia. In looking for reasons other than genuine misgivings which he is reluctant to recognise he has tended to blame opposition on Communist agitation on the one hand and Britain "dragging its feet" on the other. The announcement last night was presumably timed to coincide with resumption of full Commission hearings this week.

3. Tory who saw Tunku this morning said he had expressed regret about likely unfavourable reaction to statement in Borneo territories. He had also emphasised importance to Malaya of not antagonising the British Civil Servants in Borneo who would be needed to stay on and serve the Central Government after Greater Malaysia was realised. Tory added that it was surprising so much progress had been made towards Greater Malaysia in so little time as issue was delicate one for the British Government. What was needed at this stage was patience and understanding of genuine reservations in Borneo territories. The alleged rudeness of British resident in Jesselton was presumably not intentional but both Ghazali and Dato Wong were fairly "thin skinned".

4. Tory's view is that the Tunku's remarks will do more harm than good in Borneo territories to Greater Malaysia cause and that best course now would be to let talk rest. He is urging the Tunku not to make further statements of this

2.



68

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

ED.

I.5947.

- 2 -

nature and C.R.O. to ask the Colonial Office to ensure  
that Colonial Governors do not make strong public replies.

MIN & DEPT E.A.  
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE.  
P.M'S.

13th March, 1962.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



67

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

KW

PRESS

FROM:

5941  
L 5941  
Dated: 12th March, 1962  
1650

Rec'd: 13th March, 1962  
0830

Australian High Commission.,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

115.

UNCLASSIFIED.

Subject Greater Malaysia.

Prime Minister said inter alia at press conference last night that 'British Civil Servants in Borneo are very antagonistic towards Malaysia. They have now been persuaded not to take an active part in opposing Malaysia. Instead they have adopted an apathetic attitude'.

Prime Minister added that although the British Government had already expressed support for the Malaysia concept, British Civil Servants could do 'a lot of harm' by influencing indigenous people against Malaysia.

He also accused one British Resident in North Borneo of deliberate rudeness to Malayan members of the Cobbold Commission.

He said dangers facing Borneo territories were clear. 'We can see the threat of the Communists. If I did not see this danger I would not be bothered with the other territories like Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo. Why should I really bother with these territories if I did not see the danger ahead for us and for them.'

Please see my immediately following telegram.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M'S

13th March, 1962



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

66

KW

I. 5937

Dated: 12th March, 1962  
1845

Rec'd: 13th March, 1962  
0620

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.

1062. CONFIDENTIAL.

Malaysia.

Bentliffe (Malaysia Desk C.R.O.) told us 12th March that they are not yet sure what to make of 'Straits Times' statement by Tunku attacking British Borneo officials as antagonistic to Malaysia. It might be merely angry reaction to some real or imagined slight to Wong Pow Nee and Ghazali, in which case Tunku might have been expected to complain to the British directly instead of launching a press attack. It appeared rather more likely that it was Tunku's way of trying to bring pressure to bear on the British to ensure that they would not pay attention to any objections in Borneo to the inclusion of the territories in Greater Malaysia. In any case the episode would not facilitate the work of Communism. There was danger of a wedge being driven between Malayan and British elements of the Commission.

2. Bentliffe said Lord Cobbold had now indicated that he did not intend to interrupt his work with the Commission to spend so some time in England on business before returning to Borneo. He now felt there was too much for him to do with the Commission to leave it even for a short time. Bentliffe said Cobbold had sent no interim reports and was not expected to do so. (We think it likely that the Colonial Office will have more information on the Commission's progress and expect to discuss with them this week).

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M'S

13th March, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL



65

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

KFH

I. 3854

FROM:

Dated: 16th February, 1962.  
1822  
Rec'd: 17th February, 1962.  
0445

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE.

40. SECRET.

Repeated Kuala Lumpur 1.

Your 79.

Razak last week gave Tory a suggested agenda which covered wide issues of external defence of Malaysia. Tory asked Razak to withdraw it on the assurance that the United Kingdom would want to discuss such matters after the defence review. Razak's reaction was apparently favourable but Tory's report is not yet in Singapore.

2. I agree that present British proposal would not require Australian participation. However, if paragraph 2(d) is confirmed as Government policy it might be useful to express it now.

3. From quick reading of Razak's suggested agenda he has posed such questions as what forces "other Commonwealth countries" (i.e. other than Malaya) would furnish for external defence of Malaysia and what help Commonwealth countries could give in expending the Federation forces.

Jockel.

MIN.&DEPT E.A. (696/17/1)  
MIN.&DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

17th February, 1962.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET



PH

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
I.3838

INWARD CABLEGRAM

Dated: 15th February, 1962.  
2010  
Rec'd: 16th February, 1962.  
2018

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.

666 CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Savingram Kuala Lumpur, Singapore.  
Malaysia.

Our telegram 508.

Colonial Office (Sussex in Nield's absence) confirmed that Cobbold, Abell and Watherston are going to Singapore tomorrow 16th February. Except for first fortnight, programme is still very uncertain. Cobbold's reluctance to make arrangements had been overcome and delay now as in getting agreement of Malaysians to suggested arrangements.

2. Sussex said that Sir John Martin had returned feeling that it would be touch and go whether Greater Malaysia could be realised. Details by savingram.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN & DEPT. DEFENCE  
P.M.'S

17th February, 1962.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
INWARD CABLEGRAM

63

KW

I.1259

Dated: 17th January, 1962  
1855

Rec'd: 18th January, 1962  
0445

SECRET

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.



235.

SECRET.

Repeated Kuala Lumpur 2, Singapore 2.

(Canberra please pass both places).

Malaysia.

C.R.O. (Ormerod) today briefed us on membership of Borneo Commission which is as reported in our 202. (Please protect Nield as Ormerod does not know we were already informed). Ormerod said the High Commission would advise you tomorrow.

2. Ormerod said C.R.O. regarded Abell as key member and the only expert on the British side. He had been Governor of Sarawak for ten years to 1959 and had the confidence of the people there. Watherston had been included mainly to please Tunku. Cobbold would give the Commission high standing in British public opinion, which was very necessary in view of feeling in some domestic quarters that the Government was preparing to shuffle out of its responsibilities to Borneo peoples.

3. Ormerod said Ghazali had helped greatly by curbing Tunku's impatience during recent weeks when the latter had been growing suspicious of British intentions.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M.'S

18th January 1962

SECRET

SECRET

Copy to H





62

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA REFERRED TO IN THE PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR. MacMILLAN TO MR. MENZIES DATED 22nd NOVEMBER 1961 (already passed to Mr. Menzies by Mr. Moore).

Where the physical text of the annex~~es~~ on Defence matters differs slightly from the earlier text the changes have been underlined:

ENCLOSURE B.

TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT BY GOVERNMENTS OF UNITED KINGDOM AND FEDERATION OF MALAYA.

In a series of meetings in London this week British and Malayan Ministers examined the proposal to create a "Federation of Malaysia" which would embrace the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.

2. In the light of a full study of the problem which has been going on for some months the British and Malayan Governments are convinced that this is a desirable aim.

3. The Ministers took note with satisfaction of the heads of agreement recently negotiated between the Governments of Malaya and Singapore for the merging of the State of Singapore with the Federation.

4. Before coming to any final decision it is necessary to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak. It has accordingly been decided to set up a Commission to carry out this task and to make recommendations. The Commission will be composed of a Chairman and four members, two nominated by the British Government and two by the Malayan Government. In the light of the Commission's Report the two Governments will decide what further steps should be taken. (The terms of reference of the Commission are at Annex A).

5. At the same time the views of the Sultan of Brunei are being sought.



6. In regard to Defence matters it was decided that in the event of the formation of the proposed Federation of Malaysia the existing Defence Agreement between Britain and Malaya should be extended to embrace the other Territories concerned. It was, ~~the~~ <sup>FEDERATION</sup> ~~United Kingdom~~ however, agreed that the Government of the ~~United Kingdom~~ of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain bases at Singapore for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South East Asia. (The text of the arrangements agreed is at Annex B).

Annex A  
and  
Annex B  
follow.



4.  
ANNEX B.DEFENCE.

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Federation of Malaya have agreed in the event of the creation of the proposed Federation of Malaysia that the Agreement on external defence and mutual assistance of 1957 and its annexes shall be extended to apply to all Territories of the Federation of Malaysia and any reference in that Agreement to the Federation of Malaya shall be deemed to apply to the Federation of Malaysia subject to the proviso that the Government of the Federation of Malaysia will afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities at present occupied by their Service Authorities within the State of Singapore and will permit the United Kingdom to make such use of these bases and facilities as the United Kingdom may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South East Asia.

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58

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

KW

I.29133

Dated: 2nd December, 1961  
1130

Rec'd: 3rd December, 1961  
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.

5729.

UNCLASSIFIED.



Repeated Savingram Kuala Lumpur, Singapore,  
Malaysia.

Press Conference, by Tunku before departure  
yesterday. Main points

(A) Merger with Singapore urgent because if the  
present Government were changed (not an immediate danger)  
Malaysia would fail and this would be victory for the  
Communists.

(B) Merger with Singapore not really practical  
until at least one and preferably all Borneo's were ready to  
join also. New constitutions of Sarawak and North Borneo  
would have to be such as to enable them to be integrated into  
present structure of Malaya.

(C) Chinese problem arose only where individual  
Chinese retained allegiance to China and Communism and not  
to Malaya. Communist Chinese infiltration in Malaya and  
Singapore was 'very great', and he expected them to make  
trouble. His intelligence service was watching them closely.

(D) On Defence: Britain would consult after transfer of  
sovereignty as a matter of courtesy. There was already  
provision for consultation in event of war in the area under  
the existing agreement. He said specifically that base could  
be used to help Vietnam if necessary. Malaysia would not  
join S.E.A.T.O. but was not neutralist because it was  
anti-communist. Maintenance of bases would add to Malaysia's  
Security.

Details by bag.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE  
J.I.C.  
P.M.'S

3rd December, 1961

Copy K.H.



91

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

BJS

I.29031

Sent: 1st December, 1961  
1500

FROM:

Recd: 1st December, 1961  
2130

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

382

UNCLASSIFIED.



Malaysia.

On his return from the London Talks yesterday afternoon, Razak told reporters at the airport that the talks had been successful and that agreement on the creation of Malaysia had been reached in a matter of a few days.

2. The only outstanding point was the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission to ascertain the feelings of the people in the Borneo Territories. The Chairman could be anybody of high standing acceptable to both sides. The Malaysians had suggested some names and so had the British. The Tunku was staying a few days longer in London to clear up the matter.

3. Britain would continue to maintain the Singapore Base as Malaya was not in a position to maintain any base on that scale. However it would not be used for S.E.A.T.O. purposes. "The provisions under the Anglo Malayan Defence and Mutual Assistance Treaty will apply to the Singapore Base. The sovereignty of the base will lie with us. The British Government will not be able to make use of it without consulting us."

4. Merger would be discussed further in the Parliamentary Solidarity Committee which will meet at Kuching on December 15th.

MIN & DEPT E.A.  
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE  
P.M's

2nd December, 1961



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

SECRET

ED.

I.28650.

Dated: 27th November, 1961.  
2023.

Rec'd: 28th November, 1961.  
0700.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.

5637 SECRET.

Savingram Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.  
Malaysia.

Following from Ormerod today.

Sandys will make statement (in response to Private Notice Question) in the Commons tomorrow. This partly as result of complaints that matter in communique was of such nature that it should have been first disclosed to Parliament. Communique will be published as white paper. C.R.O. half expect questions about association of Australia and New Zealand with arrangements and are likely to reply on line that association is open to us to consider in so far as anything additional to present arrangements is necessary. Sandys will try to parry questions about apparent Malayan gloss on interpretation of Defence aspect over weekend (see following cable).

2. On latter United Kingdom are not alarmed. There has been some consideration of whether any approach should be made to Tunku over reported comments but inclination, particularly on part of Watkinson, is against this. Preference is to let issue ride for some time. They feel that Tunku is probably annoyed with the unanimity with which the United Kingdom press regarded the communique as a British victory.

3. Exact species of conference document/communique (which was of course signed) is being discussed. C.R.O. Legal Advisers are inclined to think it is of such a nature that it should be registered with the United Nations.

4. Discussions with Razak are going on on internal security and defence forces. Ormerod had no information as to course of these.

5. No decisions yet on membership of Borneo Commission. They are experiencing difficulty in hitting on suitable persons.

MIN & DEPT E.A.  
P.M'S.

28th November, 1961.

*Cope on 6/13/8*

*Cope k 11*





**FOR THE PRESS**

Released only in Melbourne.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANBERRA

PR. 112A

25th November, 1961.

**FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA PROPOSAL**

**Statement by the Prime Minister and Minister for  
External Affairs**

6/1794.

Following is the text of a statement on the Malaysian Federation proposal issued in Melbourne on 25th November, 1961:

"Important agreements have been reached in the recent talks in London between British and Malayan Ministers on the Malaysia Federation proposal.

"We have throughout indicated our belief that the concept was a very good one and we hope it will include all the countries originally indicated by the Tunku.

"We know that the question of the use of the Singapore base is a very important one and we have emphasised this. Having been in close touch we welcome the agreement now made.

"We hope that the Malaysia proposal will reach full achievement as soon as possible.

"As in the case of the Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957, the new agreement has been negotiated bilaterally with Britain. Australia was, however, associated with the 1957 agreement by a collateral exchange of letters with the Malayan Government and we will give consideration to Australian association with the new agreement in an appropriate form."

. . . . .



54  
CONFIDENTIAL  
6/1/794  
- 8 DEC 1961

GREATER MALAYSIA

The exploratory talks in London between the Tunku and Mr. Macmillan from 20th - 22nd November proceeded smoothly. There was agreement at the outset that a Greater Malaysia (which would embrace the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei) was a desirable aim, and the Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction the heads of agreement recently negotiated between the Governments of Malaya and Singapore for the merger of the two territories.\* It was further agreed that, before the Malaysia concept could proceed further, it would be necessary to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak. (While the views of the Sultan of Brunei will be sought independently, Brunei's incorporation in Malaysia was privately recognised as being primarily a matter for negotiation between the Brunei and Malayan Governments.)

In order to assess the views of the peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo a joint Commission composed of a chairman and four members, two nominated by the British Government and two by the Malayan Government, is to be established with the following terms of reference -

"Having regard to the expressed agreement of the Governments of Britain and the Federation of Malaya that the inclusion of North Borneo and Sarawak (together with other territories) in the proposed Federation of Malaysia is a desirable aim in the interests of the peoples of the territories concerned -

- (a) to ascertain views of peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak on this question, and
- (b) in the light of their assessment of these views to make recommendations."

It is expected that the Commission, which is to be established urgently, will take about three months to complete its work. Following receipt of its report, the British and Malayan Governments will hold further high level talks on progress toward Malaysia.

During discussions on the defence aspects of the Greater Malaysia plan, the Tunku is understood to have displayed an appreciation of the fact that the defence of Malaysia was intimately linked to the defence of the whole of South East Asia. (Earlier, he had said that the Singapore base, following merger, would not be

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\* The terms of this agreement state, inter alia, that Singapore will become a State within the Federation of Malaya with a larger measure of local autonomy than the other States forming the Federation. Defence, External Affairs and Security will be the responsibility of the Federation Government; Education and Labour that of the Singapore Government. The present Singapore Legislative Assembly will continue as a State Assembly. In addition, Singapore will have 15 seats in the Federation House of Representatives and 2 seats in the Federation Senate.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL <sup>53</sup>

2.

available for S.E.A.T.O. purposes). He agreed that, in the event of Malaysia coming to fruition, the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957 should be extended to apply to all territories of the Federation of Malaysia, and that the United Kingdom would be afforded "the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities at present occupied by their Service authorities within the State of Singapore" and will be permitted "to make such use of these bases and facilities as the United Kingdom may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South East Asia".

It is clear that the speed and character of further development towards Malaysia will hereafter be influenced materially by the work of the joint Commission shortly to be established. Since both the Malayan and British governments appear generally to agree on objectives, the main problem is likely to be the formulation of a constitutional arrangement which satisfies both the Malayan desire for a permanent and viable merger and the desire of the peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo for adequate safeguards against any risks of Malay domination. Meanwhile, Lee Kuan Yew, who seems assured of majority support in the Singapore Assembly for the merger terms agreed with the Tunku, appears to have abandoned temporarily his plan for an early referendum on the subject and is currently stressing the need for ample time for explanation and clarification of the issues involved in merger.

30th November, 1961.

CONFIDENTIAL



52

~~Mr. Hinde~~ Mr. Browley

You might send the  
spare copy to E.A.

Ans.  
24/11

27 NOV 1961







1173

61/794

**FOR THE PRESS**

Embargo: Not to be published or broadcast before 0400 hours Saturday 18th November (to coincide with simultaneous release to be made in London, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore).

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANBERRA

PR. 108

17th November, 1961.GREATER MALAYSIAStatement by the Minister for External Affairs

The Minister for External Affairs, Mr. R.G. Menzies, stated today that the Australian Government was greatly interested in the concept of Greater Malaysia. If it proved practicable, it could contribute significantly to stability and progress in an area in whose development and progress Australia was deeply interested.

The Minister for External Affairs expressed pleasure that this imaginative and far-sighted concept would shortly be the subject of exploratory talks in London between Malayan Ministers led by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the United Kingdom Government.

. . . . .



CONFIDENTIAL 50

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:EHB

I.27930

Sent: 17th November, 1961  
1905  
Rec'd: 18th November, 1961  
0500

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON.

5515 CONFIDENTIAL



Addressed Canberra.

Malaysia.

Arrangements for meetings are -

Monday morning - "Open" meeting at Admiralty House  
with Macmillan

Monday afternoon - Sessions in C.R.O. under Sandys'  
chairmanship

Tuesday all day - With Maudling, Watkinson (probably  
only during Defence discussions) and Hampshire  
(Assistant Under Secretary)

Wednesday morning - C.R.O.

Thursday morning - Final session under Macmillan.

United Kingdom do not wish to overload their team  
in reference to number of Malaysians. Home and Selwyn Lloyd  
will, in effect, be on call. Borneo will be taken before  
Defence. Malaysians have not yet been told details of  
arrangements.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.  
MIN & DEPT. DEFENCE  
J.I.C.  
P.M's

18th November, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL





SECRET

49

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
CANBERRA

POL.29/6

SECRET



17th November, 1961.

*Dear Griffiths*

...

Further to my letter No.POL.29/6 of 17th November about Greater Malaysia, I enclose a copy of a memorandum summarising the advice which has been submitted by officials in London to Ministers in preparation for the talks with Tunku Abdul Rahman next week.

2. Since this memorandum was prepared Lee Kuan Yew has suggested that there might be set up in Kuala Lumpur a Constituent Assembly with representatives of Singapore and the Borneo Territories with the object of considering during the transitional period between the acceptance of the goal of Greater Malaysia and its implementation the problems which arise. This body would be quite separate from the Kuala Lumpur House of Representatives. The Governors of North Borneo and Sarawak are being asked for their views on this proposal which might cut across that described in the memorandum attached for an independent Commission of Enquiry to consider these matters.

...

3. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure, together with a supplementary note which goes into further detail about the position of North Borneo and Sarawak to Mr. Blakeney in External Affairs.

Yours sincerely,

*E. V. Vines*

(E. V. VINES)

A. T. Griffiths Esq.,  
Prime Minister's Department,  
CANBERRA.

*Copy of letter & enclosures To: S. Handlan 20/11/61*

SECRET



# SECRET

## GREATER MALAYSIA

### INTRODUCTION

The possibility of a political association between Malaya, Singapore and the three British Borneo territories has been under general discussion for many years and the United Kingdom Government have throughout regarded it with favour in principle. It was discussed earlier this year at a meeting of the Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia and other United Kingdom representatives in the area and they strongly recommended that the United Kingdom should accept the development of such an association as an ultimate goal of Government policy.

2. In the past a major obstacle has been the attitude of the Malayan Government, who were not prepared to run the risk that the Chinese majority in Singapore might join with the Chinese minority in Malaya to the detriment of the interests of the Malays. Recently, however, there has been a complete change of front on the part of the Malayan Government. The Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in a speech on 27th May spoke favourably about the possibility of an association including all five territories. He has followed this up with great vigour.

3. The Tunku now regards this matter as one of great urgency because the position of the present Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, and his party has of late rapidly deteriorated; and while the Tunku finds it possible to co-operate with Mr. Lee, he sees no prospect of doing so with any other likely Prime Minister of Singapore should Mr. Lee and his Government fall.

4. In Singapore Mr. Lee is committed to a policy of achieving independence through a political merger with Malaya. He and the Tunku have met on several occasions to discuss the Malayan proposals. Mr. Lee has made it clear that these proposals have his full backing and he has agreed with the Tunku on the general arrangements under which Singapore could enter the Federation on special terms. These arrangements would be generally acceptable to us. Mr. Lee believes that his only hope of achieving his aim of "independence through merger" lies in rapid progress on these proposals. The only major problem which such a merger poses for us - and it is a very serious problem indeed - is the future of our rights in the Singapore bases.

5. On the other hand, it is essential to the Tunku's proposals that the three Borneo territories should be brought into the association in order that their predominantly non-Chinese populations may provide a counter-balance to the Chinese majority in Singapore, and the Tunku is not prepared to contemplate a merger of Malaya and Singapore without the inclusion of the Borneo territories. This faces us with a serious dilemma since the Borneo territories are in almost every way quite unready for effective participation in the proposed union.

### MALAYA

6. The future of Singapore is of direct and deep concern to Malaya. Economically its separation from the Federation makes nonsense. But the Malay majority in the Federation are deeply concerned at the likely results of a direct merger, since the Chinese population in the combined territories would then be greater than the Malay population, and moreover the Singapore Chinese contain a high proportion of Communist

/sympathisers.

# SECRET



4)

SECRET

- 2 -

sympathisers. After defeating their own Communists in the long Emergency the last thing that the Malaysans want to risk is Communist domination from Singapore.

7. For a long time the Tunku's view had been that he must keep the Singapore Chinese out. He relied on us to control the situation there and said that in the event of trouble his policy was to seal off Singapore by closing the Johore causeway. It has, however, become apparent to him that the situation in Singapore is changing, and he is aware that a constitutional review is due in Singapore during 1963. As a result, he had now come round to the view that an independent Singapore would be a source of continuous danger and embarrassment to Malaya and that the only alternative is some form of merger between Malaya and Singapore.

8. But it is vital to Malaya that the terms of the merger with Singapore should contain provisions which will safeguard the Federation as a whole against Chinese domination. To achieve this the Tunku has laid down two essential conditions -

- (a) before being committed to a merger with Singapore he must be absolutely certain that the three Borneo territories with their predominantly non-Chinese population will be brought into the wider Federation; and
- (b) Singapore should have a smaller representation in the central Parliament than they would be entitled to on a population basis: in return for this Singapore would retain much wider powers than the other member states - but not responsibility for internal security.

9. The Tunku's specific proposals as they now stand are as follows -

- (1) As a first step Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak should be brought into the Malayan Federation as constituent units on the same basis as the existing States (although he has informed certain Borneo leaders that he would be ready to give the Borneo territories a large measure of self-government).
- (2) Once (1) was secured, Singapore would join the Federation on special terms, retaining powers (much beyond those of existing States in the Federation - e.g. in the field of education and labour) to administer its own affairs. Singapore would then have proportionately smaller representation in central Parliament than it could claim on a population basis if it came in on the same footing as the existing States. Internal security would be a Federal subject.
- (3) The British bases in Singapore would cease to be at the disposal of SEATO but could be maintained as bases for Commonwealth defence.
- (4) There would be no administrative changes in Singapore and it would maintain its own civil service.
- (5) After initial talks with United Kingdom Ministers, there should be a formal discussion in which representatives of all the territories concerned and the United Kingdom would participate. That meeting should decide on the appointment of an independent constitutional commission on the lines of the Reid Commission which drafted the constitution of the Federation of Malaya.

/Singapore

SECRET



SECRET

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- 3 -

SINGAPORE

10. The present constitutional position of Singapore is full internal self-government subject to certain controls over internal security, with the United Kingdom responsible for defence and external affairs and enjoying full rights of occupation, control and use of the bases. Singapore is under mounting economic pressures, particularly as a result of an explosive rate of increase in population. Politically, there is a powerful and growing demand for early independence in one form or another. In the absence of any clear design for the future, Singapore's economic and political circumstances alike play directly into the hands of the Communists, whose influence is strong and pervasive. Mr. Lee's relatively moderate Government have recently lost much ground to the extreme left and their hold on power is now tenuous.

11. We have always had in mind that Singapore and Malaya should one day merge (and have on more than one occasion blessed the idea in public), partly because only in that direction have we been able to see any real hope for Singapore's economy and partly because the political alternative has more and more seemed to be Communist domination of Singapore. Since it is now proposed that on joining Malaya Singapore should surrender to the Federal Government all responsibility for internal security and external defence, merger with a prosperous Malaya ruled by a resolutely anti-Communist Government should greatly improve the prospects of Singapore's economic and political stability. If the creation of a Greater Malaysia is now agreed upon, Mr. Lee and his Government may survive to see it through. There is, of course, no guarantee that he will win the referendum on the subject which he has undertaken to hold in November, but he will have a far better chance if he can present his electorate with a firm promise of merger with Malaya should the voters so choose. Finally, if a merger of Singapore with Malaya can be achieved we shall not only succeed in extricating ourselves from an increasingly menacing situation in the former, but do so in the one way likely to reinforce rather than undermine the security of South East Asia in general and our own interests in particular.

12. If, however, the Greater Malaysia project fails, Mr. Lee and Government will almost certainly fall and be succeeded by another much further to the left and unwilling to contemplate merger with Malaya on terms acceptable to the Tunku. Either of two unpleasant situations could then develop. First, under the new Government the situation in Singapore might so deteriorate that our right under certain conditions to suspend the constitution could and had to be exercised. This would mean assuming direct administration of the island against the background of a hostile population, a public service now containing virtually no British officials, and a brittle economy at least badly shaken. We should then be left for an indefinite period with sole responsibility for a Singapore gone thoroughly bad. In such circumstances the value to us of the Singapore bases would, to say the least, be highly problematical. Second, the new Government might so conduct themselves as to give us no proper grounds for suspending the constitution, however sure we might feel that a Communist take-over was being prepared behind the scenes. In either situation, any previous default on our part in support of Greater Malaysia would have turned the Tunku almost as antagonistic to ourselves as to Singapore.

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13. We are committed to review the existing Singapore constitution in 1963. If Singapore is not by then at least firmly set on the road to independence through merger with Malaya (and assuming that the constitution had not meanwhile been suspended) we shall be faced with a choice no less painful than that set out in the previous paragraph. There will certainly be a demand for separate independence. Should we refuse it we shall be faced by a hostile Singapore, whether or not we have to suspend the constitution: should we accede, we shall establish in the heart of South East Asia a new sovereign state likely to be increasingly influenced by Peking. On the second of the hypotheses it seems inconceivable that the Singapore bases would in any way continue to be available to us, and even on the first they would be of very limited use.

#### BORNEO

14. Here if we leave aside our defence problem is our chief dilemma since we are under obligation to the peoples of the Borneo territories to advance them socially, economically and politically until they are able to assume responsibility for their own future - and in the ordinary way that point would take many years to reach as their political, social and economic institutions are still at a relatively early stage of evolution.

15. We have no doubt that inclusion in a Greater Malaysia offers the Borneo territories their best hope for the future in the long term. Individually they are all highly vulnerable on account of their small size and population, their racial composition and their geographical position; and even a union of the three states would by itself be relatively weak. Moreover China, Indonesia and the Philippines have, or could readily work up, interests of one kind or another in them: in particular, Indonesian irredentism is likely to prove an increasingly grave threat to which there may well be no answer except Greater Malaysia. In the light of these circumstances, of Colonial experience elsewhere and of general trends in South East Asia, it seems unlikely that we can foster the political development of the Borneo territories at a pace allowing time to secure their capacity to survive and prosper in independence by themselves: if they are left on their own we shall almost certainly be driven by external pressures to grant independence long before they are ready for it, with all the dangers in which that will involve them. On this analysis our choice lies between guiding them now into a Greater Malaysia which we are satisfied is their most desirable destination, despite the fact that their peoples are not yet themselves really capable of exercising considered judgement on the matter and are not ready to stand on their own feet in this wider association, or waiting until they have become so capable and ready, when the opportunity of Greater Malaysia may well have been lost and the alternative prospect of separate independence will be parlous and brief.

16. As we see it, the state of public opinion (such as it is) in the Borneo territories, although not unfavourable, is generally cautious. Doubts relate rather to the form of association and to timing than to principle: few people like the idea of joining a Greater Malaysia as States on a par with the existing States of the Federation of Malaya (as the Tunku proposes) or feel that they are anything like yet ready to join. Opinion in the individual territories is as follows -

- (a) In Sarawak the leading Malays (whose community forms less than a quarter of the whole population) and some of their followers

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favour early merger with Malaya without closer association of the Borneo territories first. The leftwing Chinese, while not openly opposed to Greater Malaysia as an ultimate aim, want independence in Sarawak first. There are signs that the leaders of the indigenous peoples (Ibans, Land Dayaks, Kayans, Kenyas, etc.) are favourably disposed towards the idea of a Greater Malaysia and have some awareness of a common interest with Malaya in combatting Communism. But they do not want to be rushed and would prefer a union with North Borneo first. They do not yet feel ready educationally, economically or politically for a merger and want us to stay and help them until they are stronger. They fear Malay discrimination and have unhappy memories of their relations with the Malays in the past. They are a tough people and would resist, very possibly to the extent of armed insurrection, a premature transfer of sovereignty to which they have not agreed. As the Governor puts it, "they are interested in the pig, but do not want to buy it in the present poke".

- (b) In North Borneo, the Malays are a small minority and here, too, are for historical reasons unpopular among the non-Muslim majority (Dusuns, Muruts, etc.) The Chinese generally want to go slow on Greater Malaysia and to work first for self-government for North Borneo and federation with Sarawak (and possibly Brunei). One or two native leaders are in favour of early merger with Malaya. For the rest, opinion seems to be in favour of closer association of the Borneo territories first, although there is some native opinion against any union with Sarawak in view of Communist activity there. The Governor's latest advice is that merger with Malaya cannot be rushed: it must follow a federation of the Borneo territories and then allow for a larger measure of self-government in Borneo. He thinks that the Borneo territories would be well advised to wait and see the sort of Governments in power in Malaya and Singapore in 1964.
- (c) In Brunei, which is predominantly Malay, the Sultan has for some time been in favour of his State becoming a State of the Federation of Malaya. He has, however, refused to express to our High Commissioner in Brunei even preliminary views on the Tunku's proposals and now seems rather nervous about them, no doubt because of the reactions in his State, where the only political party has come out for elections first and a federation of the Borneo territories before merger with Malaya. It is not certain how far this party could stage an effective revolt against a move by the Sultan for an early merger with Malaya, but the latest advice from the High Commissioner and Lord Selkirk is that they are probably strong enough to prevent it.

17. There is thus nothing in the material circumstances or in the general state of opinion of the Borneo territories which need inhibit us in wholeheartedly commending the principle of Greater Malaysia to their peoples: indeed, all Her Majesty's representatives there agree that we should do so. On the other hand the United Kingdom Government could not commit themselves to hand over sovereignty in Sarawak and North Borneo (we have no sovereignty in Brunei) until they were satisfied that this was substantially in line with local wishes.

18. In Sarawak the United Kingdom Government are particularly committed by the eighth of the "Nine Cardinal Principles of the Rule of the English Rājās", repeated in the constitution of 1946

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when the Crown took over from the Brooke Rajahs, and reaffirmed last year in reply to a petition to The Queen which said that the United Kingdom Government would not surrender final responsibility for the development of Sarawak until they were satisfied that the people as a whole were able to play their full part in the government of the country, and that in pursuing this goal sight would not be lost of the best interests and desires of the indigenous communities. It cannot be claimed that, even as a result of a sharply accelerated programme of administrative, political and social development, these conditions could be satisfied within the next few years and the people of Sarawak be able to assume the responsibilities of government as a constituent state in a Greater Malaysia. At present there are still few indigenous civil servants and none of them hold senior positions. British officials might not be willing to stay on in numbers for long if Sarawak entered a Greater Malaysia. Malays from Malaya (if available, which is doubtful) would be unpopular, as has recently been seen even in Malay Brunei. Sarawak's premature entry into a Greater Malaysia might therefore lead to a breakdown in the administration. In any case it will be the British officials who will have to put across the idea of an early Greater Malaysia to the non-Malay peoples and they will not be able to do this successfully unless they believe that it involves a fair deal for those peoples.

19. North Borneo is still more backward, both politically and in the share taken by local people in the public service, and even less ready than Sarawak to assume the responsibilities of Government. Although the Legislative Council has a majority of unofficial members, there are as yet no elected members; and on the Executive Council official and unofficial members are equal in numbers. It would thus be difficult to argue either that North Borneo is ready for full participation in a Greater Malaysia or that its people are in a position to decide for themselves whether or not to join.

20. Brunei presents less difficulty since it is a Protected State in which the direct internal responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government are limited; the Sultan is believed to favour joining Malaya and the majority of the population is Malay and Muslim. Moreover, although in most ways backward, Brunei enjoys great (though diminishing) oil wealth. Unfortunately, substantial opposition to merger with Malaya has grown up in Brunei; but the High Commissioner advises that there would be a good chance that the opposition party could be brought round.

21. Provided, then, that the Tunku and the Sultan can agree upon mutually satisfactory arrangements for the immediate incorporation of Brunei, we need raise no objection. In Sarawak and North Borneo the Governors believe that, given a firm lead from the United Kingdom Government, they could work out proposals for accession to a Greater Malaysia which would be acceptable in their territories. They think that these would have to include the following -

- (a) Existing British staff must be retained.
- (b) Sarawak and North Borneo must have a large measure of internal self-government, including in particular control over -

immigration,  
education including language,  
citizenship,  
land development.

/(c)

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- (c) Sarawak and North Borneo must retain their revenues, every cent of which is needed for their own development.
- (d) There must be freedom to pursue closer association of Sarawak and North Borneo.
- (e) The United Kingdom Government must somehow guarantee these provisions for a period at the end of which Sarawak and North Borneo would have opportunity to opt out.

FINANCE

22. The United Kingdom Government's present assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts towards development in Sarawak and North Borneo is of the order of about £1 million a year. If they remain dependent such aid will no doubt continue. If Greater Malaysia came about it would presumably cease but we should no doubt be expected to give assistance in some other form; we should also look to the Federation of Malaya to give substantial help.

23. If Sarawak and North Borneo are to be equipped to take their places as part of a Greater Malaysia there will have to be an accelerated programme of training of local public servants; in so far as this is done before Greater Malaysia comes about the United Kingdom Government will be expected to meet most of the cost. Plans for this are now being considered but it is not yet possible to estimate the likely cost.

24. The cost of compensating members of the Overseas Civil Service in Sarawak and North Borneo for loss of career and commutation of their pensions has been calculated at about £3.2 millions.. Of this about £1.3 millions will be payable by the United Kingdom Government under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme. They might also have to assist the two Governments with their share.

25. No financial implications for the United Kingdom Government would arise from Brunei's entry into a Greater Malaysia.

26. Questions of accelerated aid for training or of compensation do not arise in Singapore. We are committed to an Exchequer loan in aid of Singapore's development of up to £5 millions in the period to the end of 1962 (although there is a good prospect that this will not be drawn down). We have also stated our intention to make a further contribution after an examination of the need at the beginning of 1963. Thus, even if Greater Malaysia supervenes in 1963, we are likely to be asked to honour this intention.

CONCLUSIONS

27. The foregoing study of the problem leads us to the general conclusion that the earliest possible achievement of Greater Malaysia should be regarded as an aim of British Government policy because -

- (a) It offers the only satisfactory prospect of settling the political problem of Singapore.
- (b) It would thereby contribute to the general security of the area and avoid the new threat of a Singapore either contained by British arms or independent under Chinese Communist influence.
- (c) It offers the best long term prospect for the Borneo territories.

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28. We should accept the earliest practicable creation of Greater Malaysia as an aim of Government policy. We can tell the Tunku that we wholeheartedly welcome the idea of Greater Malaysia in principle and that we are prepared to give a warm public lead in its favour. We must make clear to him the importance of our working out together satisfactory defence arrangements. But the most pressing problem is one of timing, particularly in relation to the Borneo territories.

29. We fully understand the urgency of the situation in Singapore. We also fully understand the strength of the Tunku's desire that the incorporation of Singapore and of the Borneo territories in a Greater Malaysia should be a concerted operation. It is, however, essential, if the operation is to be carried through successfully, that Greater Malaysia should not be arbitrarily imposed on the inhabitants of the Borneo territories. We fully agree that their incorporation in a Greater Malaysia is to their best advantage in the long term; and we are anxious to press ahead as fast as possible. But time will be needed to ensure that the population as a whole are demonstrably in favour of this solution, and time will also be needed to develop the apparatus of Government and administration so that the territories are competent to carry out their functions as parts of a Greater Malaysia. We cannot, therefore, at this stage commit ourselves to firm dates for the accession of Sarawak and North Borneo. But we shall do everything that we can on the following lines to ensure that no time is lost.

30. We are prepared to use our influence towards the early accession of Brunei to Greater Malaysia on such terms as the Tunku and the Sultan can agree between themselves and succeed in getting accepted in Brunei. But care will be needed in the handling of the opposition in Brunei and much harm would be done if the issue were to be so forced as to cause serious disorders.

31. As regards Sarawak and North Borneo, we welcome the Tunku's suggestion for a Commission with the two-fold task of assessing the state of opinion about Greater Malaysia and of making recommendations on the manner in which the two territories might be associated in a Greater Malaysia (including any necessary safeguards for their special interests) and on the timing of their entry. We should be glad to discuss the composition and terms of reference of the Commission with the Tunku.

32. We are already pressing ahead with three different developments designed to expedite the participation of Sarawak and North Borneo in a Greater Malaysia - the appointment on the staff of the Commissioner-General of a senior officer to co-ordinate action in this context; measures to accelerate the training of local people for their own public services; and advance in the constitutional and political field. There is already a movement towards closer association between the two territories and we think it right to encourage this provided that it is pursued without prejudice to the concept of Greater Malaysia.

33. As regards Singapore, the arrangements which the Tunku has been discussing with Mr. Lee Kuan Yew do not raise any major problems for us, though the detailed arrangements will require consultation at a later stage.

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Greater Malaysia

Proposed Tactics on Sarawak and North Borneo

The British Government accepts that Greater Malaysia offers the best future for the territories and that their basic policy should be to achieve it and to work out proposals which would be acceptable in Borneo. The Governors suggest that the Sarawak and North Borneo requirements would be as follows :-

- (a) Retention of existing British staff.
- (b) Sarawak and North Borneo must have a large measure of internal self-government, including in particular control over :
  - immigration
  - education including language
  - citizenship
  - land development
- (c) Sarawak and North Borneo retain their revenues, every cent of which is needed for their own development.
- (d) Freedom to pursue closer association of Sarawak and North Borneo.
- (e) Somehow the British Government must guarantee these provisions for a period, at the end of which Sarawak and North Borneo would have an opportunity to opt out.

There have been indications that (a) might not be entirely unacceptable to the Tunku, though it raises great difficulties. From what he has said to various Borneo visitors and in his speech on the 16th October in Parliament in Kuala Lumpur, there seems to be room for negotiation on the question of the division of powers between the Federal Government and the "State Governments" in Sarawak and North Borneo ( (b) and (c) above). (d) might also be negotiable. But the requirement of a right to opt out at the end of a period seems an insuperable difficulty.

2. Since local men to administer the territories cannot be trained in a year or two, however drastically one accelerates training and the giving of responsibility, and since Malays from the peninsula might not either be available or acceptable (witness recent events in Brunei), the need to retain British staff as long as possible is clear. Apart from our obligations to the peoples, the absence of an adequate administration would carry the risk of racial strife and that in turn might lead to Indonesia fishing in troubled waters and a state of instability the exact opposite of what we would hope to achieve by the bringing about of Greater Malaysia.

3. We have therefore given much thought to various means of sharing for a period of years responsibility for the administration of Sarawak and North Borneo between the United Kingdom and the Federation Governments. But however such schemes are dressed up, all of them, involving two sovereign states, amount to a kind of condominium. The legal view is /that a

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that a condominium over these two territories is probably incompatible with their incorporation in the Federation. Indeed, the incorporation of these two territories, subject to such a condominium, might even be considered to have an adverse effect on the international standing of the Federation. However this might be, the possibilities of friction would obviously be immense and a condominium is in any case not likely to be acceptable to the Tunku. He is, however, understood not to object to British staff staying on, Malay Governors taking the place of British. Such a substitution of Governors would destroy the confidence of the non-Malays. But it seems just conceivable that an arrangement could be worked out whereby sovereignty was surrendered but the United Kingdom Government continued for a time to provide the staff to run the territories, including the Governors. The Governors would have to be appointed by, and responsible to, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaya, but it might be possible to have an agreement that such appointment would be made on the advice of the British Government. It might, perhaps, also be possible to agree that on non-Federal matters the Governors would have access to advice from this country; but this might prove to be a very difficult concept if such advice were to include "political" advice as well as "technical" advice. Such arrangements might, however, be acceptable neither to the Tunku nor to the territories, and the possibilities of friction in practice are nearly, although not quite, as great as in a condominium. (There would of course have to be a compensation scheme for officers, under which they would have the right to retire, this being framed, as in the more recent schemes elsewhere, so as not to put a premium on retirement.)

4. Our general conclusion here is that the right course is to try to convince the Tunku that we are with him in believing Greater Malaysia to be the best answer for Sarawak and North Borneo and that, because we really do believe it to be in the best interests of the territories, we intend to do our best to persuade the territories to this view. But if this operation is to be carried through successfully, it is essential that Greater Malaysia should not be arbitrarily imposed on the inhabitants of the Borneo territories. Time will be needed to ensure that the population as a whole are demonstrably in favour of this solution, and time will also be needed to develop the apparatus of Government and administration so that the territories are competent to carry out their functions as parts of a Greater Malaysia. We cannot, therefore, we should have to make clear, at this stage commit ourselves to firm dates for the accession of Sarawak and North Borneo. We propose to avoid discussion with the Tunku of the difficult and complicated concepts of shared sovereignties of that referred to in paragraph 3 above and to put forward the suggestion of an independent Commission of Enquiry with the two-fold task of assessing the state of opinion about Greater Malaysia and of making recommendations on the manner in which the two territories might be associated in a Greater Malaysia (including any necessary safeguards for their special interests) and on the timing of their entry. At the same time as we proposed a Commission of Enquiry we would assure the Tunku that we are already pressing ahead with three different developments designed to expedite the participation of Sarawak and North Borneo in a Greater Malaysia - the appointment on the staff of the Commissioner-General of a senior officer to co-ordinate action in this context; measures to accelerate the training of local people for their own public services



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Greater Malaysia

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4. Our general conclusion here is that the right course is to try to convince the Tunku that we are with him in believing Greater Malaysia to be the best answer for Sarawak and North Borneo and that, because we really do believe it to be in the best interests of the territories, we intend to do our best to persuade the territories to this view. But if this operation is to be carried through successfully, it is essential that Greater Malaysia should not be arbitrarily imposed on the inhabitants of the Borneo territories. Time will be needed to ensure that the population as a whole are demonstrably in favour of this solution, and time will also be needed to develop the apparatus of Government and administration so that the territories are competent to carry out their functions as parts of a Greater Malaysia. We cannot, therefore, we should have to make clear, at this stage commit ourselves to firm dates for the accession of Sarawak and North Borneo. We propose to avoid discussion with the Tunku of the difficult and complicated concepts of shared sovereignties of that referred to in paragraph 3 above and to put forward the suggestion of an independent Commission of Enquiry with the two-fold task of assessing the state of opinion about Greater Malaysia and of making recommendations on the manner in which the two territories might be associated in a Greater Malaysia (including any necessary safeguards for their special interests) and on the timing of their entry. At the same time as we proposed a Commission of Enquiry we would assure the Tunku that we are already pressing ahead with three different developments designed to expedite the participation of Sarawak and North Borneo in a Greater Malaysia - the appointment on the staff of the Commissioner-General of a senior officer to co-ordinate action in this context; measures to accelerate the training of local people for their own public /services



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
CANBERRA

POL.29/6

16th November, 1961

*Den Griffiths,*

Greater Malaysia



... In his letter No. POL.29/6 of 1st November, Molyneux sent to you copies of some reports about recent developments in these proposals. I now enclose copies of some further papers which have reached us by bag :-

- (a) Singapore telegram No. 455 of 27th October about the "referendum" proposal.
- (b) A report of the debate in the Senate in Kuala Lumpur on "Malaysia".
- (c) A summary of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew's statement on 26th October dealing with the possible citizenship status of Singapore citizens under the various proposals for a merger which have been mooted in Singapore.
- (d) Singapore telegram No. 461 of 30th October about the proposed "referendum".
- (e) Singapore telegram No. 465 of 2nd November, giving further information about the timetable for the referendum which the Singapore Government has in mind, (the telegram from Kuala Lumpur No. 853 which is referred to in the message was passed to you on 2nd November on receipt).

2. The papers which we have been passing to you show that the Federation Government have tended to the view that sovereignty over the British Borneo territories could be transferred to the Federation of Malaya in a matter of months and that consultation with the people of these territories is no more than a formality. (Kuala Lumpur telegram No. 906 of 11th November to Commonwealth Relations Office, a copy of which has been sent to you separately). At the forthcoming talks in London with Tunku Abdul Rahman the United Kingdom authorities intend to go thoroughly into the whole problem of the Borneo territories to work out with him the best way of effecting a possible transfer of sovereignty in a smooth manner which will carry the support of the Borneo peoples, but a firm commitment to arbitrary dates for the transfer would, in their view, create unnecessary problems for the future. It is hoped therefore, that

/the

A.T. Griffiths, Esq.,  
Prime Minister's Department,  
CANBERRA

Copy to Defence 11 7 NOV 1961

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the Tunku will recognise in London that any immediate transfer of Borneo sovereignty is not a practical possibility.

3. We will continue to keep you informed.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures to Mr. Blakeney in External Affairs.

*Yours sincerely,  
E. V. Vines*

E. V. VINES

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COPY

UNITED KINGDOM COMMISSIONER  
SINGAPORE

SECRET TELEGRAM NO. 465

UNITED KINGDOM COMMISSIONER SINGAPORE

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES - 465.

Repeated to United Kingdom High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur - 183  
United Kingdom High Commissioner Wellington (for Lord  
Selkirk) - M428 (via S. of S.)  
CANBERRA SARAWAK }  
NORTH BORNEO BRUNEI } M428 (BY BAG)

Dated 2.11.61.

CYPHER

IMMEDIATE

Despatched 2.11.61 (1645 hrs)

Following from Moore in Lord Selkirk's absence.

My telegram No. 461.

GREATER MALAYSIA

I saw Lee Kuan Yew yesterday and gave him the gist of Tory's telegram to the C.R.O. No. 853. Lee reiterated that he was fully committed to a referendum on merger and that this could only be avoided if the Barisan Socialis boycotted the referendum and attempted to bring Singapore to a standstill by a general strike, as described in paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference. He proposed to make this clear at once to Razak since it could only be dangerous if Federation Ministers harboured any illusions that he could take Singapore into merger simply through an Assembly majority. It was ridiculous to suggest that the Barisan Socialis had opposed the holding of a referendum. They had said they considered there should be a general election rather than a referendum but in the absence of a general election, they would certainly insist on a referendum.

2. I emphasised to Lee that Tory had done all he possibly could to help and it was now up to him to make the running. He accepted this and said that he would continue to plug away at the Federation. If, however, he failed to persuade the Federation, he would have to hold the referendum in the form of a straight "yes" or "no" on Ulster-type Merger, although this would mean taking an unwarrantable risk. If the referendum were held in this form, he considered it essential that H.M.G. should publicly contradict the Tunku's assertion that the alternative to Ulster-type Merger would in all probability be the granting of independence to Singapore by the British in 1963. H.M.G. should say that Singapore belonged to Malaya historically, politically, economically and geographically and was in effect a West Irian to which the Tunku could lay an unassailable claim. I told Lee I thought it very unlikely that we would be prepared to say anything on these lines, although it might be that we should want to say something which would dispel the idea that complete independence would in all probability be given to Singapore in 1963.

3. I found Lee rather discouraged by the Federation's adamant attitude and he indulged in a fair amount of talk on the lines that he had fulfilled his political mandate by reaching an agreement with the Tunku on merger. As soon as

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- 2 -

the White Paper was published with the Tunku's stamp of approval, his own task was done. It was then up to the people of Singapore. If they turned down merger, he would resign and the ball would be back with the British. All this is fairly typical Lee Kuan Yew and need not be taken too seriously at this stage. He will not easily allow the cup to be dashed from his lips.

4. Lee has again changed his time-table in order to give himself more time to persuade the Federation to accept the double choice form of referendum. The new session of the Legislative Assembly was duly opened on the 31st October by the Negara whose speech gave some more information about Ulster-type Merger, without in any way anticipating the details of the White Paper. The debate in the Assembly has, however, been postponed, with the agreement of the Opposition, until 17th November. This will enable Lee to go up to Kuala Lumpur on 12th November for the Colombo Plan Ministerial Conference, when he hopes to clear up everything with the Federation, including final details of the White Paper which may now be further postponed. The Debate in the Assembly would last at least a week and he would hope to coincide its conclusion with the issue of a successful communique from London. He would then announce the date for the referendum which seems bound to be postponed to well into December.

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Distribution:- Commissioner General's Office (6)  
C. in C. F.E.S.  
C. in C. F.A.R.E.L.F.  
C. in C. F.E.A.F.  
G.O.C.  
File

SECRET



SECRET

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COPY

UNITED KINGDOM COMMISSIONER  
SINGAPORE

SECRET TELEGRAM NO. 461

FROM UNITED KINGDOM COMMISSIONER SINGAPORE

TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES - 461

Repeated to: U.K. High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur - 180 (Immediate)  
U.K. High Commissioner Wellington (for Lord Selkirk)

M424

(via S. of S.)

BY BAG TO: CANBERRA. N. BORNEO. SARAWAK. BRUNEI -  
M.424.

Dated 30.10.61

CYPHER PRIORITY

Despatched 30.10.61 (1840 hrs.)

Following from Moore in Lord Selkirk's absence.

My telegram 455.

GREATER MALAYSIA

On Friday Lee Kuan Yew saw Ghazali who said that the main opposition to offering full merger as an alternative in the referendum came from Razak. They discussed how this might be made more palatable to Razak, and Ghazali suggested that a possible way out would be to offer full merger on the citizenship terms applied to any of the eleven States in the Federation at the time of Merdeka. This would mean that the most stringent conditions applied at that time, for example in Johore, could be applied to Singapore. Apparently for a Chinese to qualify for citizenship in Johore, it was necessary for the father also to have been born in the Federation. Ghazali had undertaken to try this out on Razak. I said it did not seem a very promising proposition since Lee Kuan Yew had already stated publicly that Penang terms would be applicable under full merger and it would hardly be possible at this stage to offer something less.

2. Today Lee told me of a conversation during golf yesterday with the Tunku and Razak. Razak was now suggesting that a two-thirds' majority in the Singapore Assembly would be sufficient and that it was not necessary to hold a referendum. (This is a possibility which I mentioned in my letter to Wallace of 18th October. It hardly seems a starter since the P.A.P. have publicly committed themselves to holding a referendum). Apparently Razak asked Lee to think it over, but Lee made it pretty clear that this course was no longer open to him. The only circumstances in which a referendum might not be held would be if the Barisan Socialis decided to boycott the referendum and stage a general strike. In those circumstances Lee might be able to argue that conditions in Singapore made it impossible to hold a referendum and that merger would have to be decided by a majority in the Assembly.

3. I have asked Tory today if he can again make clear to Federation Ministers the risks involved in forcing Lee Kuan Yew to hold a referendum on a straight "yes" or "no" to Ulster-type merger. If the answer is "no", Lee Kuan Yew

/will

SECRET



SECRET

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- 2 -

will almost certainly resign and the Barisan Socialis will win the ensuing general election. It will be of no avail for the Tunku to say that this means a communist manipulated Government and that the British must intervene to prevent them taking power. We have given Singapore a democratic constitution and it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for us to interfere if the Barisan Socialis play it constitutionally, as they almost undoubtedly will. If, on the other hand, the Federation will agree to Lee putting the referendum in the alternative form, the Barisan Socialis will be faced with an awkward choice of tactics and Lee Kuan Yew's prospects of emerging successfully will be immeasurably strengthened. Tony considers, however, that there is little more he can do to help since the Federation are fundamentally opposed to anything which suggests that they would contemplate full merger. Any further attempt on our part to persuade them would be likely to prove counter-productive. It is therefore up to Lee to apply all the pressure he can on the Federation and if they remain adamant, he has no alternative but to hold a straight referendum on Ulster-type merger. I shall be reporting this to Lee.

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Distribution: Commissioner General's Office (6)  
C. in C. F.E.S.  
C. in C. F.A.R.E.L.F.  
C. in C. F.E.A.F.  
G.O.C.  
File.

SECRET



COPY  
UNITED KINGDOM COMMISSIONER  
SINGAPORE

UNCLASSIFIED TELEGRAM NO. 458

FROM UNITED KINGDOM COMMISSIONER SINGAPORE

TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES - 458

REPEATED TO: GOVERNOR NORTH BORNEO  
GOVERNOR SARAWAK HIGH COMMISSIONER } BY ML421  
HIGH COMMISSIONER BRUNEI CANBERRA } BAG  
HIGH COMMISSIONER WELLINGTON }

Dated 27.10.61

EN CLAIR Despatched 27.10.61 (1740 hrs)

GREATER MALAYSIA

Lee Kuan Yew issued further statement yesterday to clarify press reports of his remarks on citizenship after merger broadcast on 25th October. He distinguished following three possibilities:-

Proposal A - complete merger like Penang. People born in Singapore would qualify automatically for Federal citizenship but others would have to apply for registration as citizens. Only those with eight years residence in Malaya during twelve years prior to application and a knowledge of the Malay language would qualify. There were currently 625,000 Singapore citizens on the electoral register and of these 327,000 were not born in Singapore. Probably 100,000 of these would qualify for citizenship by registration but the rest would not and would therefore be disenfranchised. This was a prospect likely to alarm the immigrant population of Singapore who were already citizens here.

Proposal B - merger with reserve powers like Northern Ireland. This preserved Singapore citizenship on an equal footing with Federation citizenship with equal national rights, same passport and same protection under the Constitution. The term "Federal nationals" had been proposed to cover both categories and the only difference between them was that one voted in Singapore and the other in the present Federation. The number of Singapore representatives in the new Federal Parliament could not exceed the number which Singapore would be entitled to if there were complete merger on basis in Proposal A. The fact that there would be local autonomy in some matters had also to be considered in deciding the number of representatives.

Proposal C - complete merger like Penang but with automatic Federal citizenship for all Singapore citizens. This was the proposition put forward by communist front organisations. It meant asking the Federation to admit Singapore citizens on special terms and then to give that greater number of citizens proportionate representation. The Singapore Government would happily accept this generous gift of special citizenship rights and extra representation in the Parliament of the new Federation if the sympathisers and supporters of the communist front organisations could carry a motion to this effect in the Federal Parliament.

/2.



- 2 -

2. Statement concluded that under proposal B Singapore citizens would have equal national rights, reserve powers on education, labour, social welfare, etc, and revenue and financial resources for the discharge of these responsibilities. The overwhelming majority of people in Singapore were practical minded and wanted practical solutions to their problems of making a living. These solutions depended on a practical arrangement of economic and political ties with the Federation.

3. Commenting on merger in Singapore on his return from Vietnam, the Tunku said there would be no problem if Singapore politicians and trade union leaders had not been given too much rope. The British had not been firm enough and had wanted to please everyone. The people now looked to the Federation and the time had come to do something. There would not be too much of a problem if the people of Singapore decided that they wanted to merge; it was up to them entirely.

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Distribution:- Commissioner General's Office (6)  
File



SECRET

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COPY  
INWARD TELEGRAM  
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

FROM SINGAPORE (Acting U.K. Commissioner)

Simplex D. 27th October, 1961  
R. 27th " "

11.45 hrs.

PRIORITY  
SECRET  
No. 455

Addressed S. of S.  
Repeated U.K. High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur  
No. 177  
" U.K. High Commissioner, Wellington for  
Lord Selkirk, No. M419  
(S. of S. please pass by bag to  
U.K. High Commissioner, Canberra)  
" Governor, North Borneo  
" " Sarawak  
" High Commissioner, Brunei as M.419.

Following from Moore in Lord Selkirk's absence.

Greater Malaysia.

Kuala Lumpur telegram No. 811 to Commonwealth  
Relations Office.

I saw Lee Kuan Yew yesterday and gave him the gist of the above quoted telegram. Lee had just been talking to Ghazali on the telephone and was now aware that both Razak and Ghazali were firmly opposed to the referendum in the form of two questions. He had been trying to persuade Ghazali to change his view, and had asked him to come down to discuss the matter in Singapore over the next two or three days, when he expects the Tunku to be in Singapore on his way back from Saigon. Lee had spoken to his Ministers but they were all still strongly opposed to putting the straight question on an "Ulster" type merger. Lee agrees with them and thought this would involve a completely unnecessary risk. He therefore proposed to make another attempt to convince the Malays. His argument would be that, even if Singapore did vote for complete merger, which he still considered unlikely, only about 430,000 Singaporeans would be entitled to vote in the federal elections giving Singapore about 18 seats in the Kuala Lumpur House of Representatives, as opposed to the 14 under "Ulster" merger. This would not represent any significant additional risk of Chinese domination over the Malays, and would safeguard both the Tunku and Lee against the danger of a complete defeat in the referendum. In other words, Lee now considers that if he is to persuade the Malays to allow him to put the referendum in the form of two questions, he will also have to persuade them that full merger need not in fact be unacceptable. He is fully conscious, however, of the fundamental objections of the Malays to full merger with its long term implications.

2. At the same time Lee confessed that he was somewhat impressed by the Tunku's view that a straight referendum on  
/"Ulster"

SECRET



SECRET

27

- 2 -

"Ulster" type merger would make it clear to Singapore that this was the only way they could hope to get merger and would give a decisive and final result. He gave me the impression that he was already envisaging the possibility of failing to convince the Tunku and was to a certain extent trying to reassure himself that there was merit in the Tunku's argument. Characteristically he was also thinking in terms of his line of retreat if Singapore voted against "Ulster" merger, and suggested that the best way to cover this would be for H.M.G. to say that if Singapore did not want "Ulster" type merger with the Federation, there was no question of separate independence for Singapore, and the British would remain there indefinitely. I told him it was impossible to speculate so far ahead and that he had better concentrate his energies on getting the Tunku's agreement to putting the referendum in the form of two questions. My own feeling is that it is taking an unwarrantable risk with the future of Singapore to ask the straight question on "Ulster" type merger. If the vote goes the wrong way, we may never get merger. With the referendum in two questions, however, the way is still left open for negotiations.

3. Lee's latest plans on timing are :-

- (i) 31st October - policy speech by the Negara in the Assembly.
- (ii) 7th/8th November to 14th November - debate on merger in the Assembly.
- (iii) 15th November - publication of White Paper.
- (iv) End of November or beginning of December - Referendum.

4. Lee showed me the latest draft of the merger White Paper as amended, following his discussions with Federation Ministers and a meeting of the working party of officials in Kuala Lumpur. This generally reflects what he told me on his return from Kuala Lumpur, as reported in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 452.

(Copies sent to Commonwealth Relations Office  
Despatch Section for repetition to Canberra)

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Greater Malaysia External Distribution.

SECRET



26

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

EJS

0.17358

Sent: 15th November, 1961  
1940

TO:

Australian High Commission,  
LONDON. . . . .3620

REPEATED:

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE. . . . .536

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR. . . . .458



PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

The Minister has approved release of the following statement on "Greater Malaysia". It will be released in Canberra on Friday 17th November embargoed until 0400 hours E.S.T. 18th November. Our intention is that it should appear in the London morning press on Saturday 18th November to coincide as nearly as possible with the Tunku's arrival in London.

Begins :-

"Minister for External Affairs stated today that the Australian Government was greatly interested in the concept of Greater Malaysia. If it proved practicable, it could contribute significantly to stability and progress in an area in whose development and progress Australia was deeply interested.

Minister for External Affairs expressed pleasure that this imaginative and far-sighted concept would shortly be the subject of exploratory talks in London between Malayan Ministers led by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the United Kingdom Government."

Ends.

For London. Please release on Friday 17th November embargoed until 1800 hours G.M.T.

For Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Please release simultaneously on Friday 17th November embargoed until 0200 hours Malayan time 18th November.

MIN & DEPT E.A. (3027/1/2/3)  
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE  
J.I.C.  
P.M's

16th November, 1961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

25  
CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:CM

I.27459

Dated: 13th November, 1961  
2015

Rec'd: 14th November, 1961  
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR

360 CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram 450.

For Harry from Tange.

I think this text would be very well received in Malaya (and Singapore) while being non-committal enough for our purposes.

I suggest its release simultaneously in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.



-----  
MIN & DEPT E.A.  
P.M.'S.

14th November, 1961

Copy A.T.G.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
**OUTWARD CABLEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

24

JRR

0.17160

Sent: 13th November, 1961.  
1200

TO:

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

450 CONFIDENTIAL

Tange from Harry.

Proposed Ministerial Statement.

Minister has given provisional approval to following draft statement subject to your comments in the light of your impressions on the spot.

Begins: Minister for External Affairs stated today that the Australian Government was greatly interested in the concept of Greater Malaysia. If it proved practicable, it could contribute significantly to stability and progress in an area in whose development and progress Australia was deeply interested.

Minister for External Affairs expressed pleasure that this imaginative and far-sighted concept would shortly be the subject of exploratory talks in London between Malayan Ministers led by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the United Kingdom Government. Ends.

2. We are aiming at release to appear in London press next weekend just after Tunku's arrival. Glad your comments.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.  
P.M's.

(Cost - £6/19/2)

13th November, 1961.

CONFIDENTIAL



I.27384/5

Dated: 12th November, 1961.

2325

Rec'd: 13th November, 1961.

0800

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

357 SECRET

Repeated Singapore 21.

For the Minister from Tange.

Greater Malaysia - South Vietnam.

I had an hour with Prime Minister today. I conveyed your message.

2. The Tunku moved straight into greater Malaysia proposal. He said Borneo territories would probably not create problems but Singapore concerned him greatly. The Federation was stable and developing well. It did not really want constitutional association with Singapore (that "poisonous island"). But the British were unwilling to act against subversives and would probably give Singapore full independence at the Constitutional conference due in 1963. This would lead to the establishment of Chinese Communist and Soviet missions which would be used as centres for subversion of the Federation. In the long run this could lead even to civil war. (The Tunku added that Yugoslavia was at present negotiating for a Consulate in Singapore and although the United Kingdom wanted the Federation to agree he had told Tory yesterday it would be a great mistake and had threatened to close the causeway if the United Kingdom agreed).

3. I touched on the future of the Singapore base. The Tunku in the main repeated the views reported in Kuala Lumpur memorandum 1290, namely that Malaya and the S.E.A.T.O. Powers faced a common Communist threat and that bases could in fact be used for operations in defence of Thailand and Vietnam (he would not want this written into any treaty however and use would presumably defend Malayan assessment of the threat). However, he could not for political reasons allow it to appear that Malaya was associated publicly with S.E.A.T.O. He instanced relations with Vietnam and said the Federation has assisted Vietnam and would if necessary and asked, send forces there without any treaty commitment. I said this was encouraging but that for the rest of us S.E.A.T.O. was necessary to permit advance co-ordinated planning (particularly with the Americans). I stressed the short time within which troops have to be moved if there were outright aggressions. Hence the value of the forward bases. We know his position required him publicly to stand apart from S.E.A.T.O. but we hoped he could avoid making attacks upon

SECRET

.../2



it. At one point he said he doubted the value of the Singapore bases since they are so vulnerable to air attack.

4. Regarding transfer of Borneo territories, I said that while Australian Government did not regard itself as party principal, it appreciated importance of the Greater Malaysia proposal. However, we attached importance to getting some expressions of popular consent, especially as territorial transfers without self-determination had important implications in other areas, e.g. Formosa. The Tunku replied that the Borneo people were too backward to have "full referendum" on joining the Federation but that "consultations" to ascertain wishes would be as extensive as practicable.

5. On South Vietnam, the Tunku said that he thought the situation was very serious. The Vietnamese lacked co-ordinated intelligence. Also operations were hampered by Diem's inability or unwillingness to delegate authority. The Tunku confirmed Malaya would give all assistance it could within its resources.

6. The Tunku, contrary to expectations, did not raise the question of possible amendment of the Netherlands resolution on West New Guinea (paragraph 8 of Kuala Lumpur (our) memorandum 1287).

7. Further details by bag.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.  
P.M's

13th November, 1961.



SECRET

21

## TELEGRAM

THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, KUALA LUMPUR.  
From: ~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS~~

Cypher.

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

POL. 29/6.

Despatched: 20.30 hours 11th November, 1961.

Received: 10.00 hours 12th November, 1961.

IMMEDIATE.

TELEGRAM NO. 71.

Following from Kuala Lumpur dated 11th November addressed  
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations No. 906, repeated  
Canberra No. 71, Wellington No. 65, United Commissioner Singapore  
No. 117, Commissioner-General No. 215, Borneo No. 49, Sarawak No.  
50, Brunei (personal) No. 35.

Your Telegram No. 1649.

### GREATER MALAYSIA.

Tunku publicly acknowledged in speech to U.M.N.O.  
Assembly on 4th November (my Telegram No. 885) that he had  
every confidence his talks in London on Malaysia would be  
successful but that United Nations Charter required British  
Government to consult people of territories concerned before  
making a decision. I confirmed at my farewell interview with  
Tunku this morning that he was clear on this. He said however  
that he could foresee no difficulty about getting on quickly  
with process of consultation.

2. Tunku, Razak and Ghazali have lately shown some  
irritation at our inability to clear some of the ground with  
them in advance of talks as they had originally requested.  
There has been tendency on part of Lee Kuan Yew to oversimplify  
process to be gone through before transfer with deliberate  
object of getting Tunku to commit himself in immediate future  
to details of merger with Singapore. Tunku and his colleagues  
for their part have also tended to convince themselves more  
and more firmly that consultation with Borneo territories  
need be no more than a formality.

/3.

*Copy Request*

115 NOV 1961

SECRET



SECRET

20

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

-2-

3. It was because he thought we were "stalling" on this question that he refused after all to go to London until the Prime Minister persuaded him again with his forthcoming message of 4th October. Ghazali made it plain to me yesterday that even now the Tunku might dig his toes in and refuse to go if he thought he was going to come back empty handed. I think Ghazali is right about this and for this reason. When I saw Tunku this morning I did not go beyond assuring myself that he recognised that we could not hand over sovereignty to him straightaway and that Borneo territories would have to be adequately consulted. I think that if I had literally told him there could be no practical question of transfer "within a few months of London Talks" this might have produced dangerous reaction.

4. I saw both Razak and Ghazali also this morning and in course of our conversation same point arose. Razak has I think a more realistic appreciation of our need still to go carefully over Borneo territories. It is in fact his clear understanding of this that has made him so reluctant to give Lee Kuan Yew permission to publish Federation approval of detailed blueprint for merger (I gather from both Tunku and Razak this morning that Malaysians have in fact now agreed upon a formula which will be satisfactory to Lee).

5. I hope that in the circumstances you will feel that I have gone far enough in disabusing Tunku.

HIGH COMMISSIONER.

SECRET



SECRET  
TELEGRAM

19  
POL.29/6.  
OYMER.

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 0925 hours. 8th November, 1961.

Received: 0130 hours. 9th November, 1961.

PRIORITY.

TELEGRAM No.2559. SECRET.

British High Commissioners Canberra No.2559, Kuala Lumpur  
No.1632.

Following is text of United Kingdom Commissioner's  
Singapore Telegram addressed Colonial Office No.478 7th November.  
Repeated Kuala Lumpur No.191, Canberra No.M436 (for Lord Selkirk)  
and by bag to Wellington, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.

BEGINS.

Kuala Lumpur Telegram No.M386.

GREATER MALAYSIA.

Tory and I saw Lee again last night after he had finished  
a long meeting with the Tunku and a number of Ministers and  
officials. Lee said they settled the details of the White Paper.  
He had also drafted his letter of an exchange of letters with  
the Tunku to set the seal on the White Paper and had tried  
unsuccessfully to get Ghazali to draft the Tunku's reply. He  
had however been promised the Tunku's letter on Thursday  
9th November. He therefore proposed to send his letter to the  
Tunku to-day before leaving for Singapore and could only hope  
that he would in fact receive the Tunku's reply on Thursday.  
2. We asked Lee how he would handle the White Paper if he  
did receive a satisfactory reply from the Tunku. He seemed to  
favour sending it to Macmillan through Lord Selkirk before the  
London talks but would prefer for tactical reasons to defer  
publishing it until he was clearer about the referendum date.  
But if he thought there was any risk of the Tunku going back on the

.../whita

15 NOV 1961  
Copy to Defence

SECRET



18

**SECRET**  
**TELEGRAM**

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

-2-

Paper it would be better to publish at once.

3. Lee claims that he persuaded the Federation to withdraw most of the amendments to the White Paper which were decided last week by the Federation Cabinet and in particular that he managed to get a useful redrafted paragraph inserted on citizenship.

4. Lee showed us an additional paragraph to the White Paper which includes an invitation from the Federation for the 15 members from the Singapore Assembly to join the Kuala Lumpur House of Representatives as a transitional measure. He said this suggestion had been welcomed by the Federation both because it would strengthen their hand in persuading Her Majesty's Government to agree to a similar transitional arrangement for the Borneo territories and because it would help them to delay the day when there had to be Singapore elections for the House of Representatives which might result in the Barisan Socialist getting more seats.

5. Lee's draft letter to the Tunku contains three points of interest as follows:-

(a) He tells the Tunku that it is now for him to arrange with Her Majesty's Government the transfer of Sovereignty over Singapore to the Federation.

(b) He asks the Tunku to ensure that the continued employment of 40,000 Singaporeans in the bases is assured.

(c) He proposes that the whole paper should only be altered with the agreement of both the Federation and Singapore Governments and a majority in the House of Representatives. ENDS.

**SECRET**

SECRETARY OF STATE.



17  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

PH

I.27001

Dated: 8th November, 1961.  
1327  
Rec'd: 8th November, 1961.  
2000

FROM:

Australian Commission,  
SINGAPORE.

359 CONFIDENTIAL.

Reference Kuala Lumpur memorandum 1287.

Greater Malaysia.

We see little merit in suggested statement from Singapore view-point. Crucial Assembly debate will open next week. There is always danger that such a statement would be misused by apponent of Government. ✓

Jockel.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.  
P.M'S

9th November, 1961.

Copy ATG



16

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

KW

I.26505

Dated: 2nd November, 1961  
1455

PRESS.

Rec'd: 2nd November, 1961  
1918

FROM:

Australian High Commission,  
KUALA LUMPUR.

343.

UNCLASSIFIED.

6/794  
28 NOV 1961

Our telegram 330.

Greater Malaysia Proposal.

Announced officially here that talks will commence in London on 20th November. The Tunku will be accompanied by Minister of Defence, Razak, Minister of Finance, Tan Siew Sin, Permanent Secretary of External Affairs, Ghazali, and Secretary of Defence, Kadiy.

Party expects to leave here on 16th, except perhaps, Razak, who will probably wait till Colombo Plan Conference ends.

Talks are expected to last one week.

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MIN.& DEPT E.A.  
MIN.& DEPT DEFENCE  
J.I.C.  
P.M'S

3rd November, 1961

Copy A.T.G.



15  
**SECRET**

**TELEGRAM**

POL.29/6  
CYPRER

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 11.50 hours 1st November, 1961.

Received: 08.00 hours 2nd November, 1961.

UNNUMBERED TELEGRAM

IMMEDIATE

SECRET



Addressed British High Commissioners Canberra and Wellington.

Following from British High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur addressed Commonwealth Relations Office 853, repeated United Kingdom Commissioner Singapore, Canberra 64, Wellington 59, and by bag to Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei,

United Kingdom Commissioner Singapore telegram 46.

GREATER MALAYSIA

In light of Moore's telegram I decided after all to speak again to Razak about this. This morning I went over the ground with him describing the situation as seen by Lee Kuan Yew and as set out particularly in paragraph 3 of Moore's message. Razak's response was exactly on same lines as before (my telegram 811). He acknowledged that a single choice referendum might result in a negative vote and resignation of Lee and emergence of Barisan Sosialis Government in place of P.A.P. In that case Razak said merger would presumably be off. He claimed however to be confident that the majority of people in Singapore wanted merger and would vote for merger on the Tunku's pattern if that were the only choice. If there were a double choice referendum many people including most of the Malays (and this was for Razak an important point) would vote for straight merger and if this got a majority as it well might the Federation Government would get in an impossible position since their own Malays would never accept this form of merger. Not only would the Federation Government be in the position of going against the democratically expressed wishes

Copy to Defence  
3 NOV 1961

**SECRET**



14  
SECRET

## TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 2.

Received:

of the Singapore people but they would also be going against the wishes of the Singapore Malays. The Federation Government were not prepared to run this risk.

2. Razak reverted to his suggestion that Lee could avoid dilemma by settling issue of merger on basis of vote in Legislative Assembly. He claimed to know that Barisan Socialis themselves had opposed taking of referendum at all and said this (? surely) gave Lee Kuan Yew sufficient excuse to settle matter on basis of all party vote. I said I understood Lee felt he was committed to referendum. Razak evidently thought that if Lee were going to "cheat" (e.g. by offering double choice when knowing second choice was a non starter) he could do it more effectively and more legitimately by basing decision on Legislative Assembly.

3. Razak said there had been a good deal of "nagging" at the Tunku about this question and there was some danger of him "turning awkward". I said I was simply wanting to make sure Lee Kuan Yew and the Federation Ministers fully understood each other's position. It was up to Lee to argue his own case with the Malays. Razak said Lee would have plenty of opportunity of doing this whilst he was up here for the Colombo Plan Ministerial Conference.

4. Razak took my further intervention in good part but I really feel now that we must leave it to Lee to make any further running.

SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRET





SECRET

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
CANBERRA

POL.29/6

1st November, 1961



*Dear Mr. Griffith,*

Since my letter (POL.29/6) of 20th October about Greater Malaysia we have sent you copies of telegrams. To help fill in the picture I now enclose copies of certain other papers which have arrived over the weekend by bag, namely:-

- (a) A report by our High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur on the debate in the Malayan Parliament on 18th October - Kuala Lumpur telegrams Nos. 790 and 177 Saving.
- (b) A summary of a press conference given by the Tunku at Singapore airport on 24th October - Singapore telegram No. 450.
- (c) A summary of a press conference by Lee Kuan Yew on 25th October - Singapore telegram 454.

As regards (b) Sir Geofroy Tory has pointed out that though this summary accurately records what the Tunku did say it probably gives the wrong impression. Mr. Ghazali has specifically confirmed that this is so. What the Tunku was trying to say was that in a major war the Singapore base could easily be put out of action and that the Tunku thought it would therefore be unrealistic to reckon on its use in these circumstances. Mr. Ghazali thinks, and Sir Geofroy Tory agrees with him that these impromptu remarks by the Tunku ought not to be taken too seriously. The more significant pointer to the Tunku's thinking is the carefully prepared passage in his opening speech on the recent debate beginning with the words "In particular I feel that they are most anxious about the question of the continued use of the important base in Singapore ..." (Kuala Lumpur telegram No. 780 to Commonwealth Relations Office, copies of which were sent you on the 17th October).

As I think you know, the Tunku's visit to Britain has been postponed and the talks are now due to begin on 20th November. The Tunku proposes to be accompanied by Tun Razak, Dr. Ismail, Tan Siew Sin (as a Chinese rather than as Finance Minister), Mr. Ghazali and Nik Hassan, his private secretary.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures, to Mr. Blakeney in External Affairs.

*Yours sincerely*  
*J. A. Molyneux*

(J. A. MOLYNEUX)

23 NOV 1961

*Copy Refuse*  
*DRS*  
A. T. Griffith, Esq.,  
Prime Minister's Department,  
CANBERRA. A. C. T.

SECRET



To: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations  
 From: British High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur  
 Number: 790 Despatched: 1018 GMT 19th October, 1961.  
 Repeated: British Commissioner-General for  
 South East Asia, Singapore. Number: 48  
 British Commissioner, Singapore. Number: 9  
 His Excellency the Governor, Number: 8  
 Sarawak. Number: 8  
 His Excellency the Governor, Number: 8  
 North Borneo. Number: 8  
 British High Commissioner, Brunei. Number: 8  
 British High Commissioner, Number: 42  
 Canberra. Number: 43  
 British High Commissioner, Number: 144M  
 Wellington. Number: 144M  
 Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Number: 144M  
 Washington. Number: 144M

Saving

UNCLASSIFIEDPRIORITY

My telegram number 784.

MALAYSIA

After three days debate motion was carried by voice vote on evening of 18th October.

2. Main opposition came from Pan Malayan Islamic Party who opposed union of Malaya, Singapore and Borneo Territories on grounds that Malaysia should include whole Malay archipelago, including Indonesia, Philippines and other islands. They claimed that Malay rights enshrined in Federation Constitution would be fatally weakened by form of Malaysia proposed by Tunku. Malays would be swamped by Chinese and would not receive preferential treatment in Singapore. Presence of Chinese Communists in Singapore was not reason for incorporating them in Federation but on contrary very strong reason for excluding them.

3. Socialist Front welcomed concept of Malaysia in principle but quarrelled with proposed form. There should be full and complete merger with Singapore and Singapore citizens should have equal rights with people of Federation. Malaya must not be dragged into military bloc and must not be used by Britain and West for their own purposes. Malaya must have full control of bases.

4. Peoples Progressive Party also advocated full merger with Singapore since anything less would be unacceptable to people of Singapore. Extension of control by Federation Government over internal security in Singapore through Internal Security Ordinance would lead to unrest and possible violent clash.

5. Speakers on Government benches confined themselves to general principles without going into much detail on form Malaysia should take. There were acrimonious exchanges particularly between P.M.I.P. and Government benches, P.M.I.P. speakers becoming so heated in defence of special position of Malays that Speaker on several occasions had to pull them up under standing orders reminding them to avoid expressions which could incite illwill or hostility between races.

6. Tunku made winding-up speech for Government in which he dealt with number of opposition criticisms:

/(a) ...



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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Number: 790

Despatched: 1018 GMT 19th October, 1961.

UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY

- (a) Any P.M.I.P. move to bring in whole Malay archipelago might cause embarrassment to Governments of Indonesia and Philippines.
- (b) He deplored attacks on Lee Kuan Yew who was not there to defend himself. He was sure that Lee would reply in kind. Tunku's conversion to Malaysia was not due to persuasion of Lee. Malaysia had previously been discussed both with Lim Yew Hock and David Marshall but circumstances were different then. Lee's fears were not without foundation; Lee believed his opponents were Communists.
- (c) Federation Government felt it inadvisable to impose their Education Policy on Singapore. At later stage Education in Singapore might be brought into line.
- (d) D.R. Seenivasagam had said that denial of equal rights to Singapore citizens would lead to frustration and even war. If it came to that, Singapore would stand no chance against Federation who would meet force with force. War was more likely to come if Singapore were allowed to go one way and Federation the other; not only Malaysians would be involved but outside intervening powers.
- (e) Ulster arrangement would be workable. It worked with Northern Ireland despite separation from Great Britain by Irish Sea.
- (f) On internal security he said that it had been alleged that Federation would come in as policeman into Singapore. Federation Government was not lavish in use of Internal Security Ordinance and was very selective in choosing those to be detained. After merger it would not be Federation policy to arrest opponents of Lee Kuan Yew unless they were Communists threatening security of country. Dr. Ismail would not hesitate to rope in Communists. Every man was free to hold his own opinions but Federation were afraid that Communists in carrying ideals into practice might use force destructive of peace and happiness of country. In Malaya there were thousands who believed in Communism and they were not victimised; hundreds of them had been given jobs.
- (g) He denied that Malaysia had come to forefront after P.A.P. defeats in two by-elections. Lee Kuan Yew had always advocated independence through merger, even before by-elections. By-elections were unimportant; what mattered were general elections. Lee Kuan Yew had not lost his mandate. Tunku had not been persuaded to prop Lee up; he had enough of his own troubles. Aspect in Singapore was threatening and question was how to avoid disaster there after independence.
- (h) He denied that he had said that all opponents of Malaysia proposals were Communists. What he did say was that they were following same line. Members opposite had not opposed concept of Malaysia, only form of merger with Singapore.

/(i) ...



OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Number: 790

Despatched: 1018 GMT 19th October, 1961.

UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY

- (i) Little had been said about Borneo Territories. All were agreed on union with Territories so that they might achieve early independence. All those who had visited Federation from Territories had gone back fully prepared to back Malaysia plan. Others in Territories were still in doubt but their minds were conditioned by imperialism and it was difficult for them to change thinking overnight. These people had lost confidence in themselves and feared Malaysia; they trusted their white rulers. British Government had welcomed Malaysia proposals and if British in Territories commended Plan to people, they would accept without giving it much thought.
- (j) Seenivasagam had said that freedom of speech in Malaya was restricted; yet Seenivasagam had been free to say what he liked in elections and had not been arrested although he had been on list for two or three years. (laughter). He denied Seenivasagam's suggestions that there was more freedom in Singapore and Borneo Territories under British. In Malaya fundamental liberties were guaranteed by Constitution.
- (k) Opposition members had said merger must be complete. There was inconsistency in their minds. They suggested Federation should have no control of internal security in Singapore and yet they advocated complete merger with Singapore which would include internal security. Question whether Lim Chin Siong would be allowed to stand in election in Federation would have to be left for working party, as also question of autonomy for Singapore in labour and education.
- (l) There was no proposal to form military bloc between Malaysia and Western bloc after fashion of S.E.A.T.O. Malaya was already in a military alliance under Defence Treaty with Britain. Malaya was satisfied with Treaty and did not intend to go further.
- (m) He had never deceived people. When he saw danger looming ahead, it was his duty to warn of such danger and to plan ways of avoiding it or of fighting it when it was beyond control. He saw sign of things to come clearly. Picture presented in his opening speech was gloomy but picture of the future was terrifying. P.M.I.P. feared Chinese but it was not Chinese they had to fear but enemy who would destroy country. Communal trouble had occurred in Malaya but its effects were transient. Malaya and Singapore had been divided into two thus making way for penetration by Malaya's enemies. Communists must be prevented from dominating country.

7. Fuller summary of debate follows by bag.

CM



9  
K. 53/128/1

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

To: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations  
From: British High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur  
Number: 177 Despatched: 20th October, 1961.  
Repeated: British Commissioner-General for South East Asia,  
SINGAPORE Number: 49  
British Commissioner,  
SINGAPORE Number: 10  
His Excellency the Governor,  
SARAWAK Number: 9  
His Excellency the Governor,  
NORTH BORNEO Number: 9  
British High Commissioner,  
BRUNEI Number: 9  
British High Commissioner,  
CANBERRA Number: 43  
British High Commissioner,  
WELLINGTON Number: 44

UNCLASSIFIED

My telegram No. 790.

MALAYSIA - PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE

A. ALLIANCE

Tan Siew Sin, Minister of Finance said it was clear Singapore required different treatment from eleven States in Federation. Central Government must have sufficient powers in reserve so that if any State Government should pursue policy affecting economic stability of whole country, it could cope with such policies effectively. This did not mean that Singapore would not get financial autonomy. Federation Government had no intention to interfere with Singapore's own housekeeping.

2. Tun Leong Yew Koh, Minister of Justice said original link of common racial stock, added to from different parts of Asia, had been reinforced by artificial link imposed by colonial masters. English common law was basis on which about 800,000,000 people governed themselves in a spirit of liberty. Federation and Borneo Territories had best system of administration yet devised. Federation must be prepared to give freely to less fortunate associates. The Federation was not sponsoring new regime to feather its own nest. Federation had received independence on a golden plate; he was confident Borneo Territories would do so too.

3. Many Ministers and Assistant Ministers intervened in debate but they did not add very much to what Tunku had to say in his opening speech. Contribution of Dr. Ismail, Minister of the Interior, was more substantial. He said that P.M.I.P. were afraid of everything. They were afraid that Chinese would overwhelm Malays. Dr. Ismail pointed out that in Kelantan and Trengganu, the two States governed by the P.M.I.P., Malays were more backward than Malays who were living in West Coast States among Chinese. In Malaysia, Malays would make great advances. He repudiated their negative and fearful approach to merger with Singapore. The P.P.P., whose policy /was...



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OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

Number: 177

Despatched: 20th October, 1961.

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- 2 -

was equality for all races without regard to circumstances of country, were getting nowhere in Federation and were adopting dog-in-the-manger attitude towards Malaysia. He denied accusation of Karam Singh that he would persecute his opponents - he would persecute only Communists. He asked whether Socialist Front was tooing line of a particular party in Singapore (Barisan Socialis).

4. Dr. Ismail said that basis of culture of Malaysia would be Malay. Malays were here first and other races had come to trade and then to settle. They too had contributed to Malay culture, both in Federation and Borneo Territories. On question of equality of races, he said that, under centuries of British colonial rule, Malays had suffered in competition with immigrant races. They had to be given certain rights in Constitution, in the same way as in a golf match a weaker player was given a handicap. (He referred at this point to the Tunku's handicap of 24 and the speaker interjected that the Tunku hated it (laughter)). The same principle, Dr. Ismail said, must be applied in the Borneo Territories. The talk of equality was merely a political stunt. Malay language would be not merely national language of Malaysia, but language of South-East Asia. Non-Malays could not claim equal treatment for other languages without making a mockery of acceptance of Malay as national language. Other races must be ready to make sacrifices in order to make one united nation.

5. On subject of democracy, Dr. Ismail said that Alliance would like to see democratic form of Government in Malaysia. He denounced Communist one-party system. He said Alliance would see that the Communists did not subvert true democracy. If democracy was to survive in this part of world it must be ready to fight for itself. Government were anti-Communist and would fight back. He said that he would continue to put Communists in detention camps however many of them there were.

B. SOCIALIST FRONT

6. Lim Kean Siew, Secretary General of Socialist Front, said his party supported motion in principle although he did not agree with details as revealed by Lee Kuan Yew. He contrasted Tunku's calm presentation with Lee Kuan Yew's hysterical campaign to smear as Communists all those who disagreed with him. Borneo Territories must have self-government and come in as equals. Their peoples must decide for themselves. They should have protection for certain things like immigration and special rights. Referring to fears that Chinese might swamp Malaya, he said the question of races should not interfere with decision on Malaysia. He held up U.A.R. split as warning of what might happen in this country. He opposed retention by Singapore of control over education and labour. What would happen if Borneo Territories had their own education system as well? People would start demanding similar rights in Federation, for instance in Penang where Dr. Lim Cheong Eu (former M.C.A. President) had already made such suggestion. He attacked concept of separate citizenship for Singapore and Federation. He cited case of Said Zahari, former editor of Utusan Melayu, who was barred from coming back into Federation because he was Singapore citizen. Federation would be accused of giving Singapore people second class citizenship. There must be full merger and, while certain rights could be retained by States, on national policies there must be nothing but Federal policy. There must be national integration with one policy on /labour



OUTWARD SAVINGHAM

Number: 177

Despatched: 20th October, 1961.

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labour and education, one national language and Islam as the national religion. If full merger were not possible, then he proposed a Commonwealth idea, with a culture on Malaysian pattern, and Malaysia court of appeal in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia must be entirely independent and neutral. It must not be used as aircraft-carrier for any country. If there were to be bases, these must be under control of Federal Government.

7. Ahmed Boestaman, Chairman of Parti Melayu, Malay component of Socialist Front, said he would support a Greater Malaysia including all islands in Malay archipelago (Indonesia and Philippines), but would not support a Malaysia formed as challenge to Indonesia. If Singapore merged with Malaya it should do so as full unit, and Singapore citizens should have same rights as people of Federation. There should be no local autonomy, otherwise other States, including the P.M.I.P. - controlled States of Kelantan and Trengganu as well as Penang, would want same treatment. Peoples of Borneo must make up their own mind whether they wanted Malaysia or not; at present they had no elected representatives and Federation Government should encourage British to let them have elections very soon.

8. Mr. Karam Singh, a young extremist Socialist Front member, said that Alliance Government posed a threat to people of Singapore by their proposed extension to Singapore of Internal Security Ordinance. Dr. Ismail, Minister of Interior and Internal Security, would persecute opponents of Alliance in Singapore. British colonialists found that peoples of the Borneo Territories and Singapore demanded independence; Britain wanted to use Malaya to do its own dirty work. There should be no repetition of the Congo, where black was sent to fight black. The British must not be allowed to make Malaysians fight their brothers who only wanted independence - "Never trust the British". British still desired to dominate South East Asia and whereas their purpose had previously been to divide and rule, now through Malaysia it was to unite and rule. He asked what independence for Malaya meant when Malaya's rubber and tin were still mainly in British hands, and whether under Malaysia, Bornean oil would be property of people of Borneo. Independence, he said, made no sense if economic heart was in London. Tunku had said that people of Singapore, if they achieved independence on their own, would drift into the Communist camp. But might they not adopt neutralism? If Singapore were denied full merger with Federation, they would only have one choice - independence.

9. V. David, ex detainee, said Britain wanted to keep Borneo Territories out of hands of Indonesia, in order to protect her economic interests. Western powers wished to see destruction of Indonesia. Tunku had said SEATO bases in Singapore would be removed, but Socialist Front did not know how far he meant it. Danger existed of Malaysia being dragged into cold war.

C. PAN-MALAYAN ISLAMIC PARTY

10. Dr. Burhanuddin, Chairman of P.M.I.P. main opposition party in House, supported idea of assisting other Territories to gain independence by joining Malaysia. He described history of nationalist movements which since before second world war had sought to liberate whole of South East Asia from colonial rule. He moved amendment to Tunku's resolution which would have added Indonesia, Philippines and other islands in Malay archipelago to territories /to be...



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OUTWARD SAVINGHAM

Number: 177.

Despatched: 20th October, 1961.

UNCLASSIFIED

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to be comprised in Malaysia. Speaker rejected amendment on procedural grounds. Although amendment was not admitted, much time was spent on it, UNMO members accusing P.M.I.P. of day-dreaming.

11. Zulkiflee Mohd., Deputy Leader of P.M.I.P., said his party could not support Tunku's plan as it was contrary to needs of Malaya, especially with regard to Malays. Federation had constitution which recognised special position of Malays. Tunku had been misled by Lee Kuan Yew who was only interested in getting what would benefit Singapore, no matter the damage to Malaya; he even wanted autonomy in education and labour, yet Lee Kuan Yew would not grant the same rights to Malays in Singapore as they enjoyed in Federation. Merger with Singapore might bring ruin to Malays. P.M.I.P. supported principle of full independence for Borneo Territories.

12. Othman bin Abdullah, P.M.I.P., who spoke with passion and arm-waving, said that his party felt no enmity towards other races as had been alleged in debate. They had no quarrel with those Chinese or others who had made Malaya object of their loyalty. If Sambanthan, Minister of works, accused P.M.I.P. of introducing racialism into politics, let him take off his own dhoti (Sambanthan, President of Malayan Indian Congress habitually wears a dhoti).

13. He asked why Lee Kuan Yew had not got rid of known Communists earlier and why he now came running to Tunku for help. He agreed that greatest enemy of Islam was Communism but this could only thrive among a certain section of the people; the same was true with Islam. As the Tunku had said in his speech, there were different sorts of Chinese in Singapore, not all of them loyal to Malaya. Singapore had been separated from Malaya by politics, and Communist ideology in Singapore had grown into danger to Federation. Education Policy of Federation, which would have only Malay as medium of instruction in 1967, was designed to achieve one united nation. If Singapore had its own Education Policy this would perpetuate racialism. Communist ideology would spread through Singapore education system. Would Education Minister be able to close Nanyang University, he asked? Minister of Transport (Sardon) had said that U.M.N.O. would stand up for rights of Malays, but what had Minister done about it? At this point Othman was shaking his fists and raising his voice when Speaker pulled him up and warned him against inciting racial illwill.

14. Several P.M.I.P. members spoke on similar lines to Dr. Burhanuddin and Zulkiflee. They opposed Malaysia since it would not adequately safeguard interests of Malays. In Malaysia there would be more non-Malays than Malays and they should secure their position. They regarded presence of Communists in Singapore as a reason for not admitting Singapore to Federation. One speaker repeated charge that independence gained by Malaya in 1957 was "empty" - a reference to alleged Western domination of Malaya, economically, politically and militarily.

D. PEOPLE'S PROGRESSIVE PARTY

15. D.R. Seenivasagam, Secretary General of P.P.P. said reasons given by Tunku, why the 70% Chinese population of Singapore would not accept principles accepted in Federation, were still valid.

/question



OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

Number: 177.

Despatched: 20th October, 1961.

UNCLASSIFIED

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question of merger had suddenly come into limelight after loss by P.A.P. of two by-elections. Lee Kuan Yew no longer had mandate from Singapore people; he was like man clutching at straw; everyone who was not for him was Communist. It was dangerous to accept views of Lee as those of majority of people of Singapore. If there was to be merger it must be full and complete merger. Government in Singapore would change and then there would be an explosion. For the moment he did not think that full merger was possible since he was convinced Alliance was not prepared to amend Constitution to make it possible. Lee Kuan Yew needed someone to prop him up and it appeared that Malaya was going to act as policeman over Singapore.

16. Seenivasagam said that in Federation fundamental freedoms were curtailed. He agreed with Tunku that views of all parties and organisations should be taken into account, but when these views were expressed, people had been branded Communist or Communist-sympathisers. If merger led to denial of rights to people of Singapore which they enjoyed now, there would be an explosion, even war. Discredited leaders of Singapore were trying to mortgage their country to Federation by agreeing to merger. People of Singapore would be enslaving themselves. There should be complete merger or nothing at all. Under Tunku's scheme, Singapore would be like an unwanted child. If Federation controlled internal security, rights and aspirations of people of Singapore would be suppressed. He called for a meeting of all leaders in the territories concerned to discuss problem. In Singapore there should be general election, since Lee Kuan Yew had lost his mandate.

17. S.P. Seenivasagam, brother of D.A., spoke in similar vein later in the debate. He asked whether Singapore citizens after merger would have freedom of speech and movement, and whether they would be allowed to vote in Federation. If not, the people of Singapore should be told so plainly. Singapore could not enjoy autonomy in education and labour while Federation controlled internal security. There should be either full and complete merger or some kind of link in form of Confederation, with Federal Government controlling external affairs and defence.

/JW



4

C O P Y

United Kingdom Commissioner  
Singapore.

UNCLASSIFIED TELEGRAM

FROM UNITED KINGDOM COMMISSIONER SINGAPORE  
TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES - 450  
REPEATED TO UNITED KINGDOM HIGH COMMISSIONER KUALA LUMPUR - 174

CANBERRA NORTH BORNEO BRUNEI } M.415 BY BAG  
WELLINGTON SARAWAK

Dated 24.10.61

EN CLAIR

Despatched 24.10.61  
(1740 hrs)

PRIORITY

Following is summary of press conference given by  
Tengku at Singapore Airport today during stop en route to Vietnam.

The Federation Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, indicated here today that in next month's merger talks with the British Government, the British would be told that they would be allowed to continue using their Singapore bases, but only on a peacetime basis.

The Tengku was talking to reporters at the airport in between planes before leaving for Saigon for a three-day official visit.

He was asked whether the Malayan Government would continue the use of the Singapore bases in case the British Government decided to relinquish their hold on them.

The Tengku said: "The point is, Singapore can never be used in time of war as a base of operations. It will be too cruel .... a few bombs will destroy the whole city."

He added, however, that the bases could continue to be used for training, exercises and repair purposes.

"I cannot imagine, for myself, that Singapore would not be vulnerable in defence in the event of an attack. Therefore, I think Singapore as a base for that purpose would be wrong," he said.

On the future of the local civilian employees in these bases, the Tengku pointed out that the bases would continue to be there as "I don't think there has been any intention on our part to disallow the use of Singapore as a base for the purposes it is being used today."

What he was talking about, he reiterated, was whether Singapore could be used as a base of operations in the event of a war.

In any case, he added with a smile, there would be no worry about labour in the event of war because the people would not go to work.

He rounded up the question on the base by declaring that "if my government were to use it (the Singapore bases) for war purposes, it will be committing an act of absolute brutality and

/atrocities



atrocities against the people of Singapore."

On his visit to Vietnam, the Tengku said he had \$30,000 in his pocket for the relief of Vietnamese flood victims.

His trip was the result of a very long standing invitation from the Vietnamese which he was unable to take up before.

He pointed out that the war in Vietnam was different from the Malayan Emergency in that the Malayan war was a "battle of hide-and-seek" while in Vietnam, thousands of men were deployed by both sides.

He thought the only way Malaya could be of help was by "giving moral support and also to assure them that we are watching the situation there, and if there is anything we can do in our own little way to help, we will do so."

Both Vietnam and Malaya, he said, were faced with the same common enemy out to destroy the established way of life and constitution.

The enemy was also out to set up a Communist State and "if anything happens in Vietnam, it will have quite serious repercussions in this part of the world," the Tengku said.

Asked for his views on the sending of American troops to Vietnam the Tengku said the Americans felt duty bound to help Vietnam and if there was imminent danger of aggression then it was their duty to send whatever help might be necessary to minimise the danger.

Asked if Malaya was sending material aid to Vietnam, the Tengku said that "we have nothing very much ourselves but the little we have we will be very happy to give."

He said that though the two countries were not bound by treaties like SEATO, yet they were bound by a common understanding and a fear of a common enemy.

Going back to the merger talks with Britain next month, the Tengku said it would not be fair to say more than what had already been said on the matter.

He disclosed however, that he and his party would be taking working papers to the London talks, which would not be an ultimatum but a mere discussion.

Asked what form the London talks would take, the Tengku said he did not know but if it took the same form and ran the same way as the discussions on Merdeka, there would be a very happy beginning and a very happy ending.

When it was suggested that he might be making special provisions for the future citizenship, the Tengku said that this was part of the working paper and it would not be fair to comment on it.

The Tengku felt the merger talks would take a week and he would take another week to "enjoy myself and to rest."

. . . . .



C O P Y

2

United Kingdom Commissioner  
Singapore.

UNCLASSIFIED TELEGRAM

FROM UNITED KINGDOM COMMISSIONER SINGAPORE  
TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES - 454

BY BAG TO: U.K.H.C. KUALA LUMPUR - 176  
U.K.H.C. WELLINGTON  
U.K.H.C. CANBERRA }  
GOVERNOR N. BORNEO. SARAWAK. } M.418  
HIGH COMMISSIONER BRUNEI }

EN CLAIR

Dated 26.10.61  
Despatched 26.10.61 (1800 hrs.)

GREATER MALAYSIA

Following are main points in recorded Press conference with Lee Kuan Yew broadcast here yesterday.

2. He said considerable amount of work had been done on administrative and legal arrangements for merger and that Joint Working Party was at present meeting in Kuala Lumpur. One of questions for discussion was whether Singapore should continue to have its own judicial and legal services and if so, what should be the relationship with the Federal judiciary.

3. Statement by Federation Finance Minister in Parliament on 16th October made it clear that, in principle, Singapore would carry out its own domestic financial arrangements. Lee instanced deficit budgeting as the sort of matter in which Singapore would be subject to checks to ensure that overall Federal economy was not affected.

4. As to the bases, Lee said that the British must agree to convert sovereign rights to treaty rights, and that these treaty rights were for the Federal and British Governments to settle. The Tengku had made it clear that after merger he would be happy to have the workshops continue running and Lee said he had himself made it clear that if the British decided to abandon their bases they would be asked to do it in stages over a period of 10 to 15 years. If the bases closed down at once, 40,000 Singapore people would be unemployed.

5. As regards citizenship, Lee said that Singapore and Federation laws were quite different, and those who demanded automatic conversion of existing Singapore citizens into Federal citizens should ask their friends in the Federal Parliament to sponsor a resolution to this effect. He wondered if they would have the courage to do so and to face the reaction in the Federation. To grant this would be to treat Singapore better than Penang or Malacca, which had to abide by the Federation laws. If the Federation Government agreed to automatic Federal citizenship for all Singapore citizens it would also have to change the citizenship laws for the whole of the Federation.

6. Lee went on to reiterate the point that all Singapore citizens would be equal to Federal citizens by being Federal nationals. The only difference would be that one would vote and enjoy state rights in Singapore, whereas the other would vote and enjoy state rights in the Federation. As the Tengku had said, such an arrangement did not render one citizenship inferior to the other. If a Singapore  
/citizen



citizen went to live in the Federation, there was nothing to prevent him from applying for Federal citizenship if he was qualified.

7. Questioned about Malaysia, Lee said his impression was that the leaders in the Borneo territories all understood that getting together was vital for their survival, and he instanced Kuwait as an example of the trouble that might face Brunei if it were to become independent alone. There were obviously problems involved, such as control of immigration into the Borneo territories, and these would be thrashed out in Kuching at the next meeting of the Solidarity Consultative Committee.

8. Lee said there was no need for him to join the Tengku in the London talks. One reason for going to London was to settle the question of the bases, and Lee had no doubt that the Tengku could come to good and reasonable arrangements with Britain. Lee said there was a chorus of requests from certain Opposition members in Singapore who wanted to go to London. He had replied that if they wanted to meet the Colonial Secretary he would arrange it for them.

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